

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JULY AND OCTOBER, 1921.

THE MSS. OF CALLIMACHVS' HYMNS.

(Concluded.)

VI. THE LACUNAE OF *x*.

THUS far, discarding such manuscripts as are copies of printed editions, we have arrived at the following grouping :

1. The group *x* (= *ABCK*), in which *K* is a copy of *A*, and *B* of *C*, while *A* and *C* are brothers, the former being only slightly superior to the latter.

2. *SQq*. Here *Q* is a copy of *S*, whose borrowings from Politian it incorporated. *Q* added some readings from *C* or *K*, and scholia and other readings from a manuscript of the *Ee* stock; and after *Q* had received these additions, *q* was in turn copied from *Q*.

3. *IID*. Mr. Allen¹ thinks it possible that, for the *Homeric Hymns*, these two are not direct copies of the same manuscript; and his conclusions may be accepted as indicating their mutual kinship in regard to Callimachus also. *D*'s lost Callimachean portion gave some readings to Politian's text of *Hymn V.*, and is in part represented by J. Lascaris' *editio princeps* of all six *Hymns*.

4. *Ee*, found to be brothers.

5. The group *z* (= *FAtGHAIBr*). Here *At* appears to be a brother of *F*; and *F* stands apart from the *z*² section (= *GHAIBr*), being nearer than they to *zSIIDEe*. Among the *z*² manuscripts, *Br* is a copy of *I*, which is itself separated from *GHAI*; this trio seem, on the imperfect evidence at hand, to be brothers.


Most of the instances of omission of lines, words, or parts of words from *ABCK* remain to be considered;² and their investigation will not only confirm the results just restated, but also enable us to discover how *AC* are related to *S* and to *IID*, and how all these five stand to *Ee* and to the *z* group. For the sake of clearness I shall state the results of this further investigation before I discuss the evidence. But, first, a *stemma* must be given; it necessarily lacks finality as regards the comparative distances of manuscripts from a common source.

¹ *J.H.S.* XV. (1895), p. 164.

² Some unimportant omissions, occurring only

in *ABCK*, have been dealt with already (*C.Q.*,

1920, pp. 14-15).



The results are as follows :

1. The *x* group and *S* had a common ancestor (*y*³: see especially II. 27; V. 78, 131, 139; VI. 118); but *AC*, and consequently *BK* also, represent a more damaged condition of the ancestral text than does *S* (see VI. 21; all the cases below 'where *cett.* give a full text'; and VI. 10-13).

2. For Callimachus, as for the *Homeric Hymns*,¹ *S* and *IID* are descended from one and the same source (*y*¹: see especially VI. 15, 17, 86), *IID* presenting sometimes a full text where *S* and *AC* are defective (see II. 27; V. 131, 139; VI. 21), while at other times *II* seems to owe its greater fulness to *y*⁴'s contamination with some text, now lost, that was descended from neither *y*¹ nor *y*² (see V. 128, 136; perhaps there was contamination also at IV. 255; V. 78; VI. 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 22), and that was fuller even than *z* at VI. 23. Its reading in this last passage seeming explicable on other grounds, I regard the contaminator as a member of the *z* group.

3. Going further back on the genealogy, we find that *Ee* must be ultimately sprung from an ancestor (*y*) from which *ACSIIID* also are descended (see V. 128; VI. 86, 118; and perhaps VI. 17, 119); but *Ee*, presenting in places a better or more complete text than some or all of them (see IV. 255; V. 78, 131, 136, 139; VI. 18, 21-2; and perhaps VI. 15), are further apart from these other manuscripts than the latter are from each other.²

Thus we have now a *y* group, embracing the *x* group together with *SQqIIIDEe*.

4. The *z* group, while it is descended from an archetype common to it and this *y* group (as witness the lacunae in them all at IV. 177, 178, 200, 201; V. 136; and VI. 23), yet differs notably from the *y* manuscripts, not only in the details already noticed (pp. 62-6 above), but also in presenting a less defective text than they at V. 136 (and *F*, though not quite *z*², is full at VI. 10-13), and a complete text in all the other passages cited below.

¹ See T. W. Allen in *J.H.S.* XV. (1895), among the 'Parisini,' while *T*, *II*, and *L* (our *S*, *II*, *D*) belong to Mr. Allen's *x* group (*J.H.S.* pp. 161-4).

² For 'Homer' *A* and *Q* (our *E* and *e*) are *XV. 1895*, pp. 174-7 and 146 sqq.).

Now
(i.) C
or probab

II. 27

The c

IV. 2

οὐκέτ' ἦσα

ἀεισαν δ

Probab

having re

unaugme

to *y*⁴; or

of ἐπίγειο

V. 128 be

V. 78

Politian a

Evide

of which I

that *y*⁹ al

θεμιτά; in

plural of

complete

conjecture

θεμιτ,

or θεμιτ'

paralleled

purely as

for the ch

a precedin

bar the w

(a) I

this text,

show a fu

(β) I

is the onl

that cont

descendan

extant z n

108:

128 8

¹ Except
manuscripts,
dicate their
Politian's re

Now for the lacunae which constitute the evidence for these conclusions:¹

(i.) Omissions from *ABCK*, where some other manuscripts, too, are or probably were lacunose:

II. 27 omitted, without leaving a space, by *ABCKSQq*: occurs in *IIDez*.²

The omission, due to *homoeographon* with l. 26, goes back to *y*³.

IV. 255 οὐκέτι . . . δ' *ABCK*: οὐκέτι ἔβησαν ὁ δ' *SQ* (? ἔφησαν *q*): οὐκέτι ἤεισαν ὁ δ' *Π*; οὐκ ἔτι ἤεισαν ὁ δ' *D*: οὐκ ἔτι (*sic*) ἤεισαν ὁ δ' *Ee*: οὐκέτι ἤεισαν ὁ δ' (*οὐκ ἔτι* *H*) *z*.

Probably *y*³ had οὐκέτι . . . δ' *δ*, *y*⁵ or *x* completing the adverb, and *y*⁶ having recourse to conjecture, helped by l. 250. As for *IID*, either the unaugmented verb form, faithfully retained in *Eez*, proved a stumbling-block to *y*⁴; or the lacuna goes back to *y*¹, *y*⁴ conjecturing *ἤεισαν* with the aid of *ἔπηεισαν* (l. 251), or relying on a manuscript outside the *y* group (see on V. 128 below).

V. 78, the last word omitted by *ABCKQq* and (at first) *S*: θέμιδες *IID* Politian and (by addition) *S*: θεμιτ (*sic*) *e*: θεμιτά *Ez*.

Evidently *y*³ lacked the word; *S* borrowed Politian's reading, *Q*'s rejection of which I have explained (*C.Q.* 1920, p. 65). In view of *e*'s reading, I fancy that *y*⁹ also had θεμιτ, the scribe of *E*, a clever emendator, completing it to θεμιτά; indeed, θεμιτ may go as far back as *y*, θέμιδες being an ill-conceived plural of θέμις, created by *y*⁴ or its contaminator (see on l. 128 below) to complete the line here. *z* either inherited θεμιτά or, if θεμιτ was archetypal, conjectured it.

θεμιτ, if archetypal, may have arisen from the curtailment of either θεμιτά or θεμιτ' ἡς; in the latter case *sc. ldeiw*, as with Brunck's θέμις ἡς, which is paralleled by *Il. XI.* 779, and Hesiod, *Shield*, 22. *y*⁴'s θέμιδες could, regarded purely as to form, be the resultant of an earlier θέμις ἡς (or even θεμιτ' ἡς); for the change from ἡς to ες is paralleled at VI. 37 (*ἡς ed. pr., ες II*), and a preceding ligatured σ could have become δ. But then difficulties of inheritance bar the way:

(a) If θέμιδες is native to *y*⁴, why does no other descendant of *y* give us this text, or its original involving ἡς, especially as *Ee* elsewhere often enough show a fuller text than any descendant of *y*¹?

(β) If the contaminator of *y*⁴ had θέμιδες from an ancestor's θέμις ἡς, this is the only passage (except VI. 23, explained later on other grounds) where that contaminator had a text irreconcilable with the belief that it was a descendant of *z*, though one less complete at some of *x*'s lacunae than are the extant *z* manuscripts.

108: see below.

128 δωσῶ καὶ βιότῳ τέρμα (or the like) omitted, *ABCK* and *Ee*: so at

¹ Except where the contrary is stated, all manuscripts, in the passages cited below, indicate their omissions by leaving a blank space. Politian's readings are given as in his first

edition (1489).

² Where *ed. pr.* agrees with *II* I call it *D*; where it follows *I*, or gives a reading not found in either *II* or *I*, I style it 'Lascaris.'

first *SQ*, but *S* adds later δωσῶ δὲ βιότου τέρμα, and alters δὲ still later to καὶ, while *Q* writes δωσῶ καὶ βιότου τέρμα differently from the context (see *C.Q.* 1920, p. 71): δωσῶ δὲ βοιωτοῦ τέρμα II, δωσῶ δὲ βιότου τέρμα *q* Politian *H*: δωσῶ καὶ βιότου τέρμα *z* (except *H*) and Lascaris.

I think *y* must have omitted all four words. For, as *S* drew here on Politian, while Lascaris followed *I*, we have here the remarkable occurrence of *II*'s showing a fuller text than the other *y* copies, whereas elsewhere (V. 136 *ad init.*; VI. 18, 22; and perhaps VI. 15) *Ee* come nearest to the completeness shown by *z*. Such a phenomenon occurs again in *II*, Politian, and *D* at V. 136 *ad fin.*; and at VI. 23 *II* and *D* even transcend *z* in fulness. I can only surmise that here and at V. 136 *ad fin.* (and perhaps at IV. 255; V. 78; and VI. 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 22) *y*⁴ drew on some manuscript, now lost, that did not belong to the *y* group but, if my explanation of VI. 23 on other grounds is accepted, was a member of the *z* family.¹ For the vagaries of *S* and *Q* here, and the δέ of *QqII* Politian *H*, see *C.Q.* 1920, p. 71.

V. 131 φαμένα omitted (after ὡς, ὢς, or ὁς) by *ABCK*, and at first by *S*, which adds it later: *Q* adds ὢς φάμενα (*sic*) in lighter ink: ὢς (or ὢς) φαμένα normally, *qIID* Politian *EeF*: ὢς (or ὢς) φαμένη *z*².

*y*³ evidently lacked φαμένα, which *S* got from Politian. *Q* probably got φάμενα from *S*, ὢς from *C* or *K* (see *C.Q.* 1920, pp. 71-2). If *S*'s ὡς is due to Politian and not to *y*⁶, this is one of the very few passages in which *y*⁶ showed a more damaged text than did *x*.

136 is blank in *ABCKq*, and was so originally in *S*, where, however, θυγάτηρ *ad fin.* was added later from Politian: only θυγάτηρ *Q* (by addition from *S*) and *IID* Politian: only ψευ (*ad init.*) *Ee*: ψεύδεα . . . ἀ θυγάτηρ *z* (*ai z*²).

Probably *y* lacked θυγάτηρ, but had ψευ, which *y*¹ would appear to have discarded as hopeless. θυγάτηρ, if missing from *y*, must have reached *IID* by contamination of *y*⁴ (see on l. 128 above).

139 *ad fin.*, only σύν *ABC*, σύν *K*: σύν τ' *S*, adding ὀλολυγαῖς later from Politian, σύν τ' . . . ΓΜσ (*sic*) *Q* (the fragment added from *S*), σύν τ' *q*: σύν τ' ὀλολυγαῖς *IID* Politian *Ez*, σύν τ' ὀλολυγὲς *e*.

Probably *y*³'s σύν τ' had dwindled to σύν by *x*'s time; for *x*, as I shall

¹ The initial lacuna of *y* here is answered by a final one in VI. 15 (if *y*⁹ took χοροφ there from the scholium), at an interval of 31 lines (= 29 of text+2 for the title of VI.). From the archetype's having had defects, at the same interval from each other, in V. 136 and VI. 23 (if it lacked ιβέσθαι), we could infer that its pages were of 31 lines each, and that *z*, whose descendants are complete at V. 128 and VI. 15, was copied before, and *y* after, the damage there was incurred by the archetype—an inference which gives some support to a suggestion of Wilamowitz (*Praef.*, p. 15: 'si quis statuere,' etc.). The archetype also showed correspondence in defect

at an interval of 23 lines (IV. 177-8 and 200-1)—perhaps an inheritance from an ancestor which had had 23 lines to the page.

For 31 lines in each page of *y*³, compare V. 108 with 139; and for 30 in each of *x*, IV. 224-5 with V. 107-8 (209 lines of text+1 for the title of VI. = 210 = 30 × 7). This last case points to a binding in quaternions; and I suggest that IV. 224-5 stood on the recto of the first folio of the quaternion and V. 107-8 on the verso of the last, and that the stain reached the last through this outside sheet's being at some time folded the reverse way.

show (foot
y², and *z*,
as there is

VI. 1

15 τρ

Only
contextua
τρίς δ' ἐπί
(ἐκαθίσαο

Prob
seemingly
the aid o
accepting
z's genitiv
instead of

17 ἀ

For
δηοῖ *z* Las

Seem
easily con
for *II*'s di
δηοῖ), whi
(see on V

18 (a
nothing S
τέθμια δῶ

*y*³ ap
if *II*'s ε
contamin
the right
part is in
script.

21-2

The

1 *S*'s hab
word (here,
(IV. 255; V
Politian (e.
rejection an
cherishes fr
23, 86, 119),
completes a

² Only *Q*

ater to *kai*,
context (see
Politian *H*:

w here on
occurrence
elsewhere
rest to the
I, Politian,
in fulness.
t IV. 255;
, now lost,
3 on other
agaries of

first by S,
os) φαμένα

obably got
is due to
y⁶ showed

however,
y addition
θυγάτηρ z

r to have
ed IID by

yaīs later
, σύν τ' q :

as I shall
and 200-)—
estor which

npare V. 108
, IV. 224-5
for the title
se points to
suggest that
the first folio
the verso of
ed the last
at some time

show (footnote 1 on this page), is a zealous conserver of fragments. That *y*⁴, *y*², and *z*, or any one of them, conjectured δλολνγαῖς is incredible, especially as there is no scholium here in any extant manuscript.

VI. 10-13: see (iii.) below.

15 τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ Καλλίχόρῳ χαμάδις ἐκαθίσσαο φρητί (Wilamowitz).

Only τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ καλλὶ ABCKIID: only τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ S: ¹ τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ in contextual, καλλίχοροι in lighter, ink Q: τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ καλλίχορον φρέαρ ἐκαλεῖτο q: τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ καλλίχορον Ee: τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ καλλίχοροι χαμάδις ἐκαθίσσαο φρητί z (ἐκαθίσσαο GH and, with breathing deleted and dots above and below ε, I).

Probably *y*, and certainly *y*¹, had only τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ καλλὶ, of which *y*⁶ seemingly discarded καλλὶ as a half-word, while *y*⁹ may have completed it with the aid of the scholium.² Q added καλλίχορον from a kinsman of *Ee*; and *q*, accepting it, rashly subjoined φρέαρ ἐκαλεῖτο from the scholium (cf. I. 22). *z*'s genitive in καλλίχοροι appears to be a conjecture, intended to depend on, instead of agreeing with, φρητί.

17 ἀ δάκρυνον ἄγαγε Δηοῖ (Wilamowitz).

For the last word, only δ ABCK: δηοῦς SQq: διῆ II: δη (sic) Ee: δηοῖ z Lascaris.

Seemingly *y*³ had δη worn to δ by the time *y*⁵ copied it. From δη *y*⁶ or S easily conjectured δηοῦς. Indeed, *Ee*'s text points to δη as the reading of *y*; for II's disturbing διῆ may well be due to a mistranscription of δη (a faded δηοῖ), which was perhaps introduced from the source of II's contaminations (see on V. 128). Lascaris follows I.

18 (after πτολίεσσιν) only ἑα ABCK, with Q (in lighter ink) and *q*: nothing S: ἐ II, ἑαδό Lascaris: ἑαδότα τέθμια δῶκε Ee (δῶκε sic e): ἑανδότα τέθμια δῶκε z.

*y*³ appears to have had ἑα (*y*⁶ again rejecting the part-word); and *y*⁴ ἑαδό, if II's ἐ came from a mis-division (ἐ αδό) in *y*⁷. Did *y*⁴'s text result from contamination (see on V. 128)? Anyhow, *y*¹ was defective. *y*² must have got the right reading by inheritance from *y*; for a successful conjecture on *y*²'s part is incredible here, and no aiding scholium appears in any extant manuscript.

21-2 run thus (Wilamowitz):

ἀνίκα Τριπτόλεμος ἄγαθὰν ἐδιδάσκετο τέχναν ·
καλλιον, ως (ἴνα καὶ τις ὑπερβασίας ἀλέγηται)

The manuscripts have no brackets; in 21, SQqEe give τέχνη, II τέχνη,

¹ S's habit is either to reject an incomplete word (here, VI. 13, 18, 22), or resort to conjecture (IV. 255; VI. 17, 21, 119) or borrowing from Politian (e.g. V. 139); at VI. 86 he blends rejection and conjecture. *x*, on the other hand, cherishes fragments (VI. 13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 86, 119), and eschews conjecture, though he completes a word at IV. 255.

² Only QEe have this scholium, which *Ee*

present thus: καλλίχορον φρέαρ ἐκαλεῖτο ἐν ἐλευσίνι· ἔστι δὲ καὶ (ε omits καὶ) δῆμος ἀττικῆς. Q ends it with ἐκαλεῖτο, perhaps owing to clipping on the edge of his source's page; and *q*, embodying Q's form of it in his text, corrects to ἐκαλεῖτο.

If *y*⁹ inherited only τρὶς δ' ἐπὶ καλλὶ from *y*², we have here for *y* a remnant more nearly equivalent to its putative text in V. 128 (see footnote on p. 116).

z and Lascaris *τέχναν*. In 21 *ABCK* end with *ἔδιδ* : *ἔδιδάσκε . . . τέχνην SQ*, but *S* adds *-το* in rough lettering : *ἔδιδάσκε τέχνην q*: the full text, *ΠΙΔΕεz*. In 22 *ABCK* end with *ὑπερβα*, *SQ* with *τις* (but *Q* adds *ὑπερ* in lighter ink), *IID* with *ὑπερβασίας*: *qEez* give *ὑπερβασίας ἀλέγηται*.

In 21, where *y³* seems to have had the original text of *S*, progressive deterioration explains *x*'s deficiency as compared with *S*, from which Valla declined to accept the added *-το* (C. Lascaris' conjecture). In 22 *y³* probably had *ὑπερβα*, *S* again baulking at the defective word, *Q* following *S* (but later taking a limited loan from *C* or *K*),¹ while *q* borrowed from the scholium² (cf. l. 15). That in this line *y⁴* and *y²* (and consequently *y*), or either of them, was as defective as *y³*, is doubtful but not impossible; for *y²* or *y⁹* may have used the scholium to complete the text, as *q* did, while *IID*, lacking the scholium, may owe *ὑπερβασίας* to their lost ancestor's contamination. On the other hand, elsewhere *Ee* sometimes show (as they do here) as full a text as *z*, but in circumstances that do not suggest aid from a scholium (e.g. VI. 18). But the possibility suggested in *IID*'s case is stronger; for their ancestor's borrowing in V. 136 fails, like *ὑπερβασίας* here, to give it as full a text as *z* shows.

86 ad fin., *ποίμνι' ἄμι ABCKII* : *ποίμνι' SQq* (but *S* adds *ἔβοσκεν* in rough letters) : *ποίμνι' ἄμιθμεῖ* Lascaris : *ποίμνι' ἄμ^{ἀμιθμεῖ} Ee* : *ποίμνι' ἀμέλγει z*.

Here *ἄμιθμεῖ* (Ruhnken and Valckenaer) is undoubtedly right. *y* must have had *ποίμνι' ἄμι*; possibly the archetype had it too, for *z*'s *ἀμέλγει* looks very like a conjecture. *S* has again spurned the part-word, and *ἔβοσκεν* is C. Lascaris' own supplement, which *Q* rejects because of its script. Both *II* and the *z* group are without a gloss here, so *ἀμιθμεῖ* may be an unaided conjecture of J. Lascaris, unless he had access to *E, e*, or a kinsman of theirs.

118 ad init., the first foot omitted, without lacuna, *ABCKq*, the last-named giving a marginal mark: lacuna of 8 or 9 letters, *SQII* (but *S* inserts *χαίρετε* in rough letters): *εἰπατε* Lascaris : *δεῦρ' ἵτε Ee* : *ἄσατε z*.

We may safely ascribe the lacuna to *y*; for *δεῦρ' ἵτε* with *παρθενικαὶ* does not correspond to *ἐπιφθέγξασθε* with the balancing *τεκοῖσαι*, 'matrons.' On the other hand, *ἄσατε* satisfies the requirements of the case, and is thus probably genuine, and not a conjecture, in *z*.

119 ad init., *τερ* (sic, after a lacuna of 4 or more letters) *ABCK* : *δάματερ cett.*

In view of the initial lacuna, just above, in *y*, it is probable that *y* had *x*'s defect here too; correction was, of course, easy. *z*, complete at 118, probably had the full text here too.

¹ See *C.Q.* 1920, p. 68.

² *Qqe* alone have it. Corrected, it runs thus: *τὸ εὖς κάλλιον τὰ δράγματα ἔδειν, ἵνα καὶ τις ὑπερβασίας ἀλέγηται*. *Q* must have got it from *Ee*'s lost kinsman. As *ῶς* (l. 22) should be followed, as in 18-20, by *narration*, *τὰ δράγματα ἔδειν* cannot

possibly conceal any of the words lost from 23. I can only suggest that the commentator took *ῶς* as *ῶς*, 'thus' (or found the latter in his text), and referred it to *δράγματα πατήσαι* of 19-20 connecting *πατήσαι* with *πατεῖσθαι*, 'devour.'

(ii.)
where *cet*
III.

ABC
give the
slightly-
seems pr

IV.
both.

Her
x's pagin

V.
ῶμα
ἔνδυμα τ
dots) : δ

S p
pp. 64-6
conceiva
τῆνα, h
metrical

60-

(W
reading
61-
lacuna
62, 63,

H
ABCK
probab
former
appear
noticing
found t

(ii.) Omissions of lines, or beginnings or ends of lines, from ABCK, where *cett.* give a full text :

III. 251-4 (Wilamowitz)—

τῶι ῥα καὶ ἡλαινων ἀλαπαξέμεν ἡπείλησε
Λύγδαμις ὑβριστής· ἐπὶ δὲ στρατὸν ἵππημολγῶν
ἡγαγε Κιμμερίων ψαμάθωι ἵσον, οἴς ῥα παρ' αὐτόν
κεκλιμένοι ναίουσι βοὸς πόρον Ἰναχιώνης.

ABCK omit *ἡπείλησε* from 251, and *ἵσον οἴς ῥα παρ'* *αὐτόν* from 253: *cett.* give the full text, with some minor diversities of reading. A stain like two slightly-parted fingers, its inner curve stopping (in the margin) short of 252, seems probable in *x*.

IV. 224, ABCK omit final *ἐκάλεσσεν*, and from 225 final *αὐτή*: *cett.* have both.

Here a stain explains *x*'s shortcomings satisfactorily. On the question of *x*'s pagination see p. 116, footnote 1.

V. 17 *ad fin.*, *ὅμμα τὸ τήνας* omit ABCK: *ἔνδυμα τὸ τήνας* (marg. *ὅμμα*) *S*: *ἔνδυμα τὸ τήνας Q* (*ώμμα* in lighter ink) and *q* (in contextual ink and without dots): *ὅμμα τὸ τήνας* *PID Politian Eez.*

S probably got its marginal from Politian; on it and *Q* see *C.Q.* 1920, pp. 64-6. The frequent closeness elsewhere of *x*'s text to that of *S* makes it conceivable that here the scribe of *y⁵* (or of *x*), inheriting like *S* *ἔνδυμα τὸ τήνας*, had produced an illegible blur by various attempts to make the line metrical—whence the gap in *x*.

60-4 run thus:

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχαίων εὗτ' ἐπὶ Θεσπιέων
ἢ 'πὶ Κορωνίας ἢ εἰς Ἀλιαρτον ἐλαύνοι
ἵππως, Βοιωτῶν ἔργα διερχομένα,
ἢ 'πὶ Κορωνίας, ἵνα οἱ τεθναμένον ἄλσος
καὶ βωμοὶ ποταμῷ κεῖντ' ἐπὶ Κουραλίαι

(Wilamowitz' text, but with 61 restored *ad init.* to the manuscripts' reading.)

61-2 are omitted by ABCK, which put 63 just after 60 and then give a lacuna of two lines, followed by 64: *cett.* have the full text, in the order 60, 61, 62, 63, 64; Politian's first edition omits 61-2 without a gap.

Homoeographon of 63 with 61 adequately explains why some ancestor of ABCK omitted 61-2; and the transference of 63 to follow straight on 61 probably arose from the feeling that it belonged there, *ἢ 'πὶ κορωνίας* in the former following naturally after *ἐπὶ θεσπιέων* in the latter. The lacuna would appear to have been indicated before 63 was transposed, a shrewd scribe noticing the lack of a principal verb in 60+63+64 as they stood when he found them.

The two steps here, if rightly postulated, point to *two* generations between *y*³ and *AC*, as I indicate in the *stemma*.

107, first word omit *ABCK*: πάσσα *Se*: πάσσα *Qq*: ὄσσα *II*
Politian: πᾶσα *E*: πόσσα *z Lascaris*.

108, first word omit *ABCK* and (at first) *S*: πάσσα *Q* (lighter ink), πᾶσσα *q*: πόσσα *IIDz*: πολλά *Ee*: ὄσσα Politian and (later) *S*.

The loss in 108 originated with *y*³ (cf. 139 and p. 116, footnote 1); and *x*'s monopoly of defect in 107 seems due to the subsequent damage which marred also IV. 224-5 (see p. 119, and p. 116, footnote 1). For the additions to *S* and *Q* in 108 see *C.Q.* 1920, pp. 65, 68-9.

(iii.) In one passage the *y*³ tradition, seen in *S*'s defects there, has suffered more extensive loss before *A* and *C* were written:

VI. 10-13 (Wilamowitz)—

πότνια πῶς σε δύναντο πόδες φέρεν ἔστ' ἐπὶ δυθμάς,
ἔστ' ἐπὶ τὸς μὲλανας καὶ ὅπα τὰ χρύσεα μᾶλα;
οὐ πίες οὐτ' ἄρ' ἔδεις τῆνον χρόνον οὐδὲ λοέσσα.
τρὶς μὲν δὴ διέβας Ἀχελώιον ἀργυροδίναν.

ABCK end 10 with δύναντο, 11 with καὶ ὅ, 12 with λοε, 13 with δὴ δι: *cett.* have the full text, with variations of reading that are irrelevant here, and with the following omissions—10, πόδες omit, leaving a gap, *S* (Lascaris later inserts σε ἐς and accents preceding -ο) *Qq*: 11, τὰ omit without gap *Ez*², with gap of 2 or 3 letters *e*, while *IIDF* have it and *SQq* substitute δὲ: 13, the verb omit without gap *SQq* (each giving dots above, and *C. Lascaris* adding ἥψθες in margin of *S*), with gap *Ee*, while *II* has διεύεν³, Lascaris διέβαινεν, *z* διέβης.

A stain in *x*, starting in the right margin and wide at 10-11, narrow at 12, and wide again at 13, explains the deficiencies of *ABCK*. Earlier, *x* (like *S*) must have inherited from *y*³ the lack of πόδες and of τὰ. I fancy that *z* had τὰ but *z*² lost it through haplography; and that *y* had a gap in its place, since *E*'s closing of the ranks is countered as evidence by *e*'s fidelity, while δὲ is *y*⁶'s bootless conjecture, and *y*⁴ probably drew on the same extraneous aid as in V. 128, etc. In 13 *z* preserved the verb, though in the Attic form; *y* appears to have had δι. This fragment *x* characteristically kept, but *y*⁶ and *y*⁹ rejected it as incomplete; while *II*'s διεύεν³ is *D*'s διέβαινεν mis-written, and results, I believe, from contamination—less probably, in view of the *y*⁴ stock's conservatism, from an independent attempt to complete δι.

IID may have got πόδες (πόδα *II*) from the contamination in *y*⁴.

(iv.) VI. 23 is an exceedingly difficult case. Here one blank line is found in *SqeFGH*, and two in *E*: *ABCK* give only π (*ad init.*), which *Q* inserts in lighter ink from *C* or *K*: *IID* have only ἰδέσθαι (*ad fin.*), and this the text-hand

placed at

Br took i

Neither i

In sh

ἰδέσθαι of

(a) T

of that pe

which C.

rights wit

the silenc

part-word

V. 136; j

may have

face (VI.

that here

(b) ἰδέσ

presence i

the same

V. 109 sh

a finer pe

FGH; fo

just beca

its progen

bases of

Lascaris,

had found

As fo

tamination

the resulta

than z's;

regardin

lost mem

diffidenc

V. 109, a

here from

from a m

folio, at e

two pages

for the tit

¹ If so, the earlier state

² z group and

exist.

³ We mig

placed at the end of the otherwise blank line in *I*, from which the text-hand of *Br* took it but placed it in the margin, just beyond the range of the end of 22. Neither in the manuscripts nor in *ed. pr.* is there a scholium.

In short, we have to account for (a) initial π of *AC* alone, and (b) final $i\delta\epsilon\sigma\thetaai$ of *IIID* alone.

(a) The consistent freedom elsewhere of *AC* from contamination disposes of that possibility here. As they cherish fragments, whereas *S* rejects those which C. Lascaris could neither himself complete nor (in *Hymn V.*) set to rights with aid from Politian's text, π may fairly be ascribed to y^3 . But now the silence of the descendants of y^4 , y^2 , and z has to be accounted for. y^4 kept part-words at VI. 15, 18, 86, though it (or y^1) seems to have dropped $\psi\epsilon\nu$ at V. 136; y^2 kept part-words at V. 136, VI. 17, 86, and perhaps at V. 78, and may have completed one at VI. 15; z probably had only one such difficulty to face (VI. 86), and made a respectable conjecture there. I can only suggest that here all three abandoned π as beyond redemption.

(b) $i\delta\epsilon\sigma\thetaai$ is even more puzzling, in respect alike of *I*'s showing it and of its presence in *II* and *ed. pr.* I shall take *I* first. Here the word is clearly from the same hand as the rest of the manuscript, as a comparison with its form in V. 109 shows; but the lettering at VI. 23 is larger than usual and comes from a finer pen. Further, it is strange that *I* should add a word not given us by *FGH*; for the latter three, like *I*, would not have abandoned a complete word just because the line is defective, as V. 136 shows. I have proved that *I* (or its progenitor or some other close kinsman) was used by Lascaris as one of the bases of *ed. pr.*; and it seems possible that *I* was written to the order of Lascaris, and that he instructed the scribe to add this word, which he himself had found in *D.1*.

As for *II* and *D*—in the other ten cases² where I have regarded contamination in y^4 with a manuscript outside the y family as probable or possible, the resultant text is never more, and thrice (V. 136; VI. 18, 22) less, complete than z 's; and this fact makes $i\delta\epsilon\sigma\thetaai$ here, if genuine, the only³ bar to our regarding y^4 's helper as a manuscript not independent of our archetype, but a lost member of the z family. In such straits I essay a solution only with diffidence. It is this: $i\delta\epsilon\sigma\thetaai$ occurs only twice in the *Hymns*, here and in V. 109, and it ends the line in each case. I suggest that y^4 's helper received it here from V. 109, in the following circumstances. The scribe was copying from a manuscript in which the two passages stood each on the verso of its folio, at either the top or the bottom of the page; and they were separated by two pages, each of 29 lines (V. 109 to VI. 23=56 lines, and I allow two lines for the title of VI.). The second folio was torn at the top (or bottom), so that

¹ If so, this passage is an exception to my earlier statement that interaction between the z group and the other extant MSS. does not exist.

² We might go further and ascribe to con-

tamination *IID*'s $\phi\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ (V. 131) and $\delta\lambda\lambda\nu\gamma\alpha\tilde{\iota}$ (V. 139).

³ I have already excluded $\theta\epsilon\mu\tilde{\iota}\delta$ (V. 78); see above, p. 115.

iδέσθαι showed through from V. 109;¹ and the scribe unwittingly impounded the word in writing VI. 23.

I return to the troubous problem of contamination in *y⁴*. That there was *some* contamination I do not doubt and shall now try to show. The comparative merits of *Ee* and *IID*, i.e. of *y²* and *y⁴*, are important in this connection.

(1) If, as a preliminary, we take their readings at their face-value, we find that both pairs show a full text at IV. 255; V. 131, 139; VI. 10, 119, and they virtually stand evenly matched also at VI. 21, 86. *Ee* are complete at VI. 18 and 22, while *IID* are not; at V. 136 (*ad init.*) *IID* lack *Ee*'s *ψευ*, and at VI. 15 they offer only *καλλι* against *Ee*'s *καλλίχορον*, while at VI. 118 *Ee* have *δεῦρ' ἵτε* against a gap in II, *ed. pr.* having resort to conjecture. *IID* have the pull slightly at V. 78 (where *y²* probably had *θεμιτ*), more seriously at V. 128, 136 (*ad fin.*) and VI. 11, 13, and 17. VI. 23 I omit from consideration in this connexion.

(2) Next, I eliminate from *Ee*'s advantages *ψευ*, *-χορον*, and *δεῦρ' ἵτε*, for reasons already offered in their detailed treatment; and I put V. 78 and VI. 17 aside for the moment,² to deal with *IID*'s other advantages. A table will be useful, in which I give *y³*'s readings in place of the divergent texts, already accounted for, of *ABCK* and *S*:

	<i>y³.</i>	<i>y⁴.</i>	<i>y².</i>
V. 128 Only <i>πολυχρόνιον</i>	<i>δωσῶ δὲ βοωτοῦ</i> (or <i>βίοτον</i>)	<i>τέρμα πολυχρόνιον</i>	Only <i>πολυχρόνιον</i>
136 (<i>ad fin.</i>) Blank	<i>θυγάτηρ</i>		Blank
VI. 11 A gap for <i>τὰ</i>	<i>τὰ</i>		A gap for <i>τὰ</i> (see e)
13 <i>δὴ δὶ + probably a gap + ἀχελώιον</i>	<i>δὴ διέβαινεν</i> (διεύεν II) <i>ἀχελώιον</i>		<i>δὴ + gap + ἀχελώιον</i>

In the last passage *διέβαινεν* may be *y⁴*'s own erroneous conjecture, based on an inherited *δὴ δὶ* and gap; on the theory of contamination it is a conjecture of the aiding manuscript. Anyhow, it may be left out of account just now, for, in point of authority as *y⁴*'s inherited reading, it stands or falls with the other three. Again, *y⁴*'s scribe could have conjectured *τὰ* at VI. 11; but I can find no tenable explanation for V. 128 and 136 (*ad fin.*) except contamination.

I shall put the case for *y⁴*'s integrity as favourably as I can. On a general estimate of their surface-values for our score or so of passages, *y³* is

¹ If V. 138, the corresponding line of the source's intervening recto, be superimposed directly on 109, measurements taken in four photographs show that *iδέσθαι* (of 109) lies beyond the end of *μελεται* (II*q*), or at least beyond *μελετ-* (*Q*) or *μελε-* (*B*). Consequently, with the source's second folio torn, and 138 lying, of course, inverted on 109, the latter's *iδέσθαι* may readily have shown through to VI. 23, without 138's having lost anything *ad init.* True, the recto lines of a manuscript often start nearer the left side of their page than do those of the verso;

but the 'even' line 138 may have been, as the 'evens' in *Hymn V.* are in so many extant manuscripts, not flush with the adjacent 'odds.' Anyhow, *y³*'s initial integrity in 138 is derived from *y¹*; and an inherited defect there in the contaminator would not invalidate my position.

² *θέμιτες* (V. 78) I have explained above as a conjecture of *y⁴* or the contaminator; and thus *IID*'s advantage there is unreal. At VI. 17 II's *δῆ*, if it arose from *δῆ* (of the contaminator, I have suggested above), may be left to stand or fall with V. 128 and 136 (*ad fin.*).

inferior
paragraph
that *y⁴* a
completed
were due
case. B
136 (*ad*
y⁴ trans
(contam
brothers
y²'s com
by its w
Secondly
and 136
four suc
keeping,
y⁴ as the
necessary
both the
advantage
this othe

This
tion, on
consider
question
this ext
this list
have rea
uniform

The
and *S* f
y³ may
S gives v

script: I
(correcte

50 *φορβ*
there bu

¹ See C.

² I.e. ev

are in no

³ Also,

dants, E

quite apart

inferior to its brother y^4 (e.g. at IV. 255, V. 131, 139); and, on our survey in paragraph (1) above, with the subsequent modifications, it might be thought that y^4 and y^2 stood on much the same level of merit as each other as regards completeness of text, and that the more serious divergences between them were due merely to the varying fortunes that the text had experienced in each case. But this conclusion as a whole is vitiated by the realities of V. 128 and 136 (*ad fin.*). For in both these places y^2 is equally deficient with y^3 , while y^4 transcends them both in fulness—a fact remarkable in two respects. First (contamination of y^4 apart), it traverses the presumption that y^3 and y^4 are brothers, but y^2 their uncle or cousin—a cleavage which is indicated both by y^2 's completeness at VI. 18 and 22, where y^3 and y^4 are notably defective, and by its wealth in variants,¹ in which respect they are markedly its inferiors. Secondly, the coincidence between y^2 and y^3 in extent of damage at V. 128 and 136 (*ad fin.*) is important. That the meritorious y^2 lost entirely at V. 128 four successive words, all of which another descendant of y was capable of keeping, is surely hard of belief. If we accepted y^2 and y^3 as brothers, with y^4 as their uncle or cousin, contamination of y^2 at VI. 18 and 22 would be a necessary assumption; and it is noteworthy that, even as IID stand,² y^4 is in both these latter places so much nearer to y^3 than is y^2 , that my theory has the advantage of not postulating such very wide divergences between brothers as this other view would demand.³

This last statement brings us to the question of how far the contamination, once it is held to exist in V. 128 and 136 (*ad fin.*), may fairly be considered to have affected y^4 elsewhere. To dogmatize is clearly out of the question; but it is at least possible that, as I have suggested, y^4 's scribe had this extraneous help also at IV. 255, V. 78, VI. 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 22. If to this list we were justified in adding V. 131 and 139, in the result we should have reached, in each of our score or so of passages except VI. 21 and 23, a uniform reading for y^3 and y^4 , which would accordingly be attributable to y^1 .

The evidence of these larger lacunae as a whole, for the descent of AC and S from a common ancestor (y^3), is backed by that of other passages. y^3 may perhaps be credited with having had the following doublets, which S gives while AC have in each case a plain text, which is that of S's superscript: I. 33 κομίσσαι: 88 νοήσει: II. 31 ἀείδει: III. 78 κόρσιν: 237 ἀμαζονίδη^ς (corrected in S from -αξ-): 259 φεραὶ^ς (shifted in S to -αιᾶς): V. 5 μεγάλως: 50 φορβέων^ς: 141 ἐλάσσεις; also I. 28, where AC have ρεῖν in the text, S ηρη there but in margin γρ' ρεῖν. Again, to y^3 perhaps belong the converse

¹ See C.Q. 1920, pp. 119-121.

² I.e. even granting that λαδό and νιπερβασία are in no measure due to contamination.

³ Also, we must remember that y^2 's descendants, E and e, stand in the Homeric Hymns quite apart from S (AC lack 'Homer') and IID,

which are there rather closely akin to each other (Allen, cited on p. 114, footnote 2).

Moreover, the contamination of y^4 with a lost z MS. will explain why II, alone among the y group, has the poem Τυνῶ τὸν ψίζυγον κτλ., of which II. 1-4 are found in some z MSS. (see C.Q. 1920, p. 105).

cases, where *A*¹ keeps the doublet and *S* has the suprascript reading alone: IV. 32 εἰναλίοντος: 208 κρημνεῖον: 318 μεγάλη^{οὐ}: V. 5 ἀθηναῖη^α: 37 τεὴν^η. Also, *S* and *AC* agree in monopoly of reading at IV. 100 ἀχαιΐδεις: 130 διφαλέον: 134 καρήσυτα *S*, -ήσατα *AC*: 187 καμόντες (*S* corrects to -ος): 294 *S* corrects διθνέων to διθέων of *AC* before *Q* is copied: V. 47 σήμερον (*S* was corrected, after *Q*'s time, to σα-): 83 ἐκόλασαν (*C. Lascaris* corrects to ἐκόλασαν).^x

S, like *ABCK*, has lacunae of its own, which we have noticed earlier, in places where *ABCK* are intact; but such defects are of very small range compared with those shown by *ABCK* where *S* is intact. In unshared major weaknesses of script (permutations, etc.) *S* has rather the better record, with 100 against 135 of *ABCK*, on a rough calculation which excludes alike those which existed in *S* before *Lascaris* corrected it and those which are peculiar to *AK* and to *CB* respectively.

Some readings shared by *Pi* only with descendants of *y*³ deserve mention here. With *ABCK* alone it has IV. 104 λάρης (*λάρις cett.*, λάρισσα *ed. pr.*), 132 εἰλήθειαν (so *ed. pr.*: εἰλείθιαν *z*², εἰλήθιαν *E*, εἰλήθιαν *cett.*), 266 ω̄ μεγάλε (ω̄ μεγάλ' ω̄ *ed. pr.*: ω̄ μεγάλη *cett.*); cf. III. 190 μίης *Pi*, μίνης *ABCK* (*μίνως cett.*, *ed. pr.*). At IV. 11 *Pi* has ήν . . . οέσσα καὶ, *ABCK* η̄ (η̄ *B*) . . . καὶ, while *cett.* and *ed. pr.* give in full ηνεμόεσσα καὶ.

With *S* (and its descendants) alone *Pi* has I. 33 κομίσσαι (so *Q*: ιζειν *ABCK*, -ίσσαι *cett.* and *ed. pr.*); III. 209 ἄλογχον *Pi*q, ἄλοχον^γ *SQ* (*ἄλοχον cett.*, *ed. pr.*); V. 28 χροῖνη (so *Qq*: χροῖνη *cett.*, *ed. pr.*); cf. IV. 36 δ̄ ωσοι *Pi*, δι' ωσοι *S*, δι' ωσοι *Qq* (δ̄ ην σοι *cett.*, *ed. pr.*), and V. 7 φέρουσαν^σ *Pi*, φέρουσαν *SQq* (-ουσα *cett.*, -οισα *ed. pr.*). At VI. 20 *Pi* omits καὶ ἐν βόας: *S* lacks ἐν βόας, *Q* supplies ἐν κόας (*sic*) from another source, and *q* copies *Q*: *cett.* have καὶ ἐν βόας in full.

With *ABCKS* alone *Pi* has I. 52 τε (corrected by *S* to σε of *cett.* and *ed. pr.*), and III. 233 τε (corrected by *Pi* to γε of *cett.* and *ed. pr.*); cf. VI. 108 τὰν *PA*, τανὸν *S* (altered later) and *Qq* (τὰν *cett.*, *ed. pr.*), and II. 31 ἀείδει^{οὐ} *PiABCe*, ἀείδει^{οὐ} *SQ*, ἀείδειοι (*sic*) *q* (-ειν *E*'s conjecture, -ει *z* and *ed. pr.*).

Similar coincidences of *Pi* with the *y*² and *z* groups are much fewer. With *Ee* alone *Pi* has them only at IV. 111 (see *C.Q.* 1920, p. 120) and at VI. 38, where *Pi*e have ἐπιώντο, while *E* shows ἐψιώντο in the text and ἐπιώντο (by correction from something like ἐστιώντο) in the margin (ἐψιώντο *cett.*, *ed. pr.*). *Pi* *ed. pr.* *z* monopolize οὐδέ τι (*sic*) πω at IV. 91 (οὐδ' ἔτι πω *cett.*); and at VI. 84-5 *Pi*z show interrogation-marks after εἰλαπίναν τις (so *ed. pr.*) and νύμφαν (no punctuation *SQq*: a comma *ed. pr.* and *cett.*).²

¹ *C* discards the source's citation of doublets (see *C.Q.* 1920, pp. 12-13), adopting the superscripts only in IV. 208, 318 of these five passages.

² *Pi* has also three unshared doublets (III. 180 ἐκέινον^{ων}: V. 93 ἀμφοτέρησι^α: VI. 114 τότ^θ) and two marginal variants (IV. 150, text εἰσόκεν but marg.

Beyo
in their s
manuscri
graph, I
and a br
promising
this task
involved

UNIVE

εἰσόκεν, which
V. 25, text λ
it gives αἴρι
of which 'T
subject. A
tion; the u
which *ed. pr.*

¹ I must
have so kin

THE
derivation
in Liddel
ἀνεψιός.
τετράπον.
νέροδε re
gives the
reason for

Now
them παιδ
ἀμάντον.
they are
Milesians
fools do,
not παιδε
rather her

St. Jo

Beyond the conclusions presented in this article, and the evidence set forth in their support, I do not think that I can usefully say anything now about the manuscripts of Callimachus' *Hymns*. Should *G* become accessible in photograph, I hope to deal with it, *H*, and *A* more satisfactorily than I have done; and a brief account of the sources of *L* and *M* seems desirable. Also, some promising clues to the history of the *z²* manuscripts must be followed; but for this task time and full materials are at present lacking, and the problem is involved with a larger question about fifteenth-century libraries.¹

M. T. SMILEY.

UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL.

εἰσβεκτόν, which latter=the text of *ABCK* ed. *pr.*; V. 25, text *λαβούσα*, marg. *γρ' βαλούσα*). At IV. 264 it gives *αὐτῆς* (*αὐτή cett.*), to suit *εἰλέρο* (*sic IIxx²*), of which *Ιωνώδης* was seemingly taken as the subject. At V. 73 II's *ἔστων* results from correction; the underlying form seems to be *εὖστων*, which *ed. pr.* gives (from *D*).

¹ I must express my gratitude to those who have so kindly helped me to obtain photographs

of MSS. My friend Mr. J. A. Twemlow, Associate Professor of Palaeography and Diplomatics in the University of Liverpool, took much trouble over the MSS. in Italian Libraries, for many of which Mgr. A. Ratti gave valuable advice. I am indebted for aid in connexion with *S* to the Librarian of the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, and as regards *H* to Dr. P. J. Enk, of Leiden, ever generous in assisting British scholars.

ΝΕΠΟΔΕΣ ΚΑΛΗΣ ΑΛΟΣΤΔΝΗΣ. *Od. δ* 404.

THERE is a general agreement among English scholars as to the meaning and derivation of these strange words: Merry and Riddell *ad loc.*, the admirable article in Liddell and Scott, and Dr. Giles, agree in connecting *νέποδες* with *nepos*, *neptis*, *ἀνεψιός*. The short *o* in the declension has come from false analogy with *τρίποντος* and *τετράποντος*. *Άλοστδνη* is probably for 'Allosinōn, 'salt water.' Other derivations of *νέποδες* refute themselves. 'Brood' is the rendering now approved, but although this gives the general sense, it does not quite hit the centre; and no critics have seen the reason for the choice of this peculiar word.

Now if an early poet wished to describe fish, he could not do better than call them *παιδες* 'Allosinōn, just as Aeschylus, *Persae* 577, calls them *ἄναδοι παιδες τὰς ἀμαύρτου*. But how are seals to be described, which are not fish (for though aquatic, they are mammals), but are certainly creatures of the 'salt water'? Like the Milesians in the epigram (ap. Aristot. *Eth. VIII. 3*), who were not fools, but did what fools do, so seals are not fishes, but do what fishes do. They are therefore called, not *παιδες* 'Allosinōn, but *νέποδες*, 'first cousins'; not her descendants or 'brood,' but rather her 'kin.' No more accurate epithet could be employed to describe them.

J. U. POWELL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

E
τελεῖ ;
= πάν
be im
confus
ποῖον
its fo
at Phi

SOPHOCLEA.

*Ant. 2. ἀρ' οἰσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν
όποιον οὐχὶ νῷν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ ;*

I HAVE never been able to swallow the explanation that this means *οἰσθ' ὅτι εἶστι τῶν κακῶν όποιον κ.τ.λ.* The order of words is dead against it, since *Ζεὺς* ought to be in the *όποιον* clause; it may be safely said that there is no shadow of a parallel to such an order in Sophocles, and probably not in anyone else either. Look at line 2 by itself and consider whether any hearer could possibly suppose that *ὅτι Ζεὺς* could mean anything but 'that Zeus' is doing or will do something or other. So Aristophanes seems to have thought; in a passage crammed with reminiscences of tragedy he declaims (*Birds* 1246):

*ἀρ' οἰσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς εἴ με λυπήσει πέρα
μέλαθρα μὲν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόμους Ἀμφίονος
καταιθαλώσω πυρφόροισιν ἀετοῖς ;*

Moreover, I flatly deny that *οἰσθ' ὅτι κακῶν όποιον οὐ τελεῖ* is possible Greek even when the order has been corrected. *οὐκ οἶδα ὅστις τῶν Ἐλλήνων όποιος οὐκ ἀπαρνοῖτ' ἀν τοῦτο μὴ οὐκ εἶναι ἀληθὲς.* Just look at it!

But neither can *όποιον* here be a direct question. Jebb, after referring to three passages in Plato, *Lysis* 212c, *Euthyd.* 271a, *Rep.* 348b, where *όπότερος*, -ον, -ως are used as if they were direct interrogatives, goes on: 'Let it be assumed that the readings are sound in those places. Still there is at least no similar instance of *όποιος*; nor is *όποιον* here the *first word* of a direct question.' The last remark is acute and very much to the point. It is difficult to deny that the indirect form of an interrogative may be used for the direct occasionally¹ in even authors of the best period, but certainly the word could not stand where it does in our passage. There is a general tendency to confuse relatives and other pronouns, etc., in Greek; one can say *ἄ μὲν* for *τὰ μὲν*, *ότε μὲν* for *τοτὲ μὲν*, and so on. If then Plato could say *όπότερος* for *πότερος*, it does not seem surprising; the explanation perhaps is that it comes of halting between *πότερος ἐστι*; and *ἐρωτῶ ὄπότερός ἐστι*. If this be so it is plain that *όπότερος* would have to begin the sentence.

¹ Jebb understates the evidence: add *Alcib.* 110c, *ὄποιω* (so much for there being no similar instance of *όποιος*!), *Soph.* 236D, *πῶς καὶ πρὸς δὲ τι*, *Minos* 313A, *όποιον* again; in [Demosth.] xlix. 51, *όποσον τινὰ καὶ ποδαπόν καὶ πόθεν*, Schäfer emends to *πόσον*, wrongly I think. If the speech were

by Demosthenes we might argue that he does not do such things, but as it is admittedly spurious we cannot tell what its author might not say. It is no great matter that Achilles Tatius (viii. 10) has *όποτέρα σε τούτων ἐωνῆσατο*;

and t
that t
όποιον
about
difficu

A
the m

Here a
questi
would
it. T
spoken
regard
at leas
interro

S
all the
grapes

It
himself
The C
includ
on wh
A man
' I sel
confus

But there remains a third explanation of *ἀρ' οἰσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς ὄποιον οὐχὶ τελεῖ*; It is not new, but it appears to me indubitably right. *ποῖον οὐχὶ = πάντα*, and *όποιον οὐχὶ* is simply *ποῖον οὐχὶ* in *oratio obliqua*. Nothing can be imagined more like the tricks and manners of Sophocles than such a confusion of construction; as the whole sentence is in *oratio obliqua*, so the *ποῖον* is influenced by it; the *οἰσθα* still makes itself felt, though logically its force ought not to extend beyond *ὅτι*. Everybody knows the passage at *Phil.* 615:

εὐθέως ὑπέσχετο
τὸν ἀνδρ' Ἀχαιοῖς τόνδε δηλώσειν ἄγων·
οἴοιτο μὲν μάλισθ' ἔκουσιον λαβὼν . . .

and the parallel quoted by the editors from Lysias. Do you mean to say that the influence which produces *οἴοιτο* in the one passage could not produce *όποιον* in the other? Of course it could, and the only thing that puzzles me about these lines is that any tolerable scholar should have ever felt any difficulty about it.

A passage which may perhaps have been consciously or unconsciously in the mind of Sophocles is *Odyssey* xiv. 186:

καὶ μοι τοῦτ' ἀγόρευσον ἐτήτυμον ὅφρ' ἐν εἰδῶ·
τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ήδε τοκῆς;
όπποίης τ' ἐπὶ νηὸς ἀφίκεο· πῶς δέ σε ναῦται
ἥγαγον εἰς Ἰθάκην;

Here *όπποίης* seems to be due to a relapse into *oratio obliqua* after the direct questions *τίς πόθεν*, *πόθι*, and then *πῶς* reverts again to the direct. No one would hesitate to say that *τίς* was direct, I think, if *όπποίης* did not follow it. The lines thus illustrate the halting between two modes of interrogation spoken of above. The punctuation of the editors shows that they do not regard *τίς* as a dependent question; even if you do so regard it, we have at least the confusion between the direct and dependent forms of the interrogative pronouns.

Somewhat similar to *ὅτι ὄποιον* is: 'This makes me wonder more than all the rest; that at this time of the year . . . from whence you had these ripe grapes' (Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*, Act V. Sc. i.).

Ant. 4. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐτ' ἀλγεινὸν οὐτ' ἄτης ἄτερ.

It is again astonishing to find scholars of the highest repute, Porson himself among them, hesitating over this very simple superfluity of *ἄτερ*. The German editors have quoted similar superfluities from authors of note, including Lessing. We often hear in everyday English speech Greek idioms on which we should write elaborate notes if we read them in classical authors. A man once asked me at Lord's to give him a match, adding apologetically: 'I seldom forget to come without them.' Nothing can be easier than such confusion in negative sentences. Does not Andocides (iv. 15) say *οὐ ταῦτα*

μόνον ἔξηρκεσεν when he means either οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔξηρκεσεν or οὐ ταῦτα μόνον ἐποίησεν? Does not Xenophon (*Hell.* iii. 2, 21) say in like manner οὐ μόνον ταῦτα ἤρκει? Does not Lycurgus cry out (51) τοιούτους μὲν ἄνδρας οὐδ' ἔξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος διλύγοντες εὔρειν ἥρδιον, when logic demands πολλοὺς, and Longinus, *de Sublim.* xxxii. 8, οὐδὲ διλύγοντες δεῖ for οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ? And this very phrase οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ is itself totally illogical.

'All those scornful eyes, without hardly any exception, were closed in death within a year' (H. Kingsley, *Mademoiselle Mathilde*, ch. 46).

Ant. 265. καὶ πῦρ διέρπειν.

Different editors have quoted on this Virgil *Aen.* xi. 787, Aristoph. *Lys.* 133, Demosth. liv. 40. Add Theophrastus frag. iii. 8 (Teubner ed., vol. iii., p. 67): διὸ καὶ οἱ διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς βαδίζοντες πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οἰς παρασκευάζονται καὶ τοῦτο φασὶ δρᾶν. This may only refer to a conjuring exhibition, but may include ordeals too; at any rate such exhibitions probably grew out of the ordeal. Lucian *Philopseudes* 13, διὰ πυρὸς διεξιόντα, refers certainly to a display.

*Ant. 466. ἀλλ' ἀν, εἰ τὸν ἔξ ἐμῆς
μητρὸς θανόντ' ἀθαπτον ησχόμην νέκυν,
κείνοις ἀν ἥλγουν.*

Pallas seems to me to have made the best correction of this vexed passage by proposing ἔξανεσχόμην for ησχόμην νέκυν. It is mere *ὑβρίς* to accuse this of being bad poetry; it is every bit as good as anyone can wish. ἀθαπτον ἀνέχομαι is unimpeachable Greek; νέκυν is clearly superfluous though unobjectionable in itself, and the reading is much superior to that of Semitelos, ἥσχυναν κίνεις. Superior, for it does not matter whether dogs devour the body or not; what *does* matter is whether Antigone does her duty or not. By sprinkling earth on the body she has not delivered it from the power of the dog, but she has done her duty. Hence that reading only spoils the point, whereas that of Pallas keeps it bright and sharp.

In favour of it is to be noted, first, that the scholiast says ηνεσχόμην, ὑπερεῖδον. Secondly, that the scholiast thought it worth while to explain ἔξανεσχήσεσθε at *Phil.* 1355 by ἀνέξεσθε; thus here ἔξανεσχόμην might become ἀνεσχόμην or ηνεσχόμην, whence the variants of L and A, which has ηνεσχόμην, probably after νέκυν had been added because it was evident that the line was too short. Thirdly, that Weil's ἔξηνεσχόμην is much the most likely correction of οὐκ ηνεσχόμην at *Eur. El.* 508. There also the ἔξ was dropped and οὐκ inserted to fill up.

Ant. 536. δέδρακα τούργον, εἴπερ ἥδ' ὁμορροθεῖ.

The logic of this looks strange, for if Ismene has done the deed she has done it whether Antigone agree or no. Poets are not always logical, and I would not mind this, but there is more behind. Ismene does not say that

she did it, which would be *ἔδρασα*, as Antigone confesses with the words *καὶ φημὶ δρᾶσαι* at 443; what Ismene says is: 'I am guilty; I am in the position of one who has done it.' The peculiar use of the perfect is a frequent source of error to us, and it is important to observe it here; it implies being in a certain condition. No doubt Ismene strains the truth, but she does not go so far as to say *ἔδρασα*, she only represents herself as being equally guilty as if she had done it, using an equivocal tense which might naturally be taken to mean that she had actually buried the body but which just avoids positively saying so, because it may be subtly interpreted to signify 'guilty.' Thus the logic turns out to be correct. The distinction may indeed appear unduly subtle at first sight, but I believe that it will gain on consideration. Cf. Demosth. *contra Evergum et Mnesibulum* 69, *τοῖς δεδρακόσι δὲ καὶ κτείναστ*, 'those who are guilty, i.e. those who committed the murder.' *εἰπερ ηδ'* *δυορροθεῖ* will then mean, I take it, 'if Antigone consents to let me share the guilt.'

Ant. 755. Accent *ἀν σ' οὐκ*, for the emphatic *σὲ* can be elided, and the emphasis is necessary.

Electra 698. *ἄλλης ἡμέρας*.

It is incorrect to say that this means 'on another day,' which would be ludicrous; it means 'next day,' for the article can be omitted in poetry: see Ap. Rhod. ii. 176. So in Spanish *otro dia* without any article regularly means 'next day.'

It is true that at *Ajax* 516 there is an even more absurd use of *ἄλλη*, when Tecmessa says that Ajax laid waste her country and 'some other fate,' she really can't remember exactly what, slew her parents. But the best MSS. read *ἄλλ'* *ἡ*, and Schneidewin's *ἄμὴν* seems to be right since Sophocles is copying *Iliad* vi. 414, *πατέρ' ἀμὸν ἀπέκτανε δῖος Ἀχιλλεὺς*. Can anyone considering the two passages doubt that it was Ajax himself and not 'another fate' which caused the death of her parents? Delicacy prevents her from putting it more plainly.

Ajax 410. *ὦ δυστάλαινα, τοιάδ' ἄνδρα χρήσιμον φωνεῦν, ἀ πρόσθεν οὐτος οὐκ ἔτλη ποτ' ἀν.*

The antithesis of *ἄνδρα* and *οὐτος* is the kind of thing which requires no comment, and accordingly does not receive any from the ordinary editors. What we want is an antithesis to *φωνεῦν*, and this Naber provides by his irresistible conjecture *ἀ πρόσθεν οὐκ ἔτλη ποτ' ἀν κλύειν*. The last word having been lost, *οὐτος* was inserted to fill up the scansion.

But we need, it seems to me, to strengthen *οὐκ* to *οὐδ'*. In English it is possible to lay a stress upon the two verbs, but Greek had no stress of the sort available, and therefore has to reach its goal by the aid of particles.

Oed. Col. 277. καὶ μὴ θεοὺς τιμῶντες είτα τοὺς θεοὺς
μούραις ποιεῖσθε μηδαμῶς· ἡγεῖσθε δὲ
βλέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εὔσεβῆ βροτῶν.

It is generally admitted that *μούραις* is impossible and the variant *μούρας* very unsatisfactory. The corrections proposed seem to me pretty bad, and perhaps mine will appear such to others; however, I propose *μώρους ποιεῖσθε· μηδαμῶς, ἡγεῖσθε δὲ κ.τ.λ.* ‘Professing to honour the gods, do not consider them so foolish that they cannot distinguish between the righteous and the impious.’

Oed. Col. 658. πολλαὶ δ' ἀπειλαὶ πολλὰ δὴ μάτην ἔπη
θυμῷ κατηπείλησαν, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν
αὐτοῦ γένηται, φροῦδα τάπειλήματα.

The corrupt word is clearly *ἀπειλαὶ*; the subject of *κατηπείλησαν* *ἔπη* must be a person, not a thing, and this is indicated also by *θυμῷ*. Read then *πολλοὶ δὲ κἄλλοι*.

Schneidewin's *πολλοὶ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ* is intolerable—at least to me. The scholiast says *πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι*; this does not look as if he read *ἀπειλαὶ*. A conceivable explanation of his *ἄνθρωποι* is that *ἄλλοι* was mistaken for *ανοι*, but anyhow he clearly read *πολλοὶ*. A blush is visible on the face of all but very brazen defenders of *ἀπειλαὶ* *ἔπη κατηπείλησαν*.

Oed. Tyr. 217. τῇ νόσῳ θ' ὑπηρετεῖν.

This phrase has been questioned, but cf. Xen. *Mem.* I. iv. 13, *νόσους ἐπικουρῆσαι*, Antipho *Tetr.* Γα fin., *τῇ ἀνομίᾳ τοῦ παθήματος ἀμύνοντας*, which means, however, ‘helping him who has been illegally ill-treated,’ and so is not exactly perhaps to the point; Aristotle *de Respir.* ix. 1, *βοήθειαν τῆς φθορᾶς*.

Phil. 852. οἰσθα γὰρ δν αὐδῶμαι,
εἰ ταῦτὰν τούτῳ γνώμαν ἵσχεις,
μάλα τοι ἄπορα πυκνοῖς ἐνδεῖν πάθη.

ταῦτὰν L, *ταύταν* A, *ταύταν* Γ and editors. The obvious and best correction seems to me *ταῦτᾶ*. ‘You know whom I mean (Odysseus): if you agree with him, great difficulties are in your way.’ That *δν* is right seems to me clear; the Chorus naturally shrink from naming Odysseus, and *τούτῳ* is strange if referring to Philoctetes, who would be *τῷδε* (cf. *ὅδε* in 839). Metre also favours *δν*, especially if we consider the metre of the previous line: it is true that it involves reading *μένομεν* for *μενοῦμεν* in 836, but either 836 or 852 must be altered, and *μένομεν* appears to me slightly better in itself than *μενοῦμεν*. For *ταῦτᾶ* cf. Theocr. xv. 18, where also it was corrupted and had to be restored by Reiske.

ARTHUR PLATT.

in Bo
their
assum
applie
which
the t
conten
pheno
theme
the s
simile
This p
the sy
confu
Owin
Good
have
and i
cumu
stitut
simile
educa

Line
took
below
seen
earlie
Both
line,

¹ I
conver
similes

PLATO'S SIMILE OF LIGHT.

PART I.

THE SIMILES OF THE SUN AND THE LINE.

I.

No part of Plato's writings has been more debated than the three similes in Books VI.-VII. of the *Republic*, and still there is a diversity of opinion about their meaning. I believe that most of these difficulties arise from certain assumptions about their purpose which need revision. The current view applies the Cave to the Line, as Plato seems to direct, and this application, which is itself attended by considerable difficulties, leads to an assimilation of the two figures till (in most accounts) they seem to have much the same content and purpose. Again, as this makes the lower line appear to be the phenomenal world, it is thought that the simile of the sun foreshadows the theme of the Line by hinting at a connexion between the intelligible and the sensible which is made more explicit in the Line. Thus the group of similes seem mainly intended to show the dependence of Becoming upon Being. This paper will argue that such a view depends upon the misrepresentation of the symbolism adopted by Plato, that two antithetical groups of symbols are confused with one another, and that symbols are even identified with antitypes. Owing to these misinterpretations (if they prove to be such) the Form of the Good has been mistaken for a material cause; both the Line and the Cave have been thought to reveal Plato as embarrassed by a dualism between sense and intellect, and the purpose of the Cave in particular, since the error is cumulative, has been completely obscured. This paper will attempt to substitute for current accounts another interpretation which will relate the three similes closely with the political arguments of Book VI., and with the Platonic education which is set forth in close connexion with them.¹

The debt which I owe to Mr. Stocks's valuable paper on 'The Divided Line' (*Classical Quarterly*, 1911, pp. 72-88) needs special acknowledgement. I took his view as my point of departure, and the account of the Line given below seems to me at least to be implicit in some of his arguments. Had I seen Dr. Henry Jackson's article in the *Journal of Philology* (1882, pp. 132-150) earlier, I should have owed to him an even greater debt on an essential point. Both papers mark the significance of the images and originals in the lower line, and the latter (rightly, I believe) gives them a purely symbolical meaning.

¹ I use Professor Burnet's text. It will be convenient to use capital letters to designate the similes themselves, and small letters for the *sun*, the *line* and the *cave*, from which the similes are named.

But neither, I venture to think, connects them rightly with the symbolism in the other similes; and both assume that the relating of the two worlds is, sooner or later, Plato's object.

II.

THE SIMILE OF THE SUN.

*λαμπρὰ μὲν ἀκτὶς ἡλίου, κανὼν σαφῆς.
ἀνθρωπος ἀνθρωπον γεννᾷ . . . καὶ ἡλιος.*

The central books of the *Republic* explain three great changes which must be made if the ideal state is to become a reality. By far the most important of these is the third, which requires that philosophers shall be kings and kings philosophers. The early part of Book VI. discusses the cleft between these classes in the existing state, and the corruption of the best natures by their surroundings. The second part asks how the philosophic natures can be rescued and trained. They must learn the greatest study, the Form of the Good, which all men desire, though most seek it blindly without knowledge. But as the Good lies beyond other studies, and *a fortiori* out of the sight of those who actually rule the state, it cannot well be described directly to hearers who have not travelled some way upon the long road to it. So naturally Socrates describes it in figure. We may say that this first simile, which is simply and purely a simile, gives the orientation of the map which is to guide his philosophers. Then the later similes, which are really part of the same figure of Light, fill in the details. The Line explains in outline the two methods by which the explorer may arrive at the Good which is his end. Then the Cave, which is more complex, exhibits two competing goods, and the means by which the neophyte, if caught in time, may be turned from the false good to the Good he really desires. We must not forget, in discussing levels of cognition and the like, that the whole experience is conceived in terms of desire or longing.

In interpreting these similes we fall into error, which engenders in turn more errors, from the moment that the symbols become more than symbols, and take on a certain reality of their own. This I believe to be the cause of all our perplexities and disputes. It is therefore important to determine how Socrates arrives at his symbolism.

He proposes to describe the Form of the Good, which all men desire, by a comparison with its offspring, the sun, which is very like it (506e 3). He recalls the 'many beautifuls' and 'beauty itself,' which is one, from Book V. (479e). 'And we say,' he continues, 'that the former are seen (*όρασθαι*) but not conceived (*νοεῖσθαι*), while the ideas are conceived but not seen' (507b). Then the sense of *seen* is strictly defined. For the analysis of sight and hearing which follows draws from Glaucon the admission that sight differs from all other senses in requiring a precious bond to unite it with its object. That bond is light and its source the sun. The sole object of this argument is to extract

a singl
purpos

W
pretati
Phaedo
and be
soul.
other u
Visibil
tangib
invisib
order t
If the
elemen
qualiti
light, r
as con
intellig
his def
fyin
purpos
annul
intellig
whole
the Re

I
make
offspring
materi
thought
the su
greate
cause
Demi
that
materi
upon i
no mo
is self-
to ma

¹ *Pha*
Tim. 28
² I s
Plato's

a single system, that of light, from the material cosmos which will serve the purpose of his analogy.

We may illustrate the effect of this distinction—which is vital to the interpretation of the similes—by comparing the superficially similar place in the *Phaedo* (79a) where Plato posits the same antithesis between many beautifuls and beauty itself. There the purpose is to argue for the immortality of the soul. Given the hypothesis that the two are opposed, the one class is seen, the other unseen; and the body belongs to the first class, the soul to the second. Visibility is clearly taken as the typical quality of matter, the visible and tangible,¹ which is in a state of becoming and perishing, in opposition to the invisible and eternal. But the *Republic* here recalls this opposition purely in order to select a single element in matter and use it as a symbol of the unseen. If the *Phaedo* makes the seen the representative of process because it is an element in process, the *Republic* distinguishes visibility from all other sensible qualities because the fact that it alone needs the valuable ‘third kind,’ the light, makes it a fit type of the intelligible. Since this is so, the *visible* cannot, as commentators assume, be identified with the *sensible* in opposition to the *intelligible* which it was selected to symbolize unless Plato expressly changes his definition.² But where does he cancel or modify his symbolism by identifying the visible pure and simple with the visible and tangible? Not for the purpose of the similes, I shall argue. But the commentators force him to annul it when they attempt to conceive of a metaphysical bond between the intelligible and its visible symbol, since the latter at once becomes at least the whole material system. This confusion leads commentators to see in the *Republic* a dualism which was far from Plato's mind in these passages.

In the simile of the Sun two considerations seem to justify the attempt to make the analogy ‘really more than an analogy.’³ They are: (1) the metaphor *offspring*, which is supposed to imply that the *Form* of the Good is somehow a material cause with the sun as its product; (2) the assertion that the sun, though not generation, is the cause of generation (509b 3). It is a mystery how the sun, hanging between being and becoming, can escape being *γένεσις*, a still greater mystery how a formal cause like the Good can also be a cosmological cause;⁴ and some try to avoid the difficulty by identifying it with God, the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. This is the first, though by no means the last, time that we shall find portentous metaphysical results brought about by materializing a metaphor. The figure of the sun and the visible dependent upon its light is a perfect analogy for the Good and the intelligible. But it is no more than an analogy. If transmuted into a piece of cosmology as well, it is self-contradictory, and ruins the illustration which it was Plato's sole purpose to make.

¹ *Phaedo*, 79a 1, 81a 5, 83b 4; *Rep.* 525d; *Tim.* 28b 7, 31b 4.

² I say *definition* rather than *terms* because Plato's vocabulary is fluid. This has caused

much of the difficulty in interpreting these similes.

³ Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, I. 162.

⁴ Natorp, *Plato's Ideenlehre*, p. 192 sqq.

The sun is not said to be the physical *product* of the Good.¹ It is the offspring of the Good because it is an observed cause of good, *final in its sphere* as the Good is final among the forms. Why is a thing 'like' a form? Because it possesses in a measure the quality that the form is absolutely. Now the sun is the chief benefactor of men in the visible world. He is the image of the Good because he is the provider of good things (517c 3), as Plato constantly reminds his readers. He is the steward dispensing that precious power, sight (508b 6); men owe to him growth and increase and nourishment (509b 2); he brings the seasons round in their course (516b 10, *Crat.* 410c 5). Here, then, is the natural basis of the figure, as the summary of the whole analogy plainly shows (517c).

This is confirmed by the saying, so dark on any other view, that the sun, though not *γένεσις*, is the cause of *γένεσις*, as if Plato were constructing a genealogy in which the Good engendered the sun, and the sun caused all process. To say that the sun causes process (that is, becoming and decay) is much like saying, in the parallel illustration, that it causes seeing and blindness (508). It is not true, and does not illustrate the Good, which is the cause of good and not of evil. And, on the other hand, if we take *γένεσις* as process, the argument is not saved by some subtlety which places the sun in, but not of, the phenomenal world. Adam asserts, for example, that the sun is the only true *γένεσις*. On the same principle of turning a plain negative into a transcendental affirmative, why not say that the sun, though not sight, is the only true sight? Such ingenuities would not occur to Glaucon, if only because they destroy a plain analogy.

The sun is not said to cause *γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν*, but *γένεσιν καὶ αὐξήν καὶ τροφήν* (509b). That is: it does not grow, though it causes things to grow by its light.² So the Good is the cause of Being, though not itself Being. That is all the illustration means. It is an analogy in respect of the light-giving power of the sun alone, and Plato's own words make this clear: Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τὰ γαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι περ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὄρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὄρωμενα (508b-c). It is a matter of values, not of causation, and it is hardly less ill-advised to draw a profound metaphysical significance from the metaphor here than to seek one in the words of the dying Mirabeau about the sun: 'Si ce n'est pas là Dieu, c'est du moins son cousin germain.'

¹ In this as in other points the *Timaeus* misleads if we seek to interpret our analogy by means of the metaphors which Plato uses there. It describes *creation*, and the application of the metaphor of offspring is determined accordingly; but our metaphor is simply the basis of a fertile analogy by which the relation of the forms to the Good may be grasped. The metaphor in the *Timaeus* explains a causal relation; this metaphor

merely gives the link of likeness between type and antitype, without cosmological implications. Though I have not space to elaborate the point, the *Timaeus* is the source of the misinterpretations noted above (see e.g. Caird and Natorp).

² *Cratylus*, 409 a, is a useful commentary; ήπιος is connected with αἰολεῖν ὅτι ποικίλλει λόγος τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τῆς γῆς. Cf. Clem. Alex., *Eccl. Proph.* 26, 3, and Dion, *Or.* III. 74.

Plato's purpose is to illustrate the dependence of mind and its objects upon the Good, and its transcendence over both mind and its objects.

First, a certain term or terms have a *need* for the sun. If the eye is to see at all, it must have the 'third kind,' light; if it is to see well, that light must be sunlight. Senses other than sight are self-complete in so far as they only need the sense organ and its object for the exercise of their function.¹ But though the eye may be perfect, and the colour, its object, within range, they need the intermediacy of light. The same point is implied in saying that the sun is the cause of growth. In both you have an activity or object self-complete, like seeing or colour or growth; yet they need another term to actualize them. Plato's first point, then, reinforced by constant repetition,² is the *need* that sight and its appropriate object have for light.

Since light is a variable, it may be used to illustrate the principle of discrimination. It will be remembered that in Book V. Plato took three main trends of the human soul—the lover and the lover of wine at the level of desire, the *φιλότυπος* at the level of ambition, and the *φιλόσοφος*.³ All of these are at first said to desire their object indiscriminately (*εὐχερώς*), but a distinction is immediately detected in the last group, according as the object that the philosopher desires to see is the truth or not. It is this distinction, or rather the source of it, that Plato brings out here. The eye is naturally formed to see in the sunlight, and has perfect vision only by day: 'Ακτὶς Ἀελίου . . . ὁ μάτερ ὄμμάτων, as Pindar wrote. Now imagine the sun's light mediated by a luminary of the night; then sight grows dim, and colours fade, and men become half-blind. So direct light is like truth, and the half-light like opinion, though still derived from the sun. This illustrates how men, who desire the Good, may find satisfaction in experience at a lower level, which nevertheless depends upon it. But the whole group of relations, knowing and its object, opinion and its object, depend on the third factor, the Good, which is not yet a direct object of knowledge or desire. In short: Plato uses the *trina ratio videndi* in order to show that the two terms need a third, and need that third to be the sun (i.e. the Good) if the vision is to be perfect.⁴

¹ It is surely a mistake to found upon this passage for Plato's theory of vision. Steinhart, followed by others, criticizes Plato for failing to see that hearing too needs a medium. But the word *medium* is imported by himself. Since man does not live now *in vacuo*, now in the ambient air, the physical medium of hearing may be disregarded as a constant. But sight differs from all other senses in depending on a variable condition, the light. This variability is the point of the simile. When Adam (507c) says that the conditions peculiar to seeing—namely, light and darkness—do not affect the other senses, he misses the meaning, which is that no other sense has similar peculiar conditions (*ἴδια ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ περικύρως*).

² 507c 19, προσδεῖ; δι, ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον; δ5, προσδεῖ; δι2, προσδεῖται.

³ 474d-475e. This must be interpreted in the light of the analysis of the soul in Book IV., where the three ways of life in the Pythagorean analogue of the Olympian games are the basis of the three tendencies of the soul which find their outlet in the ideal state. See Stocks, *Mind*, April, 1915.

⁴ Chalcidius, *Commentarius in Timaeum*, CCXLV. After describing the three flames necessary to vision, he adds: 'quorum si quid deerit, impediti uisum necesse est.' Adam gives a list of eight terms in the parallelism between the Good and the sun (*Rep.*, vol. II. p. 69): these translations of nuances in the text, however, merely obscure the fact that there is but a triple ratio, in which Sight : Colour need the third term in order to become operative.

The statement that the Good stands to Being as the sun to growth is merely another illustration of the same point. The figure itself is no more abstruse than such a saying as ἀνθρωπος ἀνθρωπον γεννα και ηλιος. The whole figure, in brief, is as simple as Milton's phrase about the 'vital sovereign lamp.'

We may now state the main purpose of the simile of the Sun. It illustrates twice over the manner in which the Good may be conceived as transcendent, yet as causing or maintaining the knowledge or Being or lower goods which some believed to be ultimate. When Glaucon exclaims ἀμήχανον κάλλος or δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς (509a 6, c1), he recognizes that the transcendence of the Good is the point of the analogy. With this recognition the first stage of the simile ends.

I have perhaps laboured a point which will seem obvious to some, because it is all-important for the interpretation of the remaining similes to see that the *visible*, now and hereafter, is purely a symbol of the intelligible, and that it is not the function of the Line to show how this visible, transmuted into the sensible or opinable, is related to the intelligible. No, having shown to Glaucon's satisfaction that the Good is transcendent, Socrates now prepares to illustrate how two successive methods of studying the intelligible may lead to knowledge of that transcendent Good, still using the convenient symbolism of the visible. Then in the allegory of the Cave he touches the question—one of supreme political importance—whether minds that are imprisoned in another system and taught to seek a lower good can be turned to the theoretical life. In this last section of the simile of Light all the symbolism of the previous similes is reintegrated into a whole.¹

III.

THE SIMILE OF THE LINE.

'For no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level: neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science.'—BACON.

A. The Line and the Simile of the Sun.

i. Glaucon asks that the comparison of the sun shall be continued if there is anything left to tell (509c 5). Socrates answers that there is a great deal left out, and then explicitly recalls the terms of the similitude. They have been discussing 'these two,' the sun and the Good, and one rules over the intelligible kind and region, the other over the visible—a plain reminiscence of the analogy in 508b-c. 'At all events,' he adds, 'you have these two kinds, the visible, the intelligible.' On the face of it Socrates picks up the threads of the first simile in order to develop within the visible, still no more than symbol, a fresh relation which will illustrate some parallel relation within the intelligible. Symbol remains symbol, antitype antitype; the text gives no

¹ I venture to give this name to the whole simile, which forms a connected and consistent picture, although a better name would be the

simile of the Sun, if that name were not already adopted by usage for the first of its three parts.

hint the
illustra
The vis
lower l
expand
Di
same p
represe
tions i
original
kind an
another
ὑποθέσ
method
he add
πίστι,
Stepha
πίστι
in the
obviou

are wo
that P
corres
others
lower
real an

τὸ ὅρα
a'
εἰκόνε

εἰκασία


Image
culty
name
on th
and e
image
analog
classe

1 I d
objects

hint that the symbolism is now to be translated from the realm of imaginative illustration, and transmuted into a lower and dependent 'world' of sense. The visible dependent on the sun is now represented by the content of the lower line, and symbolizes the upper, and I shall argue that any attempt to expand its contents to include the sensible and the opinable ends in confusion.

Divide a line into two unequal parts, A and B; divide the sections in the same proportion (a' and b' , a and b), so that $A:B::a':b':a:b$. Let A represent the visible, B the intelligible. Then a' represents shadows and reflections in smooth and polished surfaces and all the like, and b' contains the originals of these images, the living creatures about us and all the vegetable kind and all that is made by hand. These two groups are compared with one another in respect of clearness. In the upper line a stands for sciences, using $\nu\pi\theta\acute{e}\sigma\iota\ς$ and visible images of their intelligible objects as an aid, b for the method which proceeds from $\nu\pi\theta\acute{e}\sigma\i\ς$ towards a first principle. At the end he adds four mental states corresponding to these divisions. They are $\varepsilon\i\kappa\sigma\i\α$, $\pi\i\σ\i\ς$, $\delta\i\á\nou\i\α$, and $\nu\o\j\sigma\i\ς$. Of the two pages given to this analogy in Stephanus' edition less than a fifth suffices for the lower line, and $\varepsilon\i\kappa\sigma\i\α$ and $\pi\i\σ\i\ς$ are merely named in a proportion at the end, never to be recalled except in the final summary. Apparently their meaning seems to Plato to be so obvious as to need no discussion.

Such are the few and simple contents of the Line, in which commentators are wont to find all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth. They think that Plato classifies four kinds of objects and four faculties (Erkenntnissweisen) corresponding to the objects. Though some lay stress upon the objects and others upon the states, still all except Dr. Jackson consider the upper and lower line to be *in pari materia*, differing in the degree of reality, but still all real and representing all appearance and reality.



Now a classification should be exhaustive. What can it exhaust here? Images and originals cannot constitute a 'world' of phenomena. The difficulty is surmounted by taking the symbolic system of which they are part, namely the visible, neglecting the special sense in which they are dependent on the sun, and identifying it with the wider class, the sensibles (*aiσθητά*), and even with all opinables (*δοξαστά*).² Now it is one thing to say that the images and originals belong to the class *όρατόν* or *δοξαστόν*, from which the analogy was drawn, quite another to assume that therefore *all* members of the classes may be imported into the Line. It is as if Nietzsche's saying that the

¹ I do not for the present attempt to define the objects in *a*.

² See below (B) for Plato's purpose in using the singular of this word.

superman is as far beyond man as man is beyond the ape were taken as a piece of descriptive biology, and his comparison enlarged into a classification of mammals in general. Yet this fallacy is committed by the simple device of saying ὄπατά, αἰσθητά, and δοξαστά¹ instead of ὄπατόν and δοξαστόν, a class containing symbolical objects bound together by light. Then some reason must be found for all these additions, and the Line is supposed to illustrate their dependence on the intelligible, though Plato does not say so.

Any addition whatever to the content of the lower line destroys the ratio. Yet it is thought that Plato's oversight in mentioning only images and originals may be rectified by importing any and every classification made by him elsewhere.² If works of art are called images in Book X., they must needs, it is thought, be images here, although the fact that they are 'made by hand' and can cast a shadow ranks them among originals. For the test here is simply visibility and clearness. But if the distribution of objects of opinion according to some standard of value mentioned elsewhere loses the clear and distinct ratio bound by light in a maze of cross-classification, so that the lower line becomes a *monstrum informe cui lumen ademptum*, the view which treats it as the place of *αἰσθητά* fares little better. The ratio of images and originals is swamped. You cannot make a ratio into a whole 'world' of Becoming by adding freely to each term and then adding the terms together. At the first addition it ceases to be a ratio.³

No one would, I think, have attempted so hazardous a procedure as expanding the contents of the lower line if the usual method of applying the Cave to the Line in all its length did not seem to require it. If the cave really symbolizes the lower line, the lower line must have a content worth symbolizing; for, as Adam says, the images are of little or no metaphysical importance. It is this pressure from the cave that turns the lower line into the world of opinion; and it is the line in turn that makes the cave itself the world of sense. But the mode in which this application is made is itself an effect of the confusion between visible and opinables or sensibles. If it can be shown now that the usual interpretation of the passage directing that the application shall be made is mistaken, then at a stroke we can dispense with detailed criticism of other views. For we shall have explained why both Line and Cave have been thought to exhibit the dependence of Becoming on Being, why the lower line was assimilated to the cave itself and the cave to the lower line, though they have no connexion at all. We shall also have taken the first step in proving that the dualism which Plato seems to posit or to avoid

¹ Adam's whole exposition is vitiated by the failure to distinguish between the class to which the originals and images belong, and the collection of visibles and opinables which would, in a complete classification, be included in the class (see e.g. Vol. II., p. 157).

² See Mr. Stocks's criticism of such attempts.

³ One does not say that 1 : 2 is 3. The same consideration removes the difficulty felt about

the equality of the two middle sections. In the equation $\frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4}$ it does not occur to one to say that the denominator of the first is equal to the numerator of the second fraction, because each is determined by the other term in the ratio. The ratios as a whole are equal. In the Line the equality is one of clearness; other considerations are irrelevant.

with indifferent success is no metaphysical dualism, but the result of two different confusions in the Line and in the Cave. I shall therefore at once try to define the relation of the Line to the similes preceding and following it.

2. We have already seen that Socrates prepares to continue the comparison of the Sun, and restates the terms before branching out into a new distinction—one of *clearness*. This term, be it noted, is proper to a simile of light. But it is sometimes thought that the relation image-original is here substituted for the relation father-son, which was used of the Good and the sun, because Plato is about to show the dependence of the visible upon the intelligible. But the metaphor of offspring did no more than express the bond of likeness between the *heads* of the two systems, the symbols and the symbolized, whereas we have now to deal with a distinction *within* the symbolic system. The likeness was in respect of goodness, not in respect of causation; the distinction marks a difference of clearness in a system dependent on light. So far as the first simile is concerned, we thus arrive at a symbolic group of sun, originals, and images, bound together by light and illustrating a similar group in the intelligible.

Next, let us look at the passage in which Plato directs the application of the allegory to the previous account. ‘Now this simile [sc. of the Cave], my dear Glaucon, must be applied in all its parts to what we said before, the sphere revealed to sight being likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire therein to the power of the sun. If you will set the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible sphere, you will have my surmise; and that is what you are anxious to have.’¹ On the usual view the upward journey of the soul is supposed to be made in the Line,² and consequently the sphere revealed to sight is the lower line, symbolized by the shadows and puppets in the cave. Thus the Line seems at least to suggest and the Cave actually to represent, a progress from sense to the intelligible, from Becoming to Being. I shall now analyze the sentence clause by clause.

Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὡς φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἀπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὅψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῇ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἰκήσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἥλιον δυνάμει.

Plato does not mention the Line; he requires that the figure should be connected with what went before. As the mention of the sun and its power proves, the simile of the Sun as well as the Line is involved. For the lower line, which does not include the sun, adds to the realm of the visible dependent on it objects bound together by light. On the face of it, this is a contrast between two systems of light; yet the current interpretations ignore the point on which the comparison lays most stress. The point of attachment is, in fact, the visible region outside the cave, where the symbolism of the sun,

¹ 517b; Lindsay's translation.

² See postscript.

originals, and images is reintegrated after being split up for detailed explanation in the two preceding similes. The definition of the visible in the first simile still holds, then:¹ but here a new system, this time dependent on fire-light, is added below to complete and round out the simile of Light, but not to reduplicate the Line. As the translation of *προσάπτεον* by 'apply' is associated with the assumption that the Cave, as symbol, is applied to the Line, as antitype, it is preferable to say that the whole figure must be *attached* to what was said before, and that the point of attachment is the visible region outside the cave. In the *Frogs*, when Aeschylus makes the tag *ληκίθιον ἀπώλεσεν* 'fit in with' the Euripidean prologues (*ἐναρμόττειν*, v. 1202), the word for this tacking on or rounding out is *προσάπτειν* (vv. 1216, 1231, 1234).

Why are these systems put together? The clause *τὴν μέν, κ.τ.λ.*, explains that. The visible system in the sunlight is to be *compared* to the cave system, the old symbolism to the new, and in order that there may be no doubt Plato explicitly specifies the head of each system and its light.² It is, I urge, inconceivable that the phrase 'the power of the sun' should be a mere periphrasis for the material sun, when the whole similitude of Light turns on a symbolism which makes that power represent the realm of truth and reality. The visible region, held together by sunlight, is compared and contrasted with a wretched place, where the light is a fire and the place a prison. It is a divine *θεωρία* over against a human. *'Αφομοιοῦντα* therefore cannot mean that a set of symbols (in the cave) are paralleled with their antitype, the supposed sensible in the lower line. The word signifies the comparison of two antithetical sets of symbols, which are *in pari materia*; and we may recall that it is often used when an inferior imitation is set beside its genuine original.

Further, on the current view it seemed inexplicable that Plato should specify only the lower line (with which he dealt so summarily in Book VI.), and the cave with such particularity, and remain silent about the vitally important application of the upper 'world' outside the cave to the upper line. But now it seems that *upper* and *lower* mean different things in the Line and in the Cave, and that he places the *whole* imagery of the simile in relation to what has been said before. I add a table to illustrate the connexion.

¹ The 'visible region' in this passage is the symbolical *ὅπατὸς τόπος* of the Sun (508c 2), of the Line (509d 2)—yes, and of this simile too. On the page before this passage the philosopher is said to gaze at last directly at the sun, the lord of all things in the visible realm (516c 1), and it is mentioned again in this very paragraph (517c 2), where the link between the Good and its symbol is recalled from 506e 2—the link of goodness. Further, in the final summary (532c-d) the progress of the soul is likened to the rise of the clearest in the body to the sight of the highest in the bodily and visible region. This is an obvious echo of our passage; yet Adam can say

(517c) that 'Plato's guardians are not to rest satisfied with the *eikón* or *έκγυος* of the Good.' This confuses an image meant for the enlightenment of Plato's readers with the intellectual training given to the guardians. It is, I submit, impossible to take this summary as a warning against the dangers of astronomy. Once for all: if we may adopt Mr. Doughty's name for the fair region where the poets of his country dwell apart (*Clouds*, p. 9), the *ὅπατὸς τόπος* is the *Sunfield*, where philosophers learn to look upon truth.

² Cf. 509d, where the same type of definition is used in comparing symbol and antitype.

T
the po
one ar
attach
of the
perfec
But, s
for its
and th
witho

S
of ou
ἀνω
τιθεί
prison
of the
from
the L
to the
shad
sente
took
that t
as a p

I
instru
imag
even
havin
diffic
appli
are t
priso
beard
ideas
their

¹ T
admini
physi

Antitypes of the Visible.	Symbols.	Antitype of the Cave Life.
	Visible Region.	The Cave.
Form of Good = Sun	Fire =	Realm of
Upper Line, { Objects of <i>νοῦς</i> = Lower Line, { Originals	Puppets =	<i>ἀπαιδευσία</i> (514a)
{ Objects of <i>διάνοια</i> = Images	Shadows =	

The two central columns give the two contrasted systems (the one under the power of the sun, the other in the firelight), which are to be compared with one another. The left of these is outside the cave, and the whole figure is attached to what was said before, because this is identical with the imagery of the two preceding similes. The parallelism between the two is formally perfect. I have added in the outer columns the interpretation of the symbols, though the equation for the cave must for the present remain a mere hint. But, so far as the symbolism is concerned, we can now reserve the lower line for its proper function of illustrating the analogous section in the intelligible, and the cave, which has nothing to do with the lower line, can be approached without any preconceptions about its purpose to trammel interpretation.

So far, Plato has related the new symbolism to the old. The last clause of our quotation indicates how the whole figure is to be interpreted: *τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεῖς οὐχ ἀμαρτήσῃ.* . . . In other words: the journey of the rescued prisoners from their shadows to the sight of the sun symbolizes the progress of the soul from the life of the cave to knowledge and the Good. We know from the first simile what the sun means; we shall know from the analogy of the Line what the images and originals outside the cave mean; when we come to the Cave all that remains to be done is to interpret the fire and puppets and shadows. The view taken of this clause seems to be certified by the parallel sentence in 532b-d, where the progress is described in detail. But those who took the preceding application to refer to the lower line illegitimately assume that the soul performs its journey in the Line, which is accordingly interpreted as a progression.

It is not too much to say that other interpretations do not conform to the instructions in the text. Only by doing violence to the obvious parallelism of images and originals and lights do they make some 'general parallelism' which even then turns the Cave into a hazy repetition of the Line. Thus Dr. Shorey, having denied that the shadows in the Line mean anything,¹ is faced with the difficulty that the shadows in the cave (their natural analogues if the Cave is applied to the Line) must mean everything to the prisoners.² So the originals are thrown in with the images to secure even the makings of a world for the prisoners. Then the puppets have no function; so they are made, with their bearers, a mythological machinery connecting the world of sense with the ideas. But they do no more than connect the fire (which he ignores) with their shadows, and they help to keep the prisoners in the cave. He does not

¹ This denial is really a justifiable refusal to admit that the images, as such, have metaphysical import, or to add to them in order to make them a grade of reality.

² On the Idea of the Good in Plato's Republic, Chicago Studies, I.

find the objects of *διάνοια*, the importance of which he denies (they are the shadows outside the cave), and then rightly identifies the originals outside with the forms. This account is typical of those views which treat the lower line as the *sensible*.

Adam holds that the lower line is the realm of opinion. As he has distributed grades of opinion between the two lowest sections, he is able to make the images and originals in Line and cave correspond. But this really means that the shadows in the cave are said to symbolize the shadows in the Line, which stand for many other things that Plato does not mention. His canon of interpretation leads to the most complicated interlacing of *visible* and *intelligible*, so that any part of the Line may have its counterpart in the cave or outside, and the third section of the line is divided into two, one inside at the *λύσις*, another outside, with two sets of *visibles* in between. Then the shadows outside are said to correspond to the lowest section of the Line, which is true, but inadmissible on the editor's presuppositions.¹ It is evident that so careful a scholar has arrived at results so tangled because his principle of interpretation is faulty. How could it be otherwise if type and antitype, symbol and symbol, are so confused? On the ordinary assumptions, no parallel is established between Cave and Line.

A word must be added about Dr. Jackson's view,² as he sees clearly that the objects in the lower line must be purely symbolical, and that the *visible* is outside the cave. But in order to make the application accord with the theory that the dependence of sense upon the intelligible is in question, he separates off the shadows and *σκευαστά* from the reflections and the animals and plants of the line, placing the former inside and the latter outside the cave. This rests upon his contention that in the Line (510a) Plato mentions *first* shadows (in the cave), *then* reflections (outside the cave). But a simple parallelism shows that the whole content of the first section is outside the cave; compare 510a with 516a. This account ignores the *origin* of the images, which is the centre of the application: the power of the sun is contrasted with the dim firelight with its flickering light and shadow at long range.³ And it is the nature of the light that gives value to the things seen in it. Though the puppets are technically *σκευαστά*,⁴ they are but imitations of real things in a marionette show, the material of illusion like everything in the cave, far removed from the real things in the sunlight.

The Line cannot be made parallel to the Cave: each but distorts the interpretation of the other. We shall see this more fully when we come to deal with the allegory. Meanwhile the lower line can now be interpreted, both the objects and the *states*, as symbolic of the intelligible. For it follows

¹ See the notes on 514b, 515b, Vol. II. p. 163, 517c, and 516a.

² *J. Phil.* X. pp. 139-141.

³ Plato mentions this contrast again and again. See 516a, e9, 517 b, d6; 518a 2, a6, b3, c7, 520c 2, 521c 2, c6, 532c. This list may show the

vital importance of the distinction between the darkness of the *whole* cave and the light outside.

⁴ The meaning of *σκευαστά* in 515c is limited by 515a 1. Note Plato's contemptuous *παντόπα* . . . *παντοῖα* in 514b-5a.

at once
obscure
and an
Being,
gressio
passing
each o
is an :
a theo
opinio
the m
attemp
illustra
see wh

T
ness.
This g
'H και
δοξαστ
Why e
In Bo
respec
point.
have r
are rep
Plato
the ra
upper
τὸ γν
'place
they a
we ca
define
propo
seems
atio
propo

¹ *abre*
suppose
Being
proportion
so is δο

at once that the analogy is simply an analogy. It does not confess or try to obscure a dualism between two worlds. The severance is between symbols and antitypes. Therefore it does not show the dependence of Becoming upon Being, and there is no fourfold classification of objects or states. A progression from the bottom to the top is as little contemplated by the writer as passing from the back of a looking-glass. It is not necessary to suppose that each of four levels of apprehension has its special objects attached to it. This is an allowable device of symbolism; but it becomes artificial when taken as a theory of actual experience. Plato does not take account of the status of opinion here, does not exhibit the nature of error or of *ἀπαιδενσία*, nor judge the man in the street. That may be the function of the Cave. But here he attempts simply to answer the problem left by the first simile. The Line illustrates two stages of knowledge on the path to the Good. Let us try to see what light the symbolism sheds upon that.

B. *The Lower Line.*

The originals and images are said to be distinguished in respect of clearness. Then Socrates asks a question to which Glaucon at once assents. This granted, he immediately passes to the upper line. The question is this : 'Η καὶ ἔθέλους ἀν αὐτὸν φάναι, ην δ' ἐγώ, διηρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μὴ, ώς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὄμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ φῶμοιώθη ; (510a).'¹ Why does he substitute the pair *δοξαστόν* and *γνωστόν* for *όρατόν* and *νοητόν*? In Book V. he compares the object of knowledge and the object of opinion in respect of clearness, and uses the scale of darkness and light to illustrate his point.² It is from that discussion, indeed, that our figure springs, as we shall have reason to see. The two words he uses are *δοξαστόν* and *γνωστόν*; they are repeated no less than four times there,³ and are coupled nowhere else in Plato but in this analogy. Must we not infer that Plato, being about to use the ratio images-originals to illustrate a proportional difference of truth in the upper line, first recalls the established distinction between *τὸ δοξαστόν* and *τὸ γνωστόν*, made in terms of clearness, so that the illustrative ratio might be 'placed'? 'Originals are clearer than images. Would you then admit that they are *true*, just as the *γνωστόν* was *true* than the *δοξαστόν*? Very well, we can now proceed to the analogy I wish to make.' In other words: having defined the ratio *a'* : *b'* by the known ratio *A* : *B*, Plato can go on to state in a proportion how *a* differs from *b* in truth or clearness (*a'* : *b'* :: *a* : *b*). This seems to account for the dependence of the ratios of the subsections upon the ratio of the sections, and it is some confirmation of this view that the final proportion at the end of this simile (which might be expected to sum up the

¹ *αὐτό* is the lower line. But theories which suppose that the dependence of Becoming upon Being is in question appear to reverse the proportion, thus: 'as images are to originals, so is *δοξαστόν* to *γνωστόν*.' But the latter is the

ruling ratio, because it has already been fixed in Book V.

² 478c 11, and 14, *σαφηνεῖς* (*ἀσαφεῖς*; 479c 8, *οὐκονδόστερα*) (*φαντερα*).

³ 478a 10, b2, b3, 479d 7.

matter) is simply the four states. As the ruling ratio has served its purpose, it disappears till the summary of the whole simile in 534a. It may be remembered that Plato began the previous simile too by 'placing' his imagery: the sun, he said, was the child of the Good, and this had no metaphysical implications.

Next, we must ask more accurately what the illustration means. A thing is clear (*σαφής*) if it presents itself directly as what it is, if it needs no proof or guarantee beyond itself.¹ 'Αραὶ σαφεῖς are curses that are fulfilled, μάντις σαφής is a soothsayer whose words come true, φίλος σαφής is a tried friend, βάσανος σαφής a decisive test. So a thing is perfectly clear when the fact or the deed confirms the word, though that too may be unambiguous. I recall this plain sense of *σαφής* because many assume that the images and *εἰκασία*, being less clear, are not clear or even confused.² But they have descended prematurely into the cave. If Plato had desired to convey the meaning which they impute to him, it was within the resources of his language to do so. But the shadows and reflections are cast by an Attic sun, and the surfaces he mentions are mirror-like, 'close-grained, smooth and bright.' Contrast this with the flickering shadows of the cave or with the blurred image in troubled water that Aristotle took for the symbol of a dream.³

Again, what is *σαφές* is *πιστόν*, though the identical meaning is reached from different points of view. A φίλος *πιστός* means the same as a φίλος *σαφής*, and Sophocles can write *πιστά* or ἐμφανῆ τεκμήρια and *σαφῆ σημεῖα* of the sure proofs (ἐναργῶς, ὥσπερ εἰσορῆς ἐμέ) that Orestes is alive.⁴ Πίστις is μόνιμος (505e), βέβαιος (*Tim.*, 37b), and the best commentary on its fitness to illustrate the finality of ἐπιστήμη is that place in the *Cratylus* (437b), where Socrates connects *πιστόν* and ἐπιστήμη etymologically with *ιστάν* and *ἴστημι*. The thread of connexion is stability, and this sense is necessary for our analogy. If we bear in mind the close connexion of *σαφής* and *πιστός*, we shall not be tempted to import irrelevant philosophical associations, or to confuse the subjective senses of *πίστις* with its objective meaning. Τὸ πιστόν καὶ σαφές is what is verifiable. Μαστεύει δὲ καὶ τέρψις ἐν ὅμμασι θέσθαι | πίστιν. 'Seeing is believing,' says the plain man; but does not give this maxim some strained metaphysical sense.

• Πίστις, then, is the seeing directly of objects which have hitherto been seen only indirectly in images. When we turn to *εἰκασία*, we might not appear to have the same guidance from common speech, as it is chosen for its connexion with *εἰκόνες*. But if we set aside the misleading assumption that

¹ See Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Herakles*, v. 55. τὸ σαφές is τὸ βέβαιον or τὸ πιστόν (see below on πίστις); but in the hands of the Neo-Platonists this becomes: ἔχει οὖν τὸ ἀβέβαιον η̄ τουάντη πίστις, an exact inversion of Plato's sense (Iamblichus, *De Comm. Math. Sc.* VIII.).

² In 509d 9 σαφνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ is a case of polar expression. *Eikasia* and its images must be clear as διάνοια is clear.

³ *Parva Naturalia*, 461a 15, 464b 9; and compare Keats's figure: 'mingles . . . with a billowy main | A sun, a shadow of a magnitude.' Plato's figure is the more ordinary one, so common in poets, of a mirror-like surface. Contrast with λεῖα καὶ φάνα (510a) Plutarch's ἀμύδραι ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας (*De Iside*, c. 9).

⁴ *Electra*, 774, 1109, 885.

the state
name—
besieged
calculat
according
certaint
conjectur
inference
their in
mirror;
a state
original

Pla
account
ἀνάγκη
from the
bear to
is only a
the origi
at the r
the lette
which h
understa
πίστις, v
lower lin

¹ Thucy
κρίνειν, and
εἰκάσω ἐκ
dence.' If
we may c
θετις εἰκά
μᾶλλον δ' ὁ
καὶ στρίβειο
ἴστη (De P
confirmed

² Alcibiad

³ See al
cannot fol
the two sta

⁴ That δ

from 510b
⁵ Perhap
metaphor o
According
to things a
'For nam
arificial im
and the ref
such a wor
no word, bu

the state of the prisoners is *eīkaσίā*—Plato, of course, never calls it by that name—and consider usage, it is not hard to see what he means. When the besieged Plataeans were unable to measure the blockading wall directly, they calculated its height (*eīkāσavntes*)¹ from the width of a brick, and built ladders accordingly. When they used the ladders, reasonable confidence became certainty; for it now rested on *τὸ πιστόν* or *τὸ σαφές*. The translation *conjecture* is unfortunate, because it suggests unfounded surmise. *Eīkaσίā* is inference from appearances. In this context it is reading originals through their images. The plain man does not say that he sees an image in the mirror; he says that he sees *himself*.² So *eīkaσίā* may be defined, not as a state which contemplates images, but as the illustrative state which studies originals through their natural images.³

Plato's own use of the figure of natural images elsewhere confirms this account. One looks at a thing by means of its reflection if through some *ἀνάγκη*⁴ one cannot see it direct (*Phaedo*, 99d 5). Now the prisoner released from the cave first looks at the shadows and reflections because he cannot yet bear to look at the originals—*Ἐτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν* (532b). But this *eīkaσίā* is only a second best; he does not know in the true sense till he has passed to the originals themselves. ‘It is,’ writes Plato in 402b 5, ‘not enough to look at the reflections of letters in water or in mirrors, we do not really know the letters till we see them directly.’ Then the original confirms the image, which has now ‘come true.’ The allegory of the Cave, then, does help in understanding the Line; but it is outside that we must look for *eīkaσίā* and *πίστις*, when the prisoner looks at the same images and originals as in the lower line.⁵

¹ Thucydides, III. 20. Cf. *ἐκ τῶν eīkētwv kpliev*, and note the series *eīkōs*, *eīkāσw*, *eīkaσia*. *eīkāσw ē̄s* or *ā̄tō r̄wos* means ‘I infer from evidence.’ If we neglect the reference to the future, we may compare the saying, *μάντις δὲ ἄρποτος θ̄tis eīkāσeū kālōs*, with Plutarch’s comment: *μᾶλλον δὲ μὲν ‘eīkāσw kālōs’ . . . λχροσκονύrti kai στιβεύonti διὰ τῶν εὐλόγων τὸ μᾶλλον διώσ̄tēt̄* (*De Pyth. Orac. 10*); when his inference is confirmed he becomes a *μάντις σαφή̄s* or *πιστό̄s*.

² *Alcibiades I.* 132d; cf. *Phaedrus*, 250b.

³ See also Mr. Stocks’s account, though I cannot follow his view of *eīkaσia* or agree that the two states are real levels of apprehension.

⁴ That *διάρoia* is under some *ἀνάγκη* is clear from 510b 5, 511a 4, c7.

⁵ Perhaps the best example of the scope of the metaphor of natural images come from *Cratylus*. According to him names as naturally correspond to things as sensations to the objects of sense. ‘For names are like the *natural* and not the *artificial* images of visible things, such as shadows and the reflections found in water or in mirrors; and those men name in the true sense who say such a word, while those who do not, pronounce no word, but utter a mere sound: and this is the

expert’s business, to hunt down that name proper to each thing which nature has provided, just as it is the part of the keen-sighted to discern accurately the reflections proper to each thing’ (Ammonius, *On Aristotle’s De Interpretatione*, 34, 24, Busse). I owe the reference to a remark in my friend Mr. W. D. Woodhead’s unpublished paper on ‘Greek Etymology.’ Cf. Proclus, *In Cratylum XVII.*: ‘Οτι τὸ φύσει τετράχω̄s . . . ή̄w al oxiā kai al ἐμφάreis é̄t̄ rōis καθέπτōs. For a modern example of the indirect seeing of an object under a limitation, see Mr. Warde Fowler’s charming book on *Aeneas at the Site of Rome* (ed. 1): ‘Twice it has happened to me to find tree shadows reflected with such marvellous clearness that I was able to examine with my glass the shadow of a bird which was actually in the top of a tall tree.’ This is *eīkaσia*. Remembering the distinction made by the schools between ‘aenigmatical or specular vision’ and ‘immediate or direct vision,’ we might render Plato’s play on *eīkaσia* by ‘speculation,’ and say that *δiáρoia* is ‘specular,’ *νōs* ‘direct.’ For a reminiscence of the Platonic and Pauline figures see Clem. Alex., *Strom.* I. xix. 94, 1.

The two states are purely illustrative, like the objects with which they are correlated. They are not stages of apprehension, prior to *διάνοια* and *νόης*, but degrees of clearness or assurance, symbolizing *διάνοια* and *νόης*. Except as symbols, they have no metaphysical significance. The one is 'speculation,' propaedeutic; the other confirmation or fulfilment. We may contrast them with the cave, where the captives never suspect that their shadows have originals, nor recognize the originals when they see them.¹

C. The Upper Line.

i. It might be supposed that even though the lower line is found to be purely symbolical, the change need not affect accounts of the upper line, beyond affording a fresh illustration of its meaning. But this is not so. As the lower line appeared to be a classification and to have two different kinds of objects, it is supposed that intelligible objects must be completely classified in the upper, and by some that the two grades of objects must, like the lower, differ in kind. Also, there is difficulty about the relation of the intelligible to the supposed sensibles or opinables—and here the dualism imputed to Plato makes its appearance. But as the sun (the analogon of the Good) is not in the lower line, any interpretation that apparently succeeds in compressing the whole realm of the intelligible into the Line may be suspected of forcing the sense.

It will be argued that the simile does no more than give the general formula of the propaedeutic and the dialectic, two methods² by which the soul seeks the Good. The means of salvation are only outlined here, and the *συχνὸν ἔργον* (511c) of describing both disciplines in detail is left for Book VII., where Socrates also shows in figure the rescued prisoner contemplating the Good.

We may put aside for the moment, so far as we are able, those difficulties with which the upper line is beset, to follow Plato's order of exposition. Our perplexities are not Glaucon's, if we may judge from the points upon which the text insists.

Plato simply asks how the section of the *νοητόν* is made (510b 2), and the answer (b4-9), quoted below, contains all that is necessary to discriminate the two parts. The two following paragraphs explain separately at greater length the two marks of mathematical discipline in the order of their importance;

¹ If the Line is assimilated to the Cave, one is obliged to take refuge in the assumption of a good and a bad *eikasia*, of a true and a false *πλοτίς*, or else merge both states together in the cave, where all cats are grey in the dark. But this is a tacit admission that the words must be given two meanings or no specific meaning if they apply to both cave and lower line. And has *πλοτίς*, true or false, any meaning at all if applied to the utter incredulity of the prisoner when faced round to the puppets?

² For the insistence on *method* compare *ἡγεῖν* (510b 5), *πορευομένην* (b6), *μέθοδον* (b8, c5), *ὁδὸν σὺν* (511a 4), *ἰοῦσαν*, *ἐκβαίνειν* (a5, 6), etc. The primitive meaning of *way* (*όδος*) is very near the surface in Plato's whole discussion. Cf. Diels, *Parmenides*, p. 47: 'Wenn Plato sagt ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται (*Rep.* VII. 533c), so findet eine eigentliche Personifikation statt, in der die gleichsam zu διθύρωστος μεθοδεύεται wird.' In the Cave we shall find even clearer indications that Plato has in mind the figure of a way.

next he
then su
underst
proport
point, t
and Gla

The
μὲν αὐτὸν
ὑποθέσει
ἀρχὴν ἀ
εἰδεστι δι
fied and
be impo
less tha
differenc

Each
aids in t
attitude
used as i
lower lin
using νπ
consiste
to an unc

It m
use of v
intends t
the Line
that the
supreme
reach, a
it is clea
is διάνοι
(511b 4).
turns, no

The
incomple
nected w

¹ Nettles
Cook Wilso
1904, pp. 1
forgot the e
to prove th
of gradatio
scientific n
the structur
division of

next he restates the two characteristics together (511a); a single paragraph then suffices to define the method of dialectic. Glaucon shows that he fully understands the distinction that Socrates draws, and the book ends with the proportion of the four states. If we are to judge by the space given to each point, the 'placing' of mathematics is the main concern of this discussion, and Glaucon realizes that this is so (d2-5, cf. 533d-e).

The first formulation of the distinction between the methods is: 'Ηι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκέ τέ πάρχειν πορευομένη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἔτερον—τὸ ἐπ' ἄρχην ἀνυπόθετον—ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ιοῦσα καὶ ἀνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, αὐτοῖς εἰδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη (b4-9). Though this distinction is amplified and clarified afterwards, nothing essential is added; we must suppose it to be important and to contain all that is important because Plato reiterates it no less than five times. If he had intended the distinction to turn upon a difference of objects, he would surely not leave it in ambiguity.

Each method is defined by two marks. But the use or disuse of visible aids in the procedure of the two methods is dependent on the other mark—the attitude they preserve to their starting-points; if the former originals, now used as images, are mentioned first here, it is to link the explanation with the lower line. The essential difference between the methods is that the first, using *ὑποθέσεις* as starting-points, is constrained to reason from to a conclusion consistent with them, and the second, also using *ὑποθέσεις*, proceeds upwards to an unconditioned starting-point.

It might be thought that the two marks of the first method, especially the use of visible images, and Glaucon's answer (511b 1), would show that Plato intends to define the propaedeutic. But here, I think, the assumption that the Line must show a complete classification of *ὄντα* has caused some to think that the fourth section must show the forms all finally ranged under the supreme principle.¹ So *vōūs* is made a purely ideal stage, not within human reach, and *διάνοια* becomes the operant faculty of the dialectical process. But it is clear from Plato's own words, as well as his definitions, that where there is *διάνοια*, there is no dialectic, and where there is dialectic, there is no *διάνοια* (511b 4). Otherwise the structure of the Line breaks down. The distinction turns, not on things *organized*, but on the mode of *organizing*.

The mark of the mathematician's systems is not merely that they are incomplete—the dialectician's systems are incomplete too till they are connected with the Good—but they are *closed*. For him the *ὑποθέσεις* are im-

¹ Nettleship, *Lectures*, p. 254. See also Professor Cook Wilson's valuable article in *Class. Rev.* 1904, pp. 258-9. The latter suggests that Plato forgot the ethical forms, and instances the Cave to prove that ethical notions have the same kind of gradations in respect of truth and reality as scientific notions. All one can answer is that the structure of the Line exactly anticipates the division of the intellectual education, and that

all difficulty disappears if we abandon the unjustified assumption that the Line shows a continuous classification in progress. As for the Cave, that argument implies that it can be paralleled with the Line in all its extent, and that the several states in it contemplate all notions and forms at successive levels of truth and reality. But I hope to show that the second supposition is untenable too.

movable,¹ not stepping-stones to the final *ἀρχή*; and he purchases consistency at the price of being confined within his system. That is why Plato can later call his pursuit *δόξα* (534c).² The mathematician proceeds downward from what seems to be perfectly clear and intelligible; the dialectician presses up to the single principle and treats nothing short of that as immovable. In short: the difference lies in the movement of thought down from a fixed *ἀρχή* and consistently with it, or towards the supreme *ἀρχή*.

Closely connected with the *ὑποθέσεις* of mathematics are the 'visible images,'³ and this seals the inseparable connexion of the mathematical disciplines with the third section. As this is the sole hint of a direct connexion between the middle sections, it is important to determine exactly what it means. We may use Plato's account of the origin of *ἀριθμητική* in Book VII. to illustrate a vital distinction. There he shows how the science arises from the contradictions of sense, and contrasts the mathematician's units with the sensible units of the plain man. But now consider the *method* of a systematic science in possession of its *ὑποθέσεις*. Its objects are intelligible, and the scientist consciously uses visible symbols of those objects for the purposes of his inquiry. Thus, when Theaetetus desired to find a general expression for numbers with an irrational square root, he began by dividing numbers into 'square' and 'oblong'.⁴ He brings a complicated problem before his eyes by arranging units in patterns of dots, and the diagrammatic notation enables him to arrive at a general formula for 'oblong' numbers.⁵ But clearly the diagram is simply an aid.⁶ The problem does not spring from it; it has no meaning except as a convenient device for bringing before the eye objects which are conceived, not seen. Now the Line does not touch on the origin of the sciences. It simply states what the mathematician does. His *ὑποθέσεις* are not represented as arising out of the contradictions of sense (*scil.* the lower line); but, having his *ὑποθέσεις*, he goes to the objects of sight to make convenient symbols which will represent spatially his object. In other words, we must not confuse the metaphor of images and originals which Plato addresses to his readers with the action of the mathematician (whose activity is illustrated by him), in taking a visible symbol for the purposes of his science. There is no room here for the assumption that the soul is shown to rise from the contemplation of sensible particulars to the intelligible. The use that Plato makes of this mark of mathematical method confirms our belief that the lower line is used for symbolical purposes only.⁷

In 511a Socrates resumes the two marks of the mathematical disciplines,

¹ 533c, *ἀκυήτος*. This is opposed to the procedure of dialectic—*τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα* (533c). It is useful to recall the contrast between *ἀκίνητα νόμιμα* (Thuc. I. 11) and *νόμοις ἀναιρεῖν*. Cf. *Laws*, 846c.

² See Part II., end.

³ 510b 4, d5, 511a.

⁵ See e.g. Theon of Smyrna, *Comm. de Rebus*

Mathematicis, p. 32 (Hiller). Plato has been criticized for confusion in his treatment of this section, but the criticism rests on a confusion between *λογιστική* and *ἀριθμητική*.

⁶ 510d, *προσχρόνται, 511c, προσχρώμενος*.

⁷ The 'visible images,' which the mathematician 'moulds and draws,' are of course among the *σκευαστὴν γένος* in b'.

and lay
labours
escapes
Socrate
conclud
All is re
some no
limitatio
κάτω ἀ
τετιμη
objects
between
of two
moment
expositio
This is s
section h
the two
in the pa
see why
already a
then, cal
is compl

It is
the math
any acco
immovab
not enclo

Glau
upper lin
Μανθάν
διαλέγεστ
τεχνῶν κ
catches u
mark the
The acco
for them.
wishes, to
πίστις : e
Becoming
mention o
for the la

Whe

and lays special stress upon the limitation or necessity under which the soul labours in using them. This is prior to describing a higher method which escapes from the necessity. Glaucon's answer that he fully understands Socrates to mean processes of geometry and kindred sciences justifies us in concluding that an analysis of mathematical method is alone in question here. All is ready now to pass to the fourth section. But before we touch on that, some notice must be taken of the phrase which is used to describe the second limitation. It is this: *εἰκόσι δὲ χωριένην* [sc. τὴν ψυχήν] *αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέστι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις* (511a 6). This is a puzzling clause because it gathers up the objects of the lower line (it can mean nothing else) and makes a comparison between them. But if the sole purpose of the Line is to elucidate the relations of two methods, *we should expect* the illustrative ratio to be recalled at the moment that the last term in the proportion is about to be given; for a long exposition separates the original symbolism from its impending application. This is surely why the word *ἐναργέστι* is used, and why Glaucon, when the last section has been explained, at once says that a distinction of clearness between the two upper sections is made. For Socrates has only made this distinction in the parallel illustrative ratio, and here recalls it. On this view it is easy to see why Plato uses two perfect participles to express a relation of values already agreed upon as the basis of the analogy. The clause from *kai* onward, then, calls to mind the first two terms of the proportion before the proportion is completed.

It is unnecessary to analyze the description of the dialectic. The hunter, the mathematician, must hand over his bag to that cook, the dialectician,¹ if any account is to be given of the *ὑποθέσεις* which have hitherto been taken as immovable. The second method has an open road to the Good, because it is not enclosed within its starting-points.

Glaucon's answer shows that he has grasped, not the meaning of the upper line as distinguished from the lower, but the purpose of the *whole* Line: Μανθάνω . . . ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλούμενον. . . . After repeating the two marks of distinction, he catches up the word *διάνοια* from 511a 1, and adds that Socrates wishes to mark the inferiority of this state to *νοῦς*, as something between *δόξα* and *νοῦς*. The account of two activities of the soul naturally suggests convenient names for them. This gives Socrates a final opportunity of stating the proportion he wishes to establish, this time in terms of states. They are *νόησις* : *διάνοια* :: *πίστις* : *εἰκασία*. If the purpose of the Line were to show the dependence of Becoming upon Being, one would expect it to be stated here, as there is no mention of it before. But the four states merely give the illustrative analogy for the last time before the Cave.

When the second member of an analogy is to the first as the fourth

¹ *Euthydemus*, 290c.

is to the third, says Aristotle,¹ the fourth may stand for the second or the second for the fourth. How can the fourth section of the line be called *πίστις*, and the third *εἰκασία*? Seeing originals only through their images imposes limitations. Their outline, or at most their colour, is known, and one cannot give an account of them till their originals have been seen. So *διάνοια*, under its *ἀνάγκη*, is content to remain within the limits of its *ὑποθέσεις*, though its knowledge, so far as it goes, is systematic and true. That is image-gazing. When the eye passes to the originals, they are not new objects. The picture made from the images need not be cast aside, but it has suffered a sea-change. It is corrected, amplified, and set in a truer context. The images are no longer needed—they are ‘destroyed’ because their originals tell so much more and tell it more clearly. So dialectic strives to synthesize the *νοητόν* under a single principle, content with nothing less than the forms in their true connexion. It ‘makes sure.’ That is *πίστις*, assurance. Such is the way in which the power of sight ‘imitates’² the prooemium and the nomos of the intellectual education.

2. I have followed Plato's own order of exposition, because it seemed to place our modern perplexities in perspective. As to the chief of them, the nature of the objects in the third section, the little that need be said here is mainly negative. The mathematical intermediates cannot be ruled out by reading all forms short of the final synthesis into the third section, and on the other hand to demand a different *kind* of object in each section is a fallacy derived from the misinterpretation of the illustrative objects in the lower line. While the analogy of itself is consistent with either view, it suggests, if anything, that just as *εἰκασία* is looking at the originals under a limitation, so *διάνοια* may study the forms within its special limitations. But little weight can be attached to that. If the distinction of objects were of fundamental importance, one would expect that Plato, who has hitherto in the dialogue assigned only forms to the *νοητόν*, and actually reiterates no less than five times the two marks of distinction between the sections, would state as explicitly that the objects of *διάνοια* are distinguished from the forms by their plurality.³ The language gives no decisive clue. It is a desperate resort of Adam's to detect in *τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ* (510d) a generic plural, and thereby to force from the text some implied recognition of the plurality of the intermediates. The only legitimate interpretation is that Plato here distinguishes between the *diagram* that the geometer draws and the object itself that he reasons about. He looks at one thing and thinks about the other. Plurality does not enter into the question. Again—and this is a more serious point—in interpreting the phrase which says that *διάνοια* is intermediate between *δόξα* and *νοῦς*, we must remember that the word *μεταξύ* has a history

¹ *Poetics*, 1457b 16. Compare the excellent example in *Gorgias*, 465b; and see Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* XXVII. for Plato's use of the method of *ἀναλογία*.

² 532a.

³ This consideration seems to weigh against the attempt to extract from Plato's language here or in Book VII. an *implied* admission that the objects of mathematics are ‘many.’

in the
δόξα r
interm
our si
place
δόξα i
interm
metap
δόξα,
μεταξύ
in the
argues
forced
ence u
thought
recogn
Burne
Acade
the tex
it was
probab
two pa

W
νοητά.
distinc
Line i
third s
is the
καίτοι
dialect
sense.
Glauco
to deal
because
tion of
lower s

3.
what t
which
section
ditions

¹ The
νοητόν re
forms in

in the dialogue, which should give us pause before we suppose either that $\delta\acute{\xi}\alpha$ must mean the lower line, or that the objects of $\deltai\acute{a}vou\alpha$, as objects, are intermediate in the technical sense defined by Aristotle. We have seen that our simile springs from the discussion at the end of Book V. Now in that place Plato inserts $\delta\acute{\xi}\alpha$ and its object between ignorance and knowledge: $\delta\acute{\xi}\alpha$ is clearer than the former, less clear than the latter. So it is called intermediate like its object (477a, 478d, 479d). Our analogy continues the metaphor of clearness, and inserts another group of intermediates between $\delta\acute{\xi}\alpha$, which has already been placed, and knowledge proper. The word $\mu\acute{e}ta\xi\nu$ arises naturally from the mode in which the analysis is conducted in the two books. If it is said that the intermediacy of the objects of $\delta\acute{\xi}\alpha$ argues a similar intermediacy in the objects of mathematics, I agree, but am forced to give weight to the fact that Plato makes that turn on their dependence upon immovable $\dot{\nu}\pi\theta\acute{e}\sigma\epsilon\iota\sigma$, and not on their plurality. On the whole, though with some misgivings, I doubt whether Plato at this stage explicitly recognized that there were $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{a}$ other than the forms. If we accept Professor Burnet's suggestion that the intellectual education is the programme of the Academy, then is it not more likely that the distinction, unstressed as it is in the text, was developed within its walls? The other conceivable theory, that it was already known from oral discussion and is assumed here, is rendered less probable by Plato's evident care in making a distinction all-important for the two parts of his education.

We are on surer ground in asserting that the objects of mathematics are $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{a}$. $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$ is formed from $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{v}$, and the whole similitude begins with the distinction in 507b: $\tau\acute{a}s i\acute{d}\acute{e}as \nuo\eta\tau\acute{v}\theta\acute{a}i \mu\acute{e}v, \dot{\nu}\rho\acute{a}\sigma\theta\acute{a}i \delta' o\acute{v}$. The division of the Line is based upon that; the whole upper line is $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$; and in 511a 3 the third section is called $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$ without qualification (cf. 511c 6). Surely this is the natural way to take Glaucon's assertion about the objects of $\deltai\acute{a}vou\alpha$ — $\kappa\acute{a}i\acute{t}\acute{o}s \nuo\eta\tau\acute{w}\nu \dot{\delta}\acute{n}tw\acute{v} \mu\acute{e}t\acute{a} \dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\dot{\eta}\acute{s}$ (511 2). Socrates has just said that the dialectician does not make the $\dot{\nu}\pi\theta\acute{e}\sigma\epsilon\iota\sigma$ $\dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\dot{\eta}\acute{a}i$ (b5), but $\dot{\nu}\pi\theta\acute{e}\sigma\epsilon\iota\sigma$ in the true sense. He means that the mathematician does treat them as $\dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\dot{\eta}\acute{a}i$; and Glaucon recalls the distinction to show that he understands the mathematician to deal with noetic systems which have their $\dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\dot{\eta}\acute{a}i$, though they are imperfect because they cannot be connected with the final $\dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\dot{\eta}\acute{y}$. It is the last affirmation of the main distinction between two sets of $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{a}$, not a denial that the lower set are $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{a}$.¹

3. To sum up: it is unnecessary to repeat from a former section (end of A) what the Line is *not*. But I suggest that no account should be accepted which fails to pass the following tests. Does it add to the content of the sections specified by Plato, and does its probability depend upon the additions? Does it really divide the quadripartite Line into three parts, either

¹ The contention that the third section is not $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{v}$ really seems to rest upon the idea that forms in their relation to the Good alone are $\nuo\eta\tau\acute{a}$ in the proper sense; but we have seen that the last section cannot be so limited.

openly or by imposing upon it objects which appear to give each section a content? Does it try, and fail, to apply the Line *without* additions to the Cave, and does the real reason for its failure to pass the other tests lie in the attempt to assimilate the one to the other?

So far, an attempt has been made to place the Line in its relation to the parts of the simile of Light which precede and follow it. It has been treated as a pure analogy, which shows the relation of the two parts of the intellectual education to one another. But the gravest question still remains. The whole simile was undertaken to illustrate how far it was possible to awaken men from their dreams. The rare philosopher may learn his strain, but will it pierce their ears?

Haste now, philosopher, and set him free,
Charm the deaf serpent wisely.

Whether the final task is vain, or whether perhaps some may be rescued and the community saved, an allegory must declare; for the answer depends on character.

A. S. FERGUSON.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY,
KINGSTON, CANADA.

(*To be concluded.*)

POSTSCRIPT.—The accidental omission of a note on p. 142 prevented me from recalling in the proper place that Mr. Stocks' argument is a polemic against interpreting the Line as a progression, and that Dr. Shorey's interesting discussion lays all the stress on method. But if the Cave is applied to the Line, can one avoid assimilating their content and purpose? Those who apply the Cave to the whole Line must show why $\eta\tau\bar{\nu}\eta\lambda\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\nu\delta\bar{\nu}\bar{\nu}\alpha\mu\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}$, which is in exact antithesis to $\tau\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\nu}\pi\bar{\nu}\bar{\rho}\bar{\sigma}\phi\bar{\omega}\bar{\varsigma}$ and has the very ring of the symbolism of light, is not identical with the power exercised outside the cave, and how their literal interpretation of the fire as the material sun can stand. On their view the sun plays too many parts.—A. S. F.

struc
deno
escap
has
havin
on t
Gre
view
so ha

Hom
work
rearr
princ

(A)
(2) v

κορή¹
Hon
cf. κα
(Z 11
not
appl
wave
Soph
(Ant

175
He a
i.e. b
Ship
for r

¹ C
instan

GREEK COLOUR-PERCEPTION.

No one who has read the classics with any attention can fail to have been struck by certain oddities in both the Greek and Latin usage of epithets denoting colour. How really strange their application often is may have escaped general notice for three reasons: partly, it may be, because custom has staled their surprising character—phrases such as ‘the wine-dark sea’ having become, so to say, ‘household words’; partly because a natural and on the whole commendable diffidence prevents our attributing, at least to the Greeks, anything that seems in the least derogatory from an artistic point of view; and partly because these instances of curious usage are scattered and so have no cumulative effect on our judgement.

To remedy this last defect I have examined all the Greek authors from Homer to Xenophon, and have collected and studied all the passages in their works where colour epithets are used. For the sake of clearness I have rearranged these under colour headings in order to try and arrive at some principle underlying the Greek use.

The obvious main division of the subject is into these two groups: (A) chromatic and (B) achromatic. The latter subdivides itself into (1) black, (2) white, (3) grey.

And so (B) (1) black:

There are three Greek words denoting black, *κελαινός*, *μέλας*, and *κατακορής* (*δρψινος* I reserve for the ‘purple’ group). To take *κελαινός* first: Homer uses the word for blood (A 303),¹ waves (I 6), storms (*λαῆλαψ*, Δ 747; cf. *κελαινεφής* of Zeus), the earth (*χθών*, ΙΙ 384), the hide of Hector’s shield (Ζ 117). Pindar calls the Colchians *κελαινωψ* (P. 4. 212); Bacchylides does not use the word. Hesiod, like (and presumably in imitation of) Homer, applies the epithet to blood and earth (S. 172; S. 153), and Aeschylus to waves (*Eum.* 832). He also uses it of the Ethiopians (*φῦλον*, P.V. 808). Sophocles (who, like Aeschylus, uses the word frequently) applies it to sand (*Ant.* 590) and to weapons (*Trach.* 858; *Aj.* 231—so also Eur. *Bacch.* 628).

μέλας is the commonest of the three ‘black’ words. Homer uses it 175 times—it, that is, and its compounds, but excluding the verb *μελαίνω*.² He applies it to much the same objects as those to which *κελαινός* is applied, i.e. blood (Ε 354), land freshly ploughed (Σ 548), water (δ 359). Besides these, ships are *μέλαιναι* (θ 34) and wine is *μέλας*. Pindar’s usage of the word calls for no special remark. Bacchylides attributes it to clouds (3. 55), an elder-

¹ Citations refer only to typical, not to all, instances. ² Gladstone, ‘Colour in the Homeric Age’ (*Homer and the Homeric Age*, vol. 3), p. 476.

tree (8. 33), an eye (16. 17), and (like Homer) to earth (12. 153). Hesiod uses it and its compounds (apart from *μελαίνω*) 14 times: of earth in the *Theogony* (69), and in the *Shield* of hair (186), of weapons (221), of a snake's throat (167), of grapes (300), and of blood (252). The issue here is a little confused, as one does not know how far Hesiod wishes to refer to the objects themselves and how far to the colour of the shield on which they are engraved. Theognis uses the word 8 times (of blood, clouds, earth, etc.), and once (*A.* 451) of iron rust (*iός*). The second circle of fortifications at Ecbatana was, according to Herodotus (I. 98), *μέλας*—there were seven circles, all of different colours; the passage is one of the few in which colour is mentioned by a prose-writer at all.

The tragedians use the word commonly, and for the most part follow Homer, e.g. Eur. *Or.* 1148, 1472, of weapons. Sophocles and Aristophanes apply it to foliage (*Ar. Thes.* 997; *Soph. O.C.* 482 γῆ μελάμφυλλος).

Plato, in a remarkable passage in the *Timaeus* (68), to which reference will often be made, admits it as a colour admixture, and in later Greek it seems to have been the usual 'intensive' colour prefix, e.g. (of figs) *μελάμφαιος* (as opposed to *λευκόφαιος*) in Athen. (3. 13); so *μελαμπόρφυρος* of dark purple in Pollux (4. 119), etc.

κατακορής is scarcely a colour epithet at all. It is rather an intensive epithet used with such words as *μέλαν* (substantively)—so in the *Timaeus* passage, where *κατακορὲς μέλαν* is a component of *κνανοῦν χρῶμα*. Aristotle in the *de coloribus* (another amazing 'locus classicus' for colour) says (5. 5) that the green of young plants (*ποώδες*) becomes, when the plants grow older, *κατακορὲς ἰσχυρῶς καὶ πρασοειδές*.

To sum up. Black is plainly regarded as a colour, not as an absence of colour. This is clearly implied by Aristotle, who says of *σκότος* (*de color.* I. 7)—but not of *μέλας*, etc.—οὐ χρῶμα ἀλλὰ στέρησις φωτός. It has an existence as a colour specific in itself and as an intensifier of other colours. There seems to be no distinction between *μέλας* and *κελαινός*, while *κατακορής* is a quantitative word. Surface quality of objects seems indifferent—i.e. both words are used of shiny and of non-shining things.

It would of course be ludicrous to say that in their attribution of black to such objects as have been mentioned above the Greeks were misusing their words, and in this particular case it is not easy to say that the Greek usage differs from the English (though the theory does), because if we translate the words by 'dark' rather than by 'black' all difficulties disappear. Besides this we must remember such English usages as 'black men,' 'black grapes,' etc. Also, in a great many cases (not cited above), these words are used in a metaphorical sense, cf. 'black care.'

(B) (2) white. Again there are three Greek words: *ἀργός*, *λειρίσεις*, and *λευκός*.

Of these the first really means 'quick-moving,' cf. the Latin 'micare' and its uses, and it is very difficult to disentangle the 'bright' or 'white'

meaning from the 'rapid.' Does ἄργιπος=white-footed or swift-footed?¹ ἄργις is Homer's general epithet for dogs; in this case it probably means 'swift.' But what of its use with βόες (Ψ 30)—? sleek? The confusion or conjunction of meanings is seen in its attribution to lightning (Θ 133; Ar. *An.* 1747).

The word λειρίσεις (with its other form λείριος) introduces a fresh difficulty. Is it a colour or a sound epithet? Homer uses it of both—the cicada's voice (Γ 152; cf. Hes. *Th.* 41) and skin (N 850). Pindar applies it to coral (N . 7. 79) and Bacchylides to eyes (16. 95). With this last use we may compare Suidas' λειρόφθαλμος, which the lexicographer defines as ὁ προσηνεῦς ἔχων τοὺς ὀφθάλμους. Apollonius (4. 903) uses it of the voice of the Sirens, ? = 'gentle.'

But λευκός is the main word. Homer uses it and its compounds (not counting λευκώλενος nor yet λευκάνω) 60 times.² Besides ordinary usages (e.g. snow, K 437) he applies it to the calm sea (κ 94), tin (K 35), the skin (E 314; cf. λευκώλενος, *passim*), a veil 'white as the sun' (Ξ 185), barley (Γ 496), and water (Ψ 282). Herodotus says that the first circle of walls at Ecbatana is λευκός. Pindar applies the term to corpses (N . 9. 23) and (surely very oddly) to wreaths—which, by the way, never have a 'green' epithet—λευκωθεὶς κάρα μύρτοις (*I.* 4. 69). With this may be compared Aristophanes' λευκότροφα μύρτα (*An.* 1100). It is common in Hesiod (14 times plus 2 λευκώλενος), and generally used normally of ivory, teeth, snow, etc.; he also applies it to water (*W*. 739) and further to grapes (*S*. 294) and honeycombs (*Th.* 597). The melic poets imitate Homer, e.g. Theognis (*A.* 448) μέλαν ὕδωρ and Simonides (frag. 21. 1) of γαλήνη.

The tragedians seem to use it mostly in the sense of shining (cf. ἄργις—a possible analogy): e.g. λεύκαισπις λαός (Aesch. *Sept.* 88; Soph. *Ant.* 106); λ. ἡμαρ (ἡμέρα) (Aesch. *Pers.* 301, 386; Ag. 668; Soph. *Aj.* 673, 708 [*φάος*]). Aeschylus echoes Homer's λευκὸν ὕδωρ (*Suppl.* 24), and has a curious fragment (116, *Cressae*) where the epithet is applied to mulberries. The only abnormal usage in Euripides is (*I.A.* 1054) λευκοφαῖ γψάμαθον.

This use of λευκός for yellow objects is illustrated by Plato's employment of the word as = yellow-haired (*Rep.* 474E), and may further be compared with Herodotus' (*I.* 50) λευκὸς χρυσός, alloyed gold (as opposed to χρ. ἄπεφθος = unalloyed). This in turn shows the 'modificatory' meaning of λευκός, as when that word is used as a prefix, e.g. λευκόχρυσος in Pliny (*H.N.* 37. 9), and λευκέρυθρος and λευκόπυρρος in Aristotle (*de color.* 6. 3; *Physion.* 2. 4) = light red, light yellow. In the *de coloribus* Aristotle calls it a 'simple' colour (1. 1), and attributes it to water and air: earth was originally λευκός but παρὰ τὴν βαφὴν πολύχρονος φαίνεται.

In general we may say that there is only one Greek word for 'white'—λευκός. It is regarded as the opposite of black, and, like it, as a definite

¹ See Boisacq, *Dict. etymol.* under ἄργις and ἄργος.

² Gladstone, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

colour. Its loose use for the complexion can be paralleled by the English 'pale'—indeed, 'pale' and 'shining' between them cover its meaning better than 'white.' Its 'yellow' use, hair, sand, etc., has been noticed, while such usages as that with *γαλήνη* are probably more than half metaphorical. More significant is its attribution to such a definitely colourless substance as water.

(B) (3) grey. Again three Greek words, *γλαυκός*, *πολιός*, *φαιός*.

γλαυκός is a puzzling word. Like *λευκός*, etc., it seems to denote 'shininess' rather than colour, hence the Homeric *γλαυκῶπις* (A 206) and *γλαυκίων* of the glaring lion (T 172; cf. Hes. S. 430). So, probably, of the sea (II 34, the only place in Homer; cf. Hes. Th. 440 *γλαυκή*=the sea). Pindar's usage is similar, *ὅφις γλαύκωψ* (P. 4. 249) and 'Αθήνη *γλαυκῶπις* (N. 7. 96). Bacchylides' attribution of it to the olive (7. 51; 10. 29), on the other hand, is probably to be taken as denoting colour, and so, for the most part, are the passages in the tragedians—e.g. Sophocles of grapes (*Tr.* 704), of the olive-tree (*O.C.* 701); Euripides of *χλοή* (*Suppl.* 258). But observe Soph. frag. 341 of water. Herodotus (IV. 108) calls the Budini an *ἴθνος γλαυκὸν . . . καὶ πυρρόν*, by which he presumably means that they had blue eyes and yellow hair (cf. Tac. *Germ.* 4 'caerulei oculi, rutilae comae'). Plato in the *Timaeus* passage gives its composition as of *κνανοῦν* and *λευκόν*.

In later Greek both 'bright' and 'colour' meanings lived on, e.g. *γλαυκῶπις μήνη* quoted in *Schol. Ap. Rhod.* I. 1280, and Arist. *de gen. anim.* 5. I. 20, where eyes are classified from light to dark coloured as *γλαυκά*, *χαροπά*, *αιγωπά*, *μελανά* (a list curious in itself). As a definite colour epithet it seems as much 'chromatic' as 'achromatic,' varying from grey proper to blue-grey, or blue-green, or to absolute blues and greens—e.g. used by Theophrastus for topaz, beryl, and emerald.

πολιός, again, combines the meaning of 'gleaming' with that of colour. Homer uses it of hair (X 77), foam and the sea (A 350, etc.), iron (φ 3, 81); so in Eur. *Her.* 758). Pindar uses it of bronze (P. 3. 48; II. 20), Hesiod of 'adamant' (?=steel) (Th. 161). Hesiod also oddly applies the epithet to spring (W. 477, 492); we may compare with this Theocritus' (18. 27) *λευκὸν ἔαρ*. Homer's 'sea' use found many imitators (if one can call it imitation), e.g. Theognis (A. 10. 106), Archilochus (*Schol. Ap. Rhod.* I. 824), Aristophanes (Av. 350), Sophocles (Ant. 334; Phil. 1123). Euripides uses the word of *αιθήρ* (Or. 1376; cf. Ap. Rhod. 3. 275 of *ἀήρ*).

φαιός is a lateish word, first used by Plato, who, in the *Timaeus* passage, defines it as a mixture of black and white. He goes on to say that when mixed with *ξανθόν*, *πυρρόν* is the result.

The 'grey' group, then, offers the initial difficulty of a double usage, the reference being sometimes to the reflexion of light in the sense of 'brightness,' 'gleamingness,' and sometimes to colour. A further ambiguity is introduced by the confusion between chromatic and achromatic, though *γλαυκός* seems to incline to the former, *πολιός* to the latter, meaning.

In order to simplify the chromatic group I propose to subdivide it, rather arbitrarily, into four sub-groups: (1) a yellow-orange-brown, (2) a red, (3) a purple-blue, (4) a green group. I say 'arbitrarily' because, as will be seen, the divisions between these groups are shadowy, and it is often difficult to say into which of them some particular colour epithet should go.

So, then, (A) (1) the yellow-orange-brown group.

Here we have six words or types of word, *aἴθων*, *κροκωτός*, *ξανθός*, *ξουθός*, *πυρσός*, *σανδαράκινος*.

aἴθων: again a word of uncertain signification. Homer uses it of beasts and birds, of horses (B 839—in Θ 185 it is the name of one of Hector's horses, 'Sorrel'), of bulls (II 488), of eagles (O 690), of cattle (σ 372), of lions (Κ 23; cf. Tyrt. II. 1). But what in this connexion does it mean? Tawny, fierce, or fierce-eyed? Ameis (on σ 372) thinks 'fierce,' but certainly Bacchylides took it as tawny, for he uses it (5. 124) of a hide. It is also used of metals, where it clearly means 'flashing,' e.g. of iron (α 184; Hes. W. 743), of bronze (I 123; Bacchyl. 12. 50). Such phrases as Aeschylus' *aἴθων λῆμα* (*Septem* 448) are of course metaphorical, but *Αἴθιοπες* looks like the 'dusky' or 'smoky' men.

κροκωτός=yellow. Of all colour epithets this is the least ambiguous in meaning and usage. Besides Homer's obvious (and I do *not* mean therefore not beautiful) *κροκόπεπλος ἔως* (Θ 1), we have the word generally used of clothes—so twice in Hesiod and commonly in Aristophanes. Galen's *κρόκος ών*=yolk, again, requires no comment. There is only one oddity: Aeschylus' (*Ag.* 1121) *κροκοβαφής σταγών* of blood. Sidgwick explains it as 'pale with fear.'

ξουθός and *ξανθός*, etymologically the same word (see Boisacq), may be taken together. Homer and Pindar only use the latter form (though *Hom. hym. Diosc.* 13 has *ξουθὴ πτέρυξ*), and then chiefly of hair, e.g. Achilles' (A 197), Menelaos' (ο 133). Bacchylides uses it thus (?=auburn hair) 6 times. Homer also uses it of horses (Δ 680). Later the sphere of its attribution is considerably extended. Bacchylides (13. 4) calls 'flame' *ξανθός* (cf. *Arist. de color.* where *πῦρ* is *ξανθόν*), and also has a *ξανθοδερκῆς* snake (8. 12). Simonides (57) uses it of honey, Aeschylus (*Pers.* 617) of *ἔλαια*, Sophocles (frag. 257) of wine. Of the colour theorists Plato (*loc. cit.*) defines it as a mixture of *ἐρυθρόν* and *λευκόν*, while Aristotle calls it the typical colour of the flowers of laurel and ivy (*de color.* 5. 25) and of apples (5. 26), and mentions it as one of the colours of the rainbow¹ (*Met.* 3. 2. 4, 5).

A comparison of the usages of *ξανθός* and *ξουθός* brings to light the curious fact that the latter seems to be confined to winged creatures, e.g.

¹ Gladstone (*Juv. Mund.*, p. 540) pointed out that in Homer there was only one reference to the rainbow, and then (A 27) it was rather to its 'stripiness' than to its colour. Iris, too, has no colour epithet; she is only 'golden-winged' (Θ 398).

Bacchyl. 5. 17 of eagles, Ar. *Av.* 214 and Aesch. *Ag.* 1142 of nightingales, Eur. *I.T.* 635 of bees.

πυρρός (*πυρσός*) is not found in Homer. Herodotus, as we have seen, calls the Budini *πυρσοί*=yellow (? red) haired, with which we may compare Hippocrates' remark, *π. τὸ γένος τὸ Σκυθικὸν διὰ τὸ ψῦχος* (*de aer.* 20). Its most general use is as a colour epithet for hair, e.g. Solon's *πυρρότριξ* and *Πυρρίας*, a (?) red-haired Thracian slave as opposed to the darker (? auburn) haired *Ξανθίας* (Ar. *Ran.* 730). Aeschylus (frag. 110) applies it to a lion; Hippocrates and Galen to the yolk of an egg; Moschus (2. 70) to a rose. The word *πυρριάν* is used by Heliodorus (*Aeth.* 3. 5) for 'to blush,' and so possibly in Ar. *Ranae* 308, though in this passage the reference is more likely to 'ordure,' for which *πυρρός* was the usual colour epithet (e.g. Ar. *Eccl.* 329, *Equit.* 900). Plato says it is a mixture of *ξανθόν* and *φαιόν*, and Aristotle (*de color.* 4. 2) says that the sea stains things *πυρρά*.

σανδαράκινος (=red sulphide of arsenic) is used by Herodotus (*loc. cit.*) as the colour of the fifth circle of Ecbatana's walls.

Taking the group as a whole, we cannot fail to observe a very loose usage of all the terms except the second and the (rare) fourth. Depth of colour seems to be distinguished rather than quality of colour, *αιθων* and *πυρρός* seeming to come as a mean between the lighter *κροκωτός* and the darker *ξανθός* and *ξουθός*.

(A) (2) The red group comprises seven words: *δαφοινός*, *ἐρυθρός*, *μίλτος*, *πορφύρεος*, *ρόδοεις*, *φοινικόεις*, *οίνωψ*.

δαφοινός, which is, of course, only another form of *φοινικός* (*δα-* being the intensive prefix), is another dubiously-colour epithet. Its Homeric substantives are *δέρμα λεόντος* (I 23; cf. Eur. *Alc.* 581), *δράκων* (B 308), and *θῶνες* =? jackals (Δ 474). Hesiod (S. 159) applies the term to blood; Aeschylus and Pindar to eagles (*P.V.* 102 and *N.* 3. 142); the hymn to Pan (l. 23) to a lynx skin. Its general meaning seems to be 'bloody,' and not (blood) red at all.

φοιν- (i.e. *φοινήεις*, *φοινικόεις*, *φοίνιος*, etc.—there are many forms and many compounds) is used by Homer always either as=bloody or dyed blood-red (e.g. Ψ 717 of weals; K 133 of a cloak; Δ 141, where the dye is compared to a blood stain) except once, where it is the colour epithet of a horse (Ψ 454). Remarkable usages in Pindar are *φοινικοστερόπας Ζεύς* (*Ol.* 9. 6; cf. Horace's 'rubente dextra'), *φοινικόπεζα* of Demeter (*Ol.* 6. 94; so of Hecate, *Paeon* 2. 77, in this case probably metaphorically), of bulls (*P.* 4. 205), of roses (*I.* 4. 18). Commonly of flowers in general, dyes, flame (*P.* 1. 24), etc. Bacchylides uses it of oxen (10. 105), flame (17. 56; cf. Eur. *Troad.* 815), and, of course, blood (12. 164). Aeschylus (frag. 192) uses it (and *ἐρυθρός*) of the floor of the Red Sea; Euripides of blushing (*Phoen.* 1487). Aristophanes applies the epithet to the flamingo (*Av.* 272) and to the red-dyed Spartan cloaks. Aristotle in the *de color.* (2. 2) uses it of smoky flame and of red-hot coals.

There can be no doubt that these words, as opposed to *δαφοινός*, did develop a purely colour meaning.

έρυθρός is used by Homer of blood (K 484), of bronze (I 365; here so only, elsewhere *χαλκός* is *αἴθοψ*, etc., not *έρυθρός*), and of wine (*i* 208; cf., by analogy, of nectar, *e* 93). Gladstone (p. 472) notes that though Homer mentions wine 140 times, and then usually with some epithet, that epithet is only 10 times a colour one—*έρυθρός*, *μέλας*, *αἴθοψ*. Archilochus, like Homer, calls wine *έρυθρός* (4. 3), while Aeschylus applies the epithet to blood (*Eum.* 265). *ὑπερυθριᾶν* seems to be the normal word for 'to blush' (e.g. Ar. *Plut.* 702). Aristotle, in an interesting passage in the *Rhetic* (3. 2. 13), criticizes *έρυθροδάκτυλος* as unpoetical.

μίλτος (like *σανδαράκη*) is a chemical which has given birth to some colour adjectives. Homer's ships are some of them *μιλτοπάργος* (B 637), others are *φοινικοπάργος* (λ 124), while some mentioned by Herodotus (III. 57) are *έρυθρός*. It is really impossible to say whether a real colour distinction is being made by the use of these three words or not. Another compound is Aeschylus' *μιλτόπρεπτος* of mulberries in the fragment from the *Cressae* (116) quoted above.

πορφύρεος is very puzzling. Besides using it very commonly of dyed objects, Homer applies the term to clouds (P 551), to the rainbow (P 547), and to blood (P 361); but his main attribution of the epithet is to the sea or to water in general (e.g. Φ 326), apparently when in motion (cf. Lat. 'purpurasco'). This use is so common that instances need not be cited, nor is it only to be found in Homer. Bacchylides (8. 39) calls the Asopus *πορφυροδίνας*; Simonides, Aeschylus (*Syphl.* 529), and Euripides (often, e.g. *Hipp.* 744) apply the term to the sea; Aristotle (*de color.* 2. 4) says that the sea is *πορφύρεος ὅταν τὰ κύματα μετεωρίζομενα κατὰ τὴν ἔγκλισιν σκιασθῆ*. Like *ἀργός* and other words, *πορφύρεος* seems to have half a colour and half a motional signification. Hence *πορφύρω*¹ to surge, of waves (Ξ 16), and the metaphorical *κραδίν πόρφυρε* of δ 427, with which use may be compared that of the tragic *καλχαίνω*.

ρόδοεις is used by Homer as an epithet of *ἄλαιον* (Ψ 186), but the meaning here is probably 'fragrant,' not 'rosy' in the sense of 'rose-coloured.' *ρόδοδάκτυλος* needs no comment.

οἰνόψ. It is difficult to see how this word can mean anything but 'wine-coloured.' Its usage in Homer is confined to (1) the sea (*e* 132, etc.) and (2) cattle (N 703, etc.). Sophocles uses the form *οἰνώψ*—or *οἰνωπός*, the text is uncertain—of ivy (O.C. 674); and Euripides applies *οἰνωπός* to a snake (I.T. 1245) and to the cheeks (*Bacch.* 439; 'no blanching of the wine-red cheek,' Professor Murray translates). According to Aristotle (*de color.* 2. 8) the colour implied by the epithet is a combination of *ἡροειδεῖς αὐγαῖ* with unmixed, shiny black. He cites grapes as an instance.

¹ Boisacq doubts the connexion of *πορφύρα* (for which he suggests a Semitic origin) and *πορφύρω*.

(A) (3) The purple-blue group: ἀλουργός, ιο-, κναν-, ὄρφνινος.

ἀλουργός must mean originally 'sea-coloured.' Aeschylus is the first Greek writer to use it—*Ag.* 946, ἀλουργίς=royal (sea) purple garment. The theorists are interesting on this colour: Plato (in the *Timaeus* passage) says it is a mixture of ἐρυθρόν with μέλαν and λευκόν, and Aristotle (*de color.* 2. 3) calls it φωνίκεον plus black. Grapes, he says (2. 8), ripen from οἰνωπόν to ἀλουργόν. In a passage of the *Meteorologica* (3. 2. 4) Aristotle gives us the four colours of the rainbow, φωνικοῦ, ξανθόν, πράσινον, and ἀλουργόν, where, just as ξανθόν covers the orange and yellow, so ἀλουργόν must cover blue and indigo.

ιο-. In Homer three objects are ιοειδής and the like: the sea (Δ 298), iron (Ψ 850; ? a confusion with *iōs*, and means 'rusty'), and the wool of the Cyclops' sheep (*i* 426). Pindar is fond of *io-* compounds as epithets for hair—e.g. ιόπλοκος (*Ol.* 6. 30; *P.* 1. 1), ιοβόστρυχος (*Ol.* 6. 50; *I.* 7. 33); so also Bacchylides (8. 71, etc.). It would be beside the point to inquire what Pindar and his imitators meant by the famous ιοστέφανος as an epithet for Athens, but that it may mean 'girt by the "violet-coloured" sea' is made clear, not only by Δ 298, but also by Hesiod's ιοειδέα πόντον (*Th.* 833). Both Hesiod (*Th.* 3) and Theocritus (16. 62) use the epithet for fresh water also. That *io-* compounds can qualify the eye we see from Hesychius' ιόγληνος and Bacchylides' ιοβλέφαρος (18. 5, etc.).

κναν-. This is, perhaps, the most puzzling of all, and the uncertainty that shrouds the nature of the Homeric κνάνος makes it no easier. The following are among the objects called κνάνεος by Homer: hair, very frequently, human and divine, on the face (e.g. π 176) or on the head; sand (μ 243); eyes (μ 60—for presumably κνανώψ, of Amphitrite, means blue-eyed; cf. *Hom. hymn. Dionys.* 15); clouds (Τ 418, etc.); painted ships (Ο 693). Besides this we have κ. as the colour of mourning (Ω 94), κ. of a bull (*Hom. hymn. Herm.* 194), and the mysterious κνάνεαι φάλαγγες of Δ 282, which is presumably metaphorical (cf. ΙΙ 66, κ. νέφος of the Trojan host). Most of these Homeric usages can be paralleled: hair from Bacchylides (5. 33, etc.) and Euripides (*Phoen.* 308); eyes from Hesiod (*S.* 7) and from Aeschylus (κνανοῦν δέρυμα δράκοντος, *Pers.* 81); clouds from Hesiod (*Th.* 745) and Bacchylides (12. 64). The following, again, are surprising attributions: a thicket, in Pindar's famous λόχιμας ὑπὸ κνανέας of *Ol.* 6. 40; the earth (Pindar, frag. 87, l. 5). In this last passage the gods in Olympus are said to call Delos τηλέφατον κνανέας χθονὸς ἀστρον. I cannot refrain from quoting the words of Professor Wilamowitz (*Sappho und Simonides*, p. 131), cited by Dr. Sandys in his Loeb edition of Pindar (p. 561): 'Wie grossartig ist die Vorstellung, dass die Erde für den Blick der Götter eine blaue Fläche ist, wie ihr Himmel für uns, auf dem ihnen dann Delos, so klein sie ist, als ein heller Stern lieblich aufleuchtet.' But the argument that the earth looked κνάνεος to the gods because the heaven looked κνάνεος to the Greeks is vitiated by the fact—and it is a very odd and significant fact—that the Greeks did not consider the sky as κνάνεος, or at least they never called it so. If it is strange that, with the single

exception¹ of Bacchylides 12. 124, no writer before Euripides calls the sea κνάνεος, it is still stranger that Synesius seems to supply the earliest instance of this epithet's being definitely applied to the sky. It is true that Aristotle (*de color.* 3. 16) says of ἀήρ that ἐν βάθει θεωρούμενος it is κνανοείδης.

For the rest, Simonides' use of κ. for a swallow (frag. 57) is as happy as Hesiod's for the (?) Ethiopians (*W.*) is not.

Still more confusing are the philosophers: Plato says λαμπρῷ . . . λευκὸν ξυνελθόν καὶ ἐς μέλαν κατακορὲς ἐμπεσὸν κνανοῦν χρῶμα ἀποτελεῖται. Democritus, quoted by Theophrastus, says κνανοῦν comes ἐξ ἵστιδος (woad) καὶ πυρώδους (? a shiny blue). Aristotle (*de color.* 5. 16) says that grapes pass from φοινικοὶ to οἰνωποὶ, and finally become κνανοειδεῖς; so, too, poppy juice and olive lees are at first λευκός, then φοινικός, and lastly, by the addition of μέλαν, κνανοειδῆς (5. 22). Still stranger is his ποῶδες ἔδαφος (? the lichen-covered floor of a cave), which turns φοινικοῦν and then μέλαν καὶ κνανοειδεῖς.

ὄρφνιος. A comparatively rare word occupying the borderland between the purple and black. Xenophon, in one of the only passages in which he mentions colour at all (*Cyr.* 8. 3. 3), uses it of dyed cloth, classing the shade as between πορφυρὶς and φοινικὶς. Athenaeus (12. 50) uses it of the midnight sky. Plato and Aristotle are very obscure on the subject. According to the former—in the *Timaeus*—ἔρυθρόν when mixed with black and white becomes ἀλουργόν, but when the colours are burned as well as mixed, and the black is more thoroughly admixed, the result is ὄρφνιον (Jowett translates it 'umber'). Aristotle (*de color.* 2. 4, 5) defines ἀλουργόν as μέλαν and σκιερὸν φῶτὶ μαγνύμενον, and says that when ἀλουργόν has less φῶς the result is ζοφερὸν, ὃν καλοῦσιν ὄρφνιον.

(A) (4) Green group: πράσινος, χλωρός, ὡχρός.

πράσινον, leek green (πράσον=a leek), is in general a late word, though Plato (*Timaeus* 68) uses it, and, very oddly, explains it as a mixture of πυρρόν and μέλαν. Still stranger is Democritus (in Theophrastus), who says of it ἐκ πορφυροῦ καὶ ἵστιδος, ἢ ἐκ χλωροῦ καὶ πορφυροειδοῦς. Aristotle, on the other hand, is more in accord with modern ideas on the subject. In the *Meteorologica*, as we have seen, he gives it as a part (green) of the rainbow, and in the *de coloribus* (5. 5) he applies it to foliage that has passed the ποῶδες (i.e. light spring green) stage.

χλωρός is a confusing word, for, over and above its colour signification, it often means no more than 'fresh'—so αἷμα (Eur. *Hec.* 124)—and often, again, simply 'pale'; so metaphorically of, e.g., δέος (H 479, etc.). Homer's use of χλωρός for the Cyclops' club is about on the line between the metaphorical and the 'colour' meanings. Definitely 'colour' is its use with ρῶπες, shrubs (π. 47), that with μέλι (κ 234; Λ 631) might be either. In the *Batrachomyomachia* it is applied to leeks (54) and beans (124), and in the hymn to

¹ Simonides uses it once of water (frag. 23).

Apollo (45) to a mountain. Whether Homer's *χλωρης* of the nightingale¹ (cf. Simonides, frag. 73) means 'green' or 'living in green foliage' it is impossible to say. Besides instances in which it clearly means 'fresh,' Pindar uses it of the pine-tree (frag. 166b). Bacchylides applies (5. 172) the strange epithet *χλωραιχην* to Deianeira. The only other two attributions worthy of notice are those by Hesiod (*S.* 231) and Sophocles (*Aj.* 1064) respectively to *ἀδάμας* and *ψύμαθος*.

ώχρος, again, has a 'non-colour' meaning, viz. 'pale'—e.g. *ώχρος*, pallor (*Γ* 35), *ώχριν* (λ 529; cf. the common Aristophanic verb *ώχριν*). But it is used of some green colour, as, for instance, in the *Batrachomyomachia* (81), where it is applied to the body of a frog. The *Timaeus* passage says it is a mixture of *λευκόν* and *ξανθόν*. This, joined to Aristotle's (*Hist. an.* 6. 2. 1) *τὸ ὠχρὸν τοῦ ὡὐ* for the yolk, looks as though it sometimes meant yellow as well as green.

From all this the following considerations seem to me to emerge:

(1) That many objects which do not, as we should think, vary much in colour in their different manifestations receive many different colour epithets—e.g. blood is *κελαινός*, *μελάς*, *φουικοῦς*, *έρυθρός*, and *πορφυρός*; sand is *κελαινός*, *λευκός*, *κυάνεος*, and *χλωρός*; an egg-yolk is *κροκωτός*, *πυρρός*, and *ώχρος*.

(2) That many colour epithets are not purely colour epithets at all, but have another meaning, and that meaning often not even visual.

(3) That what seems to have caught the eye and arrested the attention of the Greeks is not so much the qualitative as the quantitative difference between colours. Black and white are 'colours,' and colours are accounted as shades between these extremes. It follows from this that no real distinction is made between chromatic and achromatic; for it is lustre or superficial effect that struck the Greeks and not what we call colour or tint. This is more or less natural in a country where the light is brilliant.

The conclusion seems to me to be irresistible, and it is that the Greeks' colour terminology is frankly defective as compared with that of the moderns. This may come from one of two causes: either that the Greeks were definitely colour blind, or at least that colours made a much less vivid impression upon their senses (which might account for their painting of statues); or, as I think is more likely, that they felt little interest in the qualitative differences of decomposed and partially absorbed light.

MAURICE PLATNAUER.

¹ See Jebb's appendix (p. 473) in his edition of Bacchylides. He concludes that the word =fresh and young.

SAPPHO, BOOK I.: THE NEREID ODE.

SINCE the poem of Sappho, which was first published as No. 7 of the Oxyrhynchus series, has been the object of a good deal of attention and ingenuity (some of it frivolous), it is perhaps not too early to publish a number of new readings, the result of repeated examinations of the papyrus (now P. 739 in the British Museum), that may provide a surer foundation for future attempts at reconstruction. I have submitted my suggestions to Professor Hunt, who does not reject them (though in fairness it must be added that he has not re-examined the original), and I have to thank him and Mr. H. I. Bell, of the Department of MSS., for the readiness of their help whenever and under whatever form I made appeal to it. But, of course, neither of them is in any way committed to any of my readings or deductions. In order to save space, since the poem is now tolerably well known, I adopt the course of giving a text and then commenting on the points where I believe I have something to say:

Κύπρι καὶ] Νηρήιδες, ἀβλάβη[ν μοι
τὸν καστγυνητον δότε τυίδ' ἵκεσθα[ι,
κῶσσα F]οι θύμωι κε θέληη γένεσθαι
πάντα τε] λέσθην,
όσσα δὲ πρόσθ' ἄμβροτε πάντα λῦσα[ι,
ώς φίλοις] Φοῖς χάραν γένεσθαι
· · · δ' ἔχθροις, γένοιτο δ' ἄμμι
· · · μῆδεις. 8

τὰν κασιγ]νήταν δὲ θέλοι πόνησθαι
]τίμας, [όν]λαν δὲ λύγραν
]οτοιςι π[ά]ροιθ' ἀχεύων
]. να 12
]λ' εἰσαΐω[ν] τό κ' ἐγ χρῶι
]λεπαγ[. .]αι πολίταν
]λλως[. . .]νηκε δ' αὐτ' οὐ
]κρω[. ?]
]οναικ[.]. ι
]. . [.]ν, cù [δὲ,] Κύπ[ρ.,] ρε[.]να 16
]θεμ[έν]α κάκαν
]*ι*

Editio princeps: *P. Oxy.* I. 7 (1898), cuius sunt supplementa alii non ascripta.

I Kύπρι καὶ] Earle secundum Smyth [μοι Diels, W-M. 2 τύδιον] Diels, W-M. 3 θυμωθελητάντα Jurenka 5 [^l Diels 6 ὡς] ed. pr. καὶ] Diels, quod nimis longum 8 μήποτα] ed. pr. δή ποτα] Jurenka μήκεται] Dielsio ascribit Leper. c, credo, recentius additum 10 ἔμμορον] W-M. [όν] ed. pr. 12 μέ] ed. pr.; dubium, sicut η, π. 13 Littera prima dubia; λ, credo, ueri simillimum. τοκεγχρωτι Fortasse τὸ κάνω (Sitzler κῆν) χρῶτι 14 λέπτην αὐτοῖς] ed. pr., sed spatium tribus litteris uix sufficit 16 διὰ μάκρων] ed. pr. 17 οὐ, εἰ, οὐ, θει legi possunt 18 In initio λογον Bell, ego haesito. γι ueri simillimum, sed et αὐτοῖς legere possis 19 [έν] ed. pr.

In l. 1 two particular considerations make Kύπρι καὶ very probable. The first is that, if all the appeals are addressed to the Nereids alone, they are asked to take action in matters which seem to lie quite out of their competence; the second, that in l. 18 κυ is, I believe, certain—there is a spot of ink not visible in the facsimile irreconcilable with λ—and κυτ highly probable. It is true that ρε[.]να suggests nothing but ἐρέμνα (so ed. pr.) (ἐρέμνα) or ἐρέύνα, and that there is room for no more than two letters between the π and the ρ; but I imagine there is no particular improbability in the hypothesis that Kύπρι, ἐρέμνα was written Kύπρι' ἐρέμνα, and, if this was not so, ἐρέμνα rather than Kύπρι must be bettered.

In addition to these two particular considerations, there is the general consideration that Sappho was very apt to appeal to Kypris, and that here the appeal would be very much to the point.

In l. 3 Φοι is not at all certain (for instance, ν might, I believe, be read), but it is quite possible and I think more probable than ω.

In l. 6 the papyrus has γενεθαί. The apparent accent on the second ε is due to a fibre which has sprung up, carrying ink from the ε.

In l. 8 there are two ways in which μήδεις (if that is right) may be interpreted, neither, so far as I know, hitherto suggested, and both, I believe, more probable than those usually offered. The simpler is to read μήκεται (which Leper, *Commentationes Nikitinianae*, pp. 160-6, erroneously ascribes to Diels), and suppose that Sappho prays that they shall make no *more* enemies; the other is to supply a masculine noun at the beginning of l. 7 and read μήποτα with the first editors, thus making Sappho pray that no such disagreeable as is to fall to their enemies shall ever fall to *them*; but I can think of no suitable masculine noun.

In l. 13 any letter ending in a straight downstroke would almost certainly have left different traces of itself from what are now visible. These suggest a letter ending in a sloping stroke drawn downwards from left to right, that is λ, not, in this hand, α, and probably not κ or χ, which should have left vestiges

of their
enough
(i.e. καὶ
κ' ἐχ (i.e.
alter the

In l.
nothing i

In l.
Professor
letter is a
or a λ' ω
but I am
has peris
either δὲ
Of 1.

THE Q

MR. M
of iερός, an
word in th
would tra
strengthen
act strong
pέζειν are
Homeric p

MR. A
original re
for any fo
though I sh
non 1230.
once sugge
off, evil ey
got into pri

St. John
O

of their upper right-hand strokes as well. As to *κεγχρωτ*, we do not know enough of this writer to say whether he might have written *κ' ἐγ* for *κάγ* (i.e. *καὶ ἐν*), and though *κάγ* (i.e. *καὶ ἐν*) may be thought more likely here than *κ' ἐγ* (i.e. *κε ἐν*), the restoration of this part is too uncertain to make it safe to alter the text.

In l. 14 *λαῖ* seems to me too long for the lacuna, but I can suggest nothing in its place.

In l. 15 *ἀλειπ* has held its ground since 1898, but all the same it is, as Professor Hunt agrees, an erroneous reading. Of the reading *λλωc*, the first letter is almost certain, the next two certain, the last very probable. *ἄλλωc* or *ἀ' λ' ὁc* suggest themselves and perhaps *ἐκύνηκε*, a form quoted for Alcaeus, but I am very far from wishing to pretend to restore a line of which about half has perished, particularly since *δ' αὐτ'* again is ambiguous, and may stand for either *δὲ αὐτε* or *δὴ αὐτε*, usually written *δηῦτε*.

Of l. 18 I cannot read the beginning; of the rest I have already spoken.

E. LOBEL.

THE QUEEN'S COLLEGE,
OXFORD.

IEPA PEZEIN.

MR. MULVANY in the *Journal of Philology*, XXV. 136, in discussing the meanings of *ἱερός*, and trying to find something which might be a link between the uses of the word in the sense of 'strong' and 'sacred,' finds it in the phrase *ἱερὰ πέζειν*, which he would translate 'to act strenuously in a god's service.' But his argument may be strengthened by the translation, to which the analysis of ancient religion points, 'to act strongly upon'; 'to put pressure upon,' as we should say. Both *ἱερεῖν* and *πέζειν* are used with a dative of the person, as well as with an accusative, in the Homeric poems. And with this sense we might well align *ἱερὰς ἑκατόμβας*.

J. U. POWELL.

EPPE KAKH ΓΑΗΝΗ. Θ 164.

MR. AGAR in *Homerica*, Preface ix., has suggested that *κακῆι γλίνηι* was the original reading, 'Be off with the evil eye upon you.' I have searched, but in vain, for any formula of imprecation corresponding to the formula of blessing, *τύχάγαθῆi*, though I should like to see it in *κακῆι τυχῆi* of the Treacherous Hound in *Agamemnon* 1230. Mr. T. C. Snow, objecting to Mr. Agar's alterations of the Homeric text, once suggested to me that we should rather retain the vocative, and translate it, 'Be off, evil eye.' Others also may have thought of this, but it does not appear to have got into print.

J. U. POWELL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,
OXFORD.

Here
and ἐκπνε
for ἐμπνε
less θερμ

(c) ib
(The word

οἶον βα
<οἱ> ἀ
αἴτιον δὲ
γίνεται <
καὶ ἀντὶ
βαρεῖα.
ἐν τοῖς ἄρ
ὑπὸ τῶν
τοῖς ἄρθ
κυνέσθαι
τείνεσθαι

Here
emend o
it prevent

The
Problems
to emend

The
Theophr
The

<τὴν>
κάτω ἡ A
ib. §

from [Ar

ib. §

ἀφ' ὑγρο

[Aristotl

resistan

όμαλὸς δ

ib. §

for λάβ?

gives a b

ib. §

μεθ' ἡμέ

SOME EMENDATIONS IN THE FRAGMENTS OF THEOPHRASTVS.

WHILE translating the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* for the Oxford translation of Aristotle, I have frequently found it necessary to refer to the Fragments of Theophrastus (as collected by F. Wimmer in Vol. III. of the Teubner text), which are obviously the source of many of the *Problems*, in particular in books II., V., XX., XXIV., and XXVI. The condition of the text of both the *Problems* and the Fragments of Theophrastus leaves much to be desired, but considerable improvements are possible in those passages where the compiler of the *Problems* is adapting or copying from Theophrastus.

Bekker's text of the *Problems* in the Berlin Aristotle makes no use of the parallel passages in Theophrastus; but since the footnotes which will accompany the translation of the *Problems* will record those passages where it is possible to improve the text by reference to Theophrastus, it is unnecessary to detail them here. On the other hand, considerable use has been made, especially by I. G. Schneider, of the *Problems* for the emendation of Theophrastus; but there appear to be a few passages where further improvements are possible.

Before giving a list of the proposed emendations it may be well to contrast side by side three typical passages from Theophrastus and the *Problems* in order to show, firstly, that the compiler of the latter clearly copies from the former, and, secondly, how the two authors can be used to correct one another.

(a) Theophrastus, Frag. V. (*de uentis*), [Aristotle,] *Problems* XXVI. 48.
§§ 19, 20 (Wimmer, p. 101). 945b 10-14 (Bekker).

ἀθρόως μὲν γὰρ ἐκπίπτουσα καὶ συν- ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἀθρόως ἐμπίπτῃ, καὶ εἰ- εχής αὐτῷ τῷ ἀφιέντι θερμή . . . αὐτὸ τὸ ἀφιὲν θερμή . . . ὥσπερ καὶ παράδειγμα δὲ ίκανὸν τὸ ἐκ τῶν στο- ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος.
μάτων ἀφιέμενον.

Here in the passage from the *Problems* we must read ἐκπίπτῃ, καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀφιέντι θερμή; and στόματος for σώματος.

(b) ib. § 36 (Wimmer, p. 107). [Aristotle,] *Problems* XXVI. 25. 942b 23 (Bekker).

ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τέλει μεγίστους εἶναι, διὰ τί ἐπὶ τέλει ἄνεμοι μέγιστοι; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κοινὸν πλείστων ὅταν ἡ ὅταν ἀθρόοι ἐκπνεύσωσιν, ὀλίγον γὰρ ἀθρόον ἐμπνεύσωσι μικρὸν γίγνεται τὸ θερμόν;
τὸ λοιπόν.

Here in the passage from Theophrastus we must read ἀθρόοι for ἀθρόον, and ἐκπνεύσωσι ('expend themselves,' a very common meaning in the *Problems*) for ἐμπνεύσωσι; and in the passage from the *Problems* λοιπόν for the meaningless θερμόν.

(c) *ib.* § 56 (Wimmer, p. 113).

(The words in brackets are restored from the *Problems*.)

οἷον βαρύτερον ἐν τοῖς νοτίοις ἔχουσιν
 <οἵ> ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀδυνατώτερον·
 αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἐξ <οὐλίγον> πολὺ ὑγρὸν
 γίνεται <διατηκόμενον> διὰ τὴν ἀλέαν>
 καὶ ἀντὶ κούφου πνεύματος ὑγρότης
 βιρεῖα. ἔτι δὲ οὐλή μὲν ἰσχὺς καὶ δύναμις
 ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις ἔστι· <ταῦτα δὲ ἀνίεται
 ὑπὸ τῶν νοτίων· τὸ γὰρ γλισχρὸν ἐν
 τοῖς ἄρθροις πεπηγός μὲν κωλύει>
 κινεῖσθαι ημᾶς, ὑγρὸν δὲ λίαν οὐ συν-
 τείνεσθαι.

[Aristotle,] *Problems* I. 24.
 862a 27-34 (Bekker).

διὰ τί ἐν τοῖς νοτίοις βαρύτερον
 ἔχουσι καὶ ἀδυνατώτερον οἱ ἄνθρωποι;
 ή ὅτι ἐξ οὐλίγον πολὺ ὑγρὸν γίνεται
 διατηκόμενον διὰ τὴν ἀλέαν, καὶ ἐκ
 πνεύματος κούφου ὑγρὸν βαρύ; ἔτι δὲ
 η δύναμις ημῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις ἔστι,
 ταῦτα δὲ ἀνίεται ὑπὸ τῶν νοτίων.
 (δηλούσι δὲ οἱ ψόφοι τῶν κεκολλη-
 μένων.) τὸ γὰρ γλισχρὸν ἐν τοῖς ἄρ-
 θροις πεπηγός μὲν κινεῖσθαι κωλύει
 ημᾶς, ὑγρὸν δὲ λίαν οὐ συντείνεσθαι.

Here in the last line of the passage of Theophrastus we must certainly emend οὐ to ὅν as in the passage of the *Problems* ('whereas, if it is too moist, it prevents us from exerting ourselves').

These three passages will be sufficient to show the dependence of the *Problems* on Theophrastus and the way in which the two authors can be used to emend one another.

The following is a list of proposed emendations in Wimmer's text of Theophrastus suggested by the parallel passages in the *Problems*:

Theophrastus, Frag. V. (*de uentis*), § 8 (Wimmer, p. 97), for τὴν Αἴγυπτον
 <τὴν> πρὸς θάλατταν, read <τὰ> πρὸς θάλατταν, cp. below κοίλη τὰ
 κάτω ή Αἴγυπτος and [Aristotle] 945a 20.

ib. § 36 (Wimmer, p. 107), for ἀθρόον ἐμπνεύσωσιν read ἀθρόοι ἐκπνεύσωσι
 from [Aristotle] 942b 24 (see above).

ib. § 40 (Wimmer, p. 108), οὐ γὰρ ὕσπερ ἐν γῇ . . . ἀλλὰ πλανᾶται διὰ τὸ
 ἀφ' ὑγροῦ βεβηκέναι ἐφ' ὄμαλῃ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ λεῖός ἔστι should be emended from
 [Aristotle] 946a 24 οὐ γὰρ ὕσπερ ἐν γῇ <ὑπομένει τὴν ὥλην¹> ('meet with
 resistance from the matter'), ἀλλὰ πλανᾶται διὰ τὸ ἀφ' ὑγροῦ βεβηκέναι, καὶ
 ὄμαλὸς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ λεῖός ἔστι.

ib. § 48 (Wimmer, p. 110), διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐὰν λάβῃ πνέοντα ἄλλον ἄνεμον,
 for λάβῃ we should probably read καταλάβῃ from [Aristotle] 942b 12, which
 gives a better sense.

ib. § 49 [Wimmer, p. 111], καὶ <πολὺς> ὁ κινούμενος ἀήρ οὐδὲν ἔλαττον ή
 μεθ' ημέραν should read καὶ <πολὺς> ὁ κινούμενος ἀήρ <καὶ> οὐδὲν ἔλαττων

¹ We should perhaps read εἰλην 'the sun's warmth,' since Y^a reads ίλην.

κ.τ.λ. as in [Aristotle] 941a 34, *ώστε πολὺς κινεῖται ὁ ἀηρ καὶ οὐθὲν ἐλάττων*

κ.τ.λ.

ib. § 56 (Wimmer, p. 113), read *ὑγρὸν δὲ λίαν ὄν* (for *οὐ*) from [Aristotle] 862a 33 (see above).

ib. § 57 (Wimmer, p. 113), read *ὑγρότητα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι <καὶ>* *θερμὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ἐμποιοῦσι* from [Aristotle] 862a 18.

ib. § 60 (Wimmer, p. 114), for *ὡς ἀπὸ πόντου* read *ἀλλ' ἀπὸ πόντου* from [Aristotle] 947a 8.

Fragment VII. (*de lassitudine*), § 10 (Wimmer, p. 133), *διὰ τὴν κίνησιν <ἐπισπῶσιν οἱ μηροὶ> μᾶλλον*, we should probably supply *συσπῶσιν* instead of *ἐπισπῶσι* from [Aristotle] 883b 16.

ib. § 12 (Wimmer, p. 133), for *τῷ ἐπιπίπτειν τὸ σῶμα* we should read *τῷ ἐπιπίπτειν <κάτω> τὸ σῶμα* from [Aristotle] 883a 37 to complete the sense.

ib. § 15 (Wimmer, p. 134), *πολλὴ δ' ἡ συνεχῆς καὶ ὄμοία*, the MSS. here read *μία*, which Wimmer has changed to *όμοία*; *μία*, however, is read in [Aristotle] 880b 18, and should certainly be retained here. In the second half of the same section the quotation in [Aristotle] 880b 24 ff. shows that the text of Theophrastus is incomplete, and we should read *ὅταν δ' ἡ βραχεῖα διὰ μὲν τὸ πλήθος τῆς κινήσεως <ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις> οὐ γίνεται κόπος, <ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀνάτεσιν>* διὰ τὸ τῆν μεταβολὴν ἴσχυρὰν εἶναι *κ.τ.λ.*

Fragment IX. (*de sudore*), § 13 (Wimmer, p. 142). We should probably read *ἔλκη ἐκφύουσι* for the colourless *ἔχουσι*, from [Aristotle] 883b 26.

ib. 37 (Wimmer, p. 148), *διὰ τὸ ἐλάττω μὲν εἶναι ὡστε ξηρᾶναι πλείω δὲ τῆς ἐμφύτου καὶ προυπαρχούσης*, read *ἐλάττων . . . πλείων* from [Aristotle] 869a 11, where Bekker's emendation is necessary to the sense; we must also insert *<ἢ>* before *ώστε* to complete the sense.

E. S. FORSTER.

THE UNIVERSITY,
SHEFFIELD.

HIST
employed
of about
by the d
death, qu
grounds.
carefully
we surren

The

The
forms in
the morp
erected m
these insc
informed
these tw
criticizes
(p. 166) s
was put
archaistic

Befo
say that

¹ There s
this assum
(cons. 298)

THE SCIPIONIC INSCRIPTIONS.

HISTORIANS and grammarians, palaeographers, and epigraphers have long employed the Scipionic inscriptions as providing accurate data for the period of about 200 B.C. A recent article, however, appearing in this journal, written by the distinguished grammarian, Professor Fay, just before his untimely death, questions the authenticity of these inscriptions, chiefly on grammatical grounds. The inscriptions are so important that it might be well to consider carefully the validity of such arguments in the light of other evidence before we surrender these landmarks of republican history and language.

The two inscriptions read as follows :

Dessau, I.L.S. no. 1 ; Diehl, *Alt. Inschr.* 458.

Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus,
 Gnaiuod patre prognatus fortis uir sapiensque,
 Quoius forma uirtutei parisuma fuit,
 Consol, censor, aidilis quei fuit apud uos,
 Taurasia Cisauno Samnio cepit,
 Subigit omne Loucanam opsidesque abdoucit.

Dessau, I.L.S. no. 3 ; Diehl, 460.

Honc oino ploirume cosentiont R[omai]
 Duonoro optumo fuise uiro,
 Luciom Scipione; filios Barbati,
 Consol, censor, aidilis hic fuet a[pud uos]:
 Hec cepit Corsica Aleriaque urbe:
 Dedet Tempestatebus aide mereto[d].

The points raised by Professor Fay are three : (a) Several grammatical forms in these inscriptions seem to be incorrect, or at least inconsistent with the morphology of 200 B.C.; (b) Scipio Metellus, the friend of Cicero, who erected many statues to his ancestors (Cic. *Ad Att.* VI. 1, 17), may have ordered these inscriptions to be made; (c) Grammarians of Cicero's day were well enough informed on questions of early morphology to compose epitaphs as correct as these two appear to be. It must be added that while the article throughout criticizes the forms of both inscriptions alike, Professor Fay in one passage (p. 166) seems to distinguish between them : 'possibly the Barbatus epitaph was put on the tomb by a son or grandson about 200 B.C.,¹ while only the archaic epitaph of the son of Barbatus was inspired by Scipio Metellus.'

Before proceeding to raise new questions, it may not be out of place to say that to the layman these inscriptions do not seem to contain more

¹ There seems to be an historical difficulty in this assumption. Two grandsons of Barbatus (cons. 298) were killed in Spain in 212. It is doubtful whether any grandson of his survived till 200—at any rate, no son could have been living at that time.

inexplicable grammatical forms than do for instance any twelve lines of the *Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus*. Let us briefly examine the questioned words,¹ taking them in the order of Professor Fay's discussion, pp. 167 sqq.

'CORNELIUS LUCIUS BARBATUS—classical forms, not according with nominative <Corneli> of the "titulus." Yet the form in *ius* occurs in Dessau, I.L.S. no. 15 (189 B.C.), no. 16 (about 187), and no. 18 (186 B.C.).

'GNAIVOD (*G* not *C*!).' However, *G* would hardly be a lapsus of a 'forger,' since it was never used in Cicero's day in this praenomen, nor is it likely to have been considered a proper archaism, since it must at best have been rare. It can best be accounted for as a genuine though rare use of *G* at a time when *G* and *C* were still rivals in a not clearly defined field. Other early instances of confusion may be found in Diehl's nos. 68, 58, 102, 216.

'LOUCANAM, ADOUCIT: The word *Lucius* . . . has *u*<IE *eu*, so that *ou* in *Loucanam* and *abducit* is certainly archaic.' Perhaps it would be safer to say that we know too little about the (presumably Oscan) word *Lucanam* to draw any inferences from its morphology. As for *abducit*, no one has questioned the authenticity of the S.C. *de Tiburtibus* (about 160 B.C.) which has *indoucere*, and it is not usual to assert that the *u* of *Lucius* derives from IE *eu*.

These, I think, are the only forms of the Barbatus inscription seriously questioned by Professor Fay. In the second the objections are hardly more serious :

'HONC . . . the archaizer's mind works roughly; if *avonculus* . . . is for *avunculus*, then *honc* is for *hunc*.' But there can hardly be any objection to the orthodox derivation of *honc* from 'hom-ce' in view of the occurrence of *honce* on the *cippus* of Spoleto (Diehl, 214).

'FUET, DEDET, but CEPIT: -et and -it cannot both be contemporary and genuine.' Would it not be difficult to find a republican inscription of any length that presented complete consistency in orthography?

'HIC/HEC, AIDILIS/ES.' The confusion between the rather open *z* and *e* during the second century B.C. is of course well documented, and the variation in orthography is only to be expected. Would an archaizing 'forger' who mastered the obscure morphology, the historical data, and the palaeography of the Scipionic period let himself lapse into such needless inconsistencies?

'PLOIRUME . . . a false archaism.' The orthodox grammarians assume an *o* grade, *plo-*, which is entirely plausible, and which satisfactorily explains the form. At any rate we may not abandon the inscription on the ground of an uncertain derivation of one word, when every republican inscription of any length still presents us with unexplained forms.

It would seem then that the grammatical argument need not compel us to surrender the inscription. But there are other serious questions that should be examined before a final decision is rendered.

i. The palaeography of both inscriptions is consistent beyond criticism.

¹ I discuss only the forms that are definitely questioned.

The letter
of the c
sprawlin
the form
Cicero's
could ha
themselves
forgery
almost in
more, if
that this
that of t
plausibly
this supp

2. I
possessed
appropri
the later
hopeless
authors
grammat
arena fr
because s
oculus.' V
It could
Scipio M
in fact, w
having t
reproduci
loc. cit.)

3. F
Metellus
placed b
permisio
Rome th
deception
a slightl
early E
but the l
tions, cl
language

It w
to these

The lettering is rude and primitive and uniformly so. The firm, incisive stroke of the classical inscriptions never once appears. The primitive open P, the sprawling S, the short medial bar of the E, the early forms of L, R, and M and the form of the punctuation are especially noteworthy. Trained cutters of Cicero's day, like trained scribes, would have their style so formed that they could hardly have inscribed twelve lines in an obsolete style without betraying themselves at some one stroke. One has but to think of the thousands of forgeries perpetrated by practised impostors in the Renaissance, and later, that almost invariably lapsed into a betraying inconsistency at some point. Furthermore, if the two inscriptions came from the time of Scipio Metellus, is it likely that this inscription of the father would have been made in a later style than that of the son, and that the two different styles should have been kept so plausibly and uniformly distinct from each other? Can Roman science match this supposed accuracy in antiquarian detail in any other field?

2. Is it probable that there were two scholars in Cicero's day who possessed the linguistic training requisite to write these two inscriptions so appropriately—I say two, since one would not have made the earlier appear the later? Varro was perhaps the best grammarian of that day, yet he was hopelessly confused by the 'spurious' *ei* (Varro *L.L.* G.S. p. 207), while the authors of these inscriptions were not. Here are a few examples of Varro's grammatical knowledge taken at random: '*Carmen* comes from *Casmen* as . . . *arena* from *asena*', VII. 27; '*cornua* from *curuare*', VII. 25; '*canes* so-called because *signa canunt*', VII. 32; '*comiter* from Greek *κώμος*', VII. 89; '*cocles* from *oculus*', VII. 71. Such was the state of linguistic knowledge in Cicero's day. It could hardly have created the Scipionic inscriptions, nor is it likely that Scipio Metellus would have done much better with the historical data. He, in fact, was the man who betrayed such ignorance of his ancestors, that in having the portrait of his great-grandfather made he had that of Scipio Africanus reproduced, and on the *titulus* omitted a reference to the censorship (Cic. *ad loc. cit.*).

3. Finally, historians cannot lightly suppose that a man like Scipio Metellus would have inscriptions forged with a view to deception. The statues placed by him on the Capitol were of course placed openly and by official permission. There has not yet appeared a single inscription from classical Rome that can be proved to have been archaized either for amusement or deception. The *Elogia* of Augustus' Forum are in classical Latin, though of a slightly conservative orthography. The Duillius inscription, recut in the early Empire, reproduced so far as possible the orthography of the original, but the lettering was modern to the extent of using the I-longa. Legal inscriptions, charters, and religious *leges* were apt to be phrased in conservative language, but they were not 'archaized' so far as our present knowledge goes.

It would seem, therefore, that we need not hesitate to give full credence to these famous inscriptions.

TENNEY FRANK.

The vari
nised that

LUCAN VII 460-465.

- 460 ut rapido cursu fati supra
 1 consumpsere locum, parua tellure dirempti,
463 quo sua pila cadant aut *quam* sibi fata minentur
462 inde *manum*, spectant. *tempus, quo noscere possent*
 4 facturi quae monstra forent. uidere parentes
465 frontibus aduersis fraternaque comminus arma.

463 ante 462 VGP et ante corr. ut uidetur U, item adnotator super Lucanum ed. Endtii p. 276 et Statii scholiastes ad *Theb.* VI 760, qui 462 et 464 coniunctos legerunt.

462 ante 463 MZ et ex corr. U.

463 *quam* MZPGV, *qua* ex corr. U.

462 *manum* VGP, lemma schol. Bern., Statii schol., *manus* Z et ex corr. U, de M non liquet.

tempus quo noscere possent VGP et ut uidetur M, adn. sup. Luc., Z (*possit*), Statii schol. (*possint*), *tempus = q.t.i.r.n.p.* lemma schol. Bern., *uultusque agnoscere quaerunt* ex corr. U, Z² G², *uultus* etiam V².

The text printed above is the reading of Gronouius, Cortius, Heitland, and a few old editors of the days before Grotius; it is one of the only two readings yet adopted which require any consideration, and of those two it is by far the better authenticated and moreover the better. It is paraphrased by Gronouius thus: 'paullulum stant defixi in contemplando, quae in corpora (nempe cognatorum) pila essent missuri, aut *quam* ex aduerso manum consanguineorum, tamquam fatalem, haberent metuendam: erat id *tempus* sufficiens ad intelligendum, quae monstra essent facturi. uidere namque et agnouere parentes et fratres'. Sense and expression are perfect, except for the doubt whether *tempus* can well stand, as the Bernese scholiast says, for '*tempus erat*': in the one parallel cited by Cortius (for he cites only one) the noun has an epithet, Plin. *ep.* II 13 2 'tibi . . . longum . . . *tempus* . . . quo amicos tuos exornare potuisti', and this may make a difference.¹

The incoherent order of verses traditional among editors, 462 463, I will not even consider. It is a pure accident, injurious to sense and even to grammar: if readers care to see what editors make of it, here are two specimens, the texts of Grotius and of Mr Hosius.

- parua tellure dirempti,
462 inde *manum* spectant, *uultusque agnoscere quaerunt*,
463 quo sua pila cadant, aut *qua* sibi fata minentur,
facturi quae monstra forent.²

¹ Mr Hosius in *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1893 p. 348 says 'zu *tempus* ist wie so häufig *erat* zu ergänzen'. Out of the seven examples which he pretends to add to Kortte's there is not a single one where *erat* is to be supplied: the time is always the present, and the sense of *tempus* is

always *öpa iorlv*, as at Catull. 62 3 'surgere iam *tempus*'.

² 'ubi proprius hostem uentum est, aspicunt quos petant *uultus*, quae ipsis minentur manus, quae denique facturi essent sclera'.

are secure
The
tradition,

that is 'fa
security.
such an in
Hith
which we
and muti
or 5th ce
greater th
they disse
verses 46

It thus c
so far as
uultus wi

If n
MS auth

And this
It was u
but intell
Gronouiu
agnoscere

II, as I
or parent

¹ 'die t
die schar
ein ziel f
wo sie g

- parua tellure dirempti
- 462 inde manum spectant: *tempus, quo noscere possent,*
 463 quo sua pila cadant, aut *qua sibi fata minentur,*
*facturi quae monstra forent.*¹

The variants *qua* and *manus* may equally be set aside. It ought indeed to be recognised that the line and a half

- 463 quo sua pila cadant aut *quam sibi fata minentur*
 462 inde *manum*, spectant

are securely established, and that all uncertainty is confined to what follows.

The only reading which stands over against the text of Gronouius as a rival tradition, not a mere blunder of scribes, is that elicited and recommended by Weber,

spectant, uultusque agnoscere quaerunt,
facturi, quae monstra forent:

that is 'facturi res monstrosas'. It cannot compete with the other, but it robs it of security. If Lucan wrote *tempus quo noscere possent*, there was nothing to provoke such an interpolation as this.

Hitherto I have cited only the medieval MSS, of the 9th century or later, on which we mainly depend throughout. But verses 458-537 of this book, much defaced and mutilated, survive in II, the Vatican fragment Palatina, assigned to the 4th or 5th century. The authority of this palimpsest, despite its antiquity, is not greater than the joint authority of the medieval MSS, but it is equal; and where they dissent among themselves its intervention must needs be weighty. It gives verses 462-4 as follows:

- 463 quo sua pila cadant aut *quam sibi fata* [
 462 inde *manum* spectant *uultus quo no*[
facturi quae monsta forent uidere pa[.

It thus confirms the majority of the younger MSS in the ordering of the lines and, so far as it reaches, in every other particular, except that instead of *tempus* it has *uultus* with the minority.

If now we simply write out in succession the several words which possess most MS authority, they will give us this:

uultus quo noscere possent
facturi quae monstra forent uidere parentes.

And this is a source from which the two variants would easily and naturally spring. It was unintelligible, and had to be altered somehow. One corrector made the bold but intelligent change of *uultus* to *tempus*, which was good enough even to satisfy Gronouius. The other, bolder still and not quite so intelligent, wrote *uultusque agnoscere quaerunt*, which was good enough to satisfy Weber. But try again.

uultus, quo noscere possent
facturi quae monstra forent, uidere parentum
frontibus aduersis fraternaque communis arma.

II, as I have said, retains only *pa-*, and we do not know whether it had *parentes* or *parentum* or *paternos*. I mention *paternos* because it will promptly be conjectured

¹ 'die truppen einander nahe gerückt schauen die schar sc. der feinde; es ist die zeit, wo sie ein ziel für ihre geschosse zu suchen beginnen, wo sie gegen das von den gegnern drohende geschick vorkehrungen zu treffen suchen, aber auch die zeit wo sie noch einsehen können was für frevel sie zu begehen im begriff sind'.

and stoutly preferred if I do not. I reject it because it is less elegant, as *fraterna* follows, and was less likely to be changed. The last word of a verse is especially liable to have its inflexion altered by scribes who do not at once perceive its construction and who seek to bring it into false grammatical connexion with the word immediately preceding. Hence such corruptions as V 19 *ab urbe* for *ab urbis*, VII 310 *respexerit hostem* for *r. hoste*, Verg. *georg.* II 274 *metabere campos* for *m. campi*, 467 *fallere uitam* for *f. uita*, *Aen.* XI 605 *hastasque reductas* for *h. reductis*, Hor. *serm.* I 1 118 *tempore uitae* for *t. uita*. The whole passage, as thus amended, may be compared with IV 169-72 *postquam spatio languentia nullo | mutua conspicuos habuerint lumina uoltus,* | *deprensum est ciuile nefas* and V 470-2 *posse duces parua campi statione diremptos | admotum* *damnare nefas; nam cernere uoltus | et uoces audire datur.*

It once occurred to me that the common origin of *possent* and *quaerunt* might be sought in *quirent*, as *queo* is regularly explained in glossaries by *possum*. But the imperfect subjunctive is not found between *ciris* 5 and *Stat. silu.* V 3 60; and Lucan, whose vocabulary is as commonplace as his versification, was not likely to use it.

A. E. HOUSMAN.

'A WILFUL EXAGGERATION.'

IN the whole theory of the Latin tenses there is no more popular item than this explanation by Roby (*Latin Grammar*, 1574a) of the use of the pluperfect indicative in unreal conditional sentences. Far the most familiar instance is that in Horace (*C.* II. 17), 'me truncus illapsus cerebro sustulerat, nisi Faunus ictum dextra leuasset.'

Since we can say in Latin *perii*, 'I am a dead man,' there seems no objection in principle to Horace saying 'the tree struck me dead.' But why should the pluperfect be used and not the perfect? Why do we find this idiom in an author so ancient as Plautus ('ubi tu quingentos semel, ni hebes machaera foret, uno ictu occideras,' *Mil. Gl.* 53), in one so serious as Livy (III. 19, see Roby), and in one so late as Seneca (*de Ir.* II. 33, see Roby). Wilful exaggerations lose their force when they become conventional.

It seems necessary to believe that the pluperfect indicative expressed the straightforward meaning in each case, and we know that the Romans felt this to be the equivalent of a future participle with *eram*. Thus *sustulerat* in Horace was equivalent to *sublaturus erat*. Is it not likely that association with the future *sustulerit* made this meaning possible?

The Latin pluperfect indicative appears to be derived from an old aorist (typically that in *-sis-*), but this does not exclude subsequent influence from a future form. We may even ask whether the imperfect, so singularly associated with the future simple in form in the *-ā* and *-ē* conjugations, was not also infected with a future meaning, and whether in this way *iam tuta tenebam* in Virgil, *Aen.* VI. 358, came to suggest *adēpturus eram*?

E. V. ARNOLD.

BANGOR.

PROF.
Manilius
the taradi
can find
about a M
fairly clai

In th
misreport
did so in
164, 169,
729, 748,
errors are
and 698, v
to draw i
committed
at 205, ar
and which
alert.¹ B
two perso
said of M
exscribere

Mr va
where my
his testim
is no use p

1. At
inter ciuil
adice L².

Except
MS thus:

The supe
of dots, v
signify th
of L² is, a
much too
which see
the Arabi
observed

¹ The rea
L² has very

fraterna
specially
eive its
he word
VII 310
fallere
I 1 118
red with
vultus,
admotum
might be
But the
Lucan,
se it.
SMAN.

han this
dicative
Horace
a dextra
ection in
uperfect
cipient as
cideras,'
late as
en they
sed the
is to be
ace was
sustulerit
d aorist
a future
with the
ed with
VI. 358,
NOLD.

THE CODEX LIPSIENSIS OF MANILIUS.

PROFESSOR J. VAN WAGENINGEN has sent me a review of my fourth volume of Manilius which he has published in *Museum* vol. 28 pp. 173-7. I never contradict the taradiddles usual in reviews, because, if the reader thinks it worth his while, he can find out for himself whether they are true or no, and if he chooses to believe them without enquiry, it serves him right. But when he is fed with false information about a MS which is out of his reach, he can do nothing to help himself, and may fairly claim to be protected.

In the edition of Manilius which he published in 1915 Mr van Wageningen misreported the readings of L, cod. Lips. 1465, in a great number of places. He did so in the following twenty-seven verses of book IV alone: 44, 104, 114, 126, 164, 169, 205, 228, 275, 369, 412, 489, 510, 523, 583, 585 (titulus), 614, 622, 640, 685, 729, 748, 759, 804, 818 (titulus), 889, 907 (for I omit 508 and 553 and 670 where his errors are merely slips of the pen or misprints); and further at 179 and 350 and 469 and 698, without actually misreporting the MS, he wrote notes which force the reader to draw false conclusions. Sixteen of his twenty-seven errors had already been committed by Breiter in his edition of 1907. Some of these, such as '*mensurae et L'* at 205, are errors which both Breiter and Mr van Wageningen were sure to commit, and which might indeed be committed by almost any collator who was not on the alert.¹ But others, notably those at 169, 585, 640, 818, 889, are such blunders as no two persons could make independently; and I stated the truth of the matter when I said of Mr van Wageningen in my note on 169 '*multis locis falsa Breiteri testimonia exscribere maluit quam ipsum librum sua causa Groningam missum inspicere*'.

Mr van Wageningen, bent on retaliation, believes that he has found three places where my reports of L are wrong. They are the following. To win credence for his testimony he tells us that he possesses a photographic reproduction of L; but it is no use possessing photographs of MSS unless you can read them.

i. At IV 44 Mr van Wageningen's note was '*adice ML¹G, adice et L² (ss. et inter ciuilia et bella)*'; mine was '*adice et L nisi fallor et cod. Cusanus, adice GM, et adice L²*'.

Except for one detail which I will mention presently, the verse stands in the MS thus:

Pugnantē menbris. ^{et} *adice ciuilia bella.*

The superscript *et* is in the neat and rather pretty hand of L²; the two pairs of dots, which Mr van Wageningen appears to regard as meaningless ornament, signify that this word is to be inserted after *menbris*; and therefore the reading of L² is, as I said, *et adice*, and not, as he said, *adice et*. Between *adice* and *ciuilia*, much too faint and blurred for Mr van Wageningen to notice it, there is something which seemed to me as if it might once have been that abbreviation of *et*, resembling the Arabic numeral 7, which is used by L in a few other places; and I further observed that the cod. Cusanus, which was copied from L in the 12th century, was

¹ The reading of L, as of M, is *mensura et*: final *a* into the ligature *æ*, which L does not L² has very carefully and cleverly altered the use.

cited as giving here *adice et*. I therefore wrote with due caution '*adice et L nisi fallor*'. Mr van Wageningen begs the reader to believe—'uix credideris, lector, sed crede'¹—that this was a mistake which had been made by Breiter. Breiter either made the same mistake as Mr van Wageningen, the mistake of thinking that the superscript *et* was meant for insertion at this point, or else he thought that the faint sign was a caret, as indeed it may be, though not from the hand which wrote the *et*.

2. At 350 Mr van Wageningen's text was *ingratus* and his note was '*ingrati M*'; my text was *ingrati* and my note was '*ingrati LM cod. Venetus, ingratus GL²*'. He asseverates that the reading of *L* is simply *ingratus*.

The reading of *L* is *ingrati*. Between that word and the next, as often happens in this MS, there is a rather wide space, where *L²* found enough room to make the correction *ingratus*. It accordingly expanded the final *i* to *u* by a supplementary stroke, and it added the tall free springing *s* which is characteristic of *L²* and which differentiates it more than anything else from *L*. How *L* writes the syllable *-tus* may be seen in the *receptus* of the next line. The truth was stated, before my time, by Jacob: Mr van Wageningen presumes to contradict us both, relying on his own defective eyesight or superficial observation or inexperience in reading MSS.

3. At 369 Mr van Wageningen's text was *cunctisque* and his note was '*cunctisque L, cunctis G, iunctisque MC*'; my text was *iunctisque* and my note was '*iunctisque M, coniunctisque L cod. Venetus, cunctisque L², cunctis G*'. He asseverates that the reading of *L* is simply *cunctisque*.

The reading of *L* is this:

Inq. alio querendo mali. qd̄ īiunctisq. sequendū.

The preposition (*con-*), as often in this MS, stands a little apart from the rest of the compound. There has been drawn through *qd̄* and *ī* a horizontal stroke of deletion, which makes *ī* look something like *ē* and has deceived all my predecessors, and the initial *i* of *iunctis* has been converted into *c* with a clumsiness which ought to deceive nobody.

If Mr van Wageningen wishes to know of errors in my writings he had better address enquiry to me. I am more interested in discovering them than anyone else can possibly be, and consequently I discover more of them. Here are two: II 79 '*minusque GLM*' should be '*minusque GL, minusque M*', and II 394 '*adsumpto L²*', *assumpto L*' should be '*adsumpto L, assumpto L²*'.

A. E. HOUSMAN.

¹ He calls this 'het Latijn van Housman', but it seems to be his own improvement of the Latin of Ovid, 'uix mihi creditis, sed credite', which I borrowed in my note on IV 141.

THER
an insight
endow wr
perfection,
the corre
viduals, w
uses, or pa
ing to the
Thus we
which the
or 'unreal
logical poi
varieties o
pointed ou

Eight
Cicero's L
of his writi
letter. Th
uses in Ve

(a) Th
speaker is
Aeneid

' Ther
The sp
and steps b
(See al

(b) Th
Authorship
Eclogue

(See al

¹ I am ind
not only fo
some valuab

THE SINGULAR *NOS* IN VERGIL.¹

I.

THERE can be few other uses in the Latin language which afford us so great an insight into the mental attitude of a writer at the moment of his writing, or which endow writing with so much of that personal colour which the voice alone gives in perfection, as does the singular use of the pronoun *nos*. All forms of this word (with the corresponding adjective and verb forms) which occur in the speeches of individuals, who are at the moment speaking independently, are either wholly singular uses, or partly plural uses with more or less justification for the plural form according to the extent to which the speaker is identifying himself with his surroundings. Thus we find all degrees of plurality in such forms, and it is those instances in which the plural form can be least definitely justified which we call 'singular' or 'unreal plural' uses, and which prove to be the most fascinating from a psychological point of view. The object of the present essay is to inquire how far the varieties of meaning in the singular use of *nos*, which Professor R. S. Conway has pointed out in Cicero,² appear also in Vergil.

II.

Eight distinct types of the use of the unreal plural pronoun are to be found in Cicero's *Letters*, but of these only five appear in Vergil's works, because the nature of his writings does not admit of the finer shades of meaning which are needed in a letter. The lettering of the Ciceronian types has been applied to the corresponding uses in Vergil which follow, to render comparison easier.

(a) The Personage Plural—expressing a tone of general superiority, when the speaker is conscious of the personality he presents to the outside world.

Aeneid II. 651. Aeneas :

Nos contra, effusi lacrimis, coniunxque Creusa,
Ascaniusque, omnisque domus, ne uertere secum
cuncta pater, fatoque urgunti incumbere uellet.

'There you might have seen Aeneas and his household imploring Anchises....'

The speaker draws, as it were, a picture of himself and his family in this act, and steps back from the picture to reflect upon it.

(See also *Aen.* III. 325, VIII. 397, *Georgics* IV. 449, *Ecl.* V. 18.)

(b) The Plural of Poetic Dignity (equivalent in a prose author to the plural of Authorship).

Eclogue VIII. 5 :

Damonis Musam dicemus et Alphesiboei.

(See also *Georgics* II. 40, *Ecl.* IV. 1-3.)

¹ I am indebted to Professor R. S. Conway not only for the suggestion of this subject and some valuable guidance in its earlier develop-

ment, but also for the later notes which are included in this article with his initials.

² *Cambridge Philological Society Transactions*, Vol. V. Part I. 1899.

Only twice in the whole of the *Aeneid* does Vergil apply the unreal plural to himself (*Aen.* VII. 646, 733), and these two instances belong to type b. The significance of this fact will be discussed later on.

(c) The Plural of Ownership (or Royalty).
Aeneid I. 627-629. Dido speaks to the Trojans:

Quare agite, O tectis iuuenes succedite nostris.
 me quoque per multos similis fortuna labores
 iactatam hac demum voluit consistere terra.

There is an additional note of royal hospitality conveyed by 'nostris' here. The following two lines show the contrasting singular 'me,' which reveals a simply expressed and sincere sympathy on the part of a foreign ruler to unfortunate and homeless wanderers.

(See also *Ecl.* I. 8, 44—both passages with contrasting singular forms—and *Aen.* VI. 71.)

(e) The Plural of Seniority (expressing superiority to a third person).
Georgics IV. 358, 359:

Duc, age, duc ad nos: fas illi limina diuom
 tangere.

The goddess Cyrene, in giving orders for her son Aristaeus to be led to her, thus expresses her superiority to a mortal.

(See also *Aen.* VIII. 514, XII. 571, *Ecl.* III. 44.)

(g) The Patronizing Plural (indicating superiority to the person addressed, occasionally also conveying a tone of reproof).

Aeneid I. 676:

Qua facere id possis, nostram nunc accipe mentem.

Spoken by Venus to Cupid, giving him instructions to impersonate Ascanius.

(See also *Georgics* IV. 445, *Ecl.* V. 85, *Aen.* IX. 560, XII. 800.)

III.

There follow some examples of what I have ventured to claim as three new types of the unreal plural use of *nos* in Vergil. The plural form seems to occur so often in connexion with the particular shade of feeling as to suggest that Vergil felt that it helped to express that feeling.

(i) The Demonstrator's Plural.

Georgics I. 50:

Ac prius ignotum ferro quam scindimus aequor, . . .

II. 248, 249:

Pinguis item quae sit tellus, hoc denique pacto
 discimus:

III. 305:

Hae quoque non cura nobis leuiore tuendae;

—in showing the value of a flock of goats.

The plural form here, I think, brings out very clearly the two essential sides of a demonstrator's attitude to his students: the one where he, as it were, dictates to inferiors; the other, when he joins them as an equal in seeking the common goal. This use always appears in this kind of passage (never *ego*) in the *Georgics*, as one

might ex
ences of
Georgics

(j) *Eclo*

VII.

VIII.

The
estimation
Ecl. I. 31

(k) *Aene*

X. 48

88

[The
horror of

Vergi
picture th
some dea

(See a

In wh
of more th

Aene

If thi
of injured
herself wi
for recogn
into the re
two. In
certainly i

II. 14

might expect from the didactic nature of the poetry. The following are the references of all the other examples of this type which I have been able to trace: *Georgics* I. 204, 242, 249, 250, 253, 257, 351, II. 32, 186, 204, 428, III. 285, 325.

(j) The Plural of Romance.

Eclogue III. 80, 81. Damoetas :

Triste lupus stabulis, maturis frugibus imbris,
arboribus uenti, nobis Amaryllidis irae.

VII. 59. Thyrsis :

Phyllidis aduentu nostrae nemus omne uirebit.

VIII. 108. Alphesiboeus :

Credimus? an, qui amant, ipsi sibi somnia fingunt?

The examples of this type are all found in passages which represent the self-estimation of proud or offended lovers. The remaining examples are: *Aen.* IV. 369, *Ecl.* I. 31, II. 7, 44, III. 72, VIII. 81, IX. 22.

(k) The Scenic Plural.

Aeneid XII. 677. Turnus :

Quo deus et quo dura uocat fortuna sequamur.

X. 481. Turnus :

Aspice, num mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum.

880. Mezentius :

Nec mortem horremus, nec diuom parcimus ulli.

[The use of the plural in a sentence which mentions the gods intensifies the horror of the blasphemy.—R.S.C.]

Vergil seems to put this use into the utterances of those of his characters who picture themselves as the centre of a great scene, where they are about to perform some deed of terrible import, or who anticipate some sudden and violent death.

(See also *Aen.* II. 139, IV. 659-662, XII. 50, 51.)

IV.

In what follows all examples of the plural pronoun and verb which are capable of more than one interpretation are recorded and discussed.

Aeneid I. 250-253. Venus addresses Jupiter :

Nos, tua progenies, caeli quibus adnuis arcem,
nauibus—infandum—anmissis, unius ob iram
prodimur atque Italis longe disingimur oris.
Hic pietatis honos? sic nos in sceptr'a reponis?

If this is a singular use, it certainly belongs to the *g* type (reproof), as the tone of injured dignity is clear. It is all a question as to how far Venus is identifying herself with the Trojans. This is one instance where there is much to be said for recognizing a real plural, and in any case it shows how the singular use merges into the real plural, and that there is no absolute line of demarcation between the two. In this passage all the plural forms are probably real; the last 'nos' certainly is.

II. 148, 149. Priam to Sinon :

Quisquis es, amissos hinc iam obliuiscere Graios :
noster eris ; mihique haec edissere uera roganti.

Taking into consideration Priam's state of mental stress at this juncture, which of itself would tend to exclude the lofty attitude given by the singular use, and also the occurrence of 'mihi' applied to himself in the same line, the conclusion that 'noster' is here the genuine plural ('one of us') perhaps has the greater reason on its side.

IV. 96, 97. Juno to Venus:

Nec me adeo fallit, ueritam te moenia nostra
suspectas habuisse domos Carthaginis altae.

The plural in this passage is parallel to that in VII. 293, which must also be classed as doubtful: it may be a real plural, or possibly a combination of scornful superiority (*g*) with the Scenic Plural (*k*).

IV. 307, 308. Dido appeals to Aeneas:

Nec te noster amor, nec te data dextera quondam,
nec moritura tenet crudeli funere Dido?

'Noster amor,' I think, seems exactly parallel to the singular 'moritura,' implying that all the affection was now on Dido's part; it would belong in this case to type *j*, showing the reproach of an offended lover. But it is quite reasonable to render 'our mutual love,' and the phrase 'per conubia nostra' (l. 316) is enough to make the question doubtful.

VII. 293, 294. Juno soliloquizes:

Heu stirpem inuisam, et fatis contraria nostris
fata Phrygum!

Juno may be including the Latins in 'nostris,' and the rendering should then be 'the Trojan destiny that thwarts the destiny of me and mine.' If it be a singular use, however, it must be classed with type *k* as Scenic. This interpretation is perhaps more probable, as it seems more in conformance with Juno's haughty temperament; but the doubt must be admitted.

X. 42, 43. Venus:

Nil super imperio moueor: sperauimus ista
dum fortuna fuit:

—probably a real plural ('I and the Trojans'), but it may belong to type *g*, showing reproach. The singular form in the same line makes it difficult and doubtful.

[The plural used of herself alone might be compared with Cicero's *Viximus: floruiimus*.—R.S.C.]

XI. 54, 55. Aeneas:

Hi nostri reditus, exspectatique triumphi?
Haec mea magna fides?

As with the previous passage, this instance is rendered doubtful by the singular form immediately following. By itself the plural might suggest self-reproach, as though Aeneas said: 'Is this how your ally Aeneas promised to come back to you (Evander)?'; but it may be a genuine plural, including Aeneas and Pallas together.

Eclogue I. 19. Meliboeus:

Sed tamen iste deus qui sit, da, Tityre, nobis.

Unless there are some unmentioned persons present to form an audience, this plural must be unreal. But what particular feeling does it indicate? It might be the poetical plural, or, perhaps, the personage or patronage use. It is hard to tell,

for Melib
feeling m
careful a
Perhaps

[In A
may be se
is used fa

VII.

VIII

The s
that the s
in the fir
do'—tha

Aene

Altho
it is wise
until ano
masculine

The c
used in c
importanc
writer in
enables hi

The c
only twic
reference
or verb i
example,

The
himself a
then, tha
the earlie
in the Ec
characters
after comp
usages wh
nowhere e

re, which
and also
sion that
r reason

must also
scornful

a, imply-
this case
nable to
nough to

I then be
singular
tation is
haughty

showing
al.
Viximus :

singular
roach, as
k to you
together.

ence, this
might be
ard to tell,

for Meliboeus has no very sound reason for any of these feelings; and no special feeling may be intended, if it is due to metrical convenience. But Vergil is too careful a writer to allow of our assuming this without very careful consideration. Perhaps it is simply poetical—type b—but I confess I cannot decide.

[In *Elogue II. 7* another example of the singular *nos* with no very clear meaning may be seen. In the artificial, half-Alexandrine style of the *Elogues* the unreal plural is used far more freely than in any other part of Vergil's work.—R.S.C.]

VII. 23, 24. Corydon :

Aut si non possumus omnes,
hic arguta sacra pendebit fistula pinu.

VIII. 62, 63.

Haec Damon : uos, quae responderit Alphesiboeus,
dicite, Pierides : non omnia possumus omnes.

The word 'omnes' shows that the plural is real, and the second passage suggests that the sentence was a proverb. But it is applied so directly to himself by Corydon in the first case—he really means 'if this is a thing which I can't do as well as others do'—that the lines seem to call for at least brief mention here.

Aeneid X. 68, 69. Juno :

Num linquere castra
hortati sumus aut uitam committere uentis ?

Although four unreal plural forms occur shortly afterwards in the same speech, it is wiser to count this example as a real plural, meaning 'the gods on my side,' until another instance can be found of a woman-speaker describing herself by the masculine plural, as do the heroines of Greek Tragedy.

V.

The number of examples of the singular *nos*, and of the genuine singular form used in contrast, given in the foregoing sections, is perhaps sufficient to show the importance of the use as a means by which we may examine the mental attitude of a writer in different circumstances, and appreciate the varying colours with which it enables him to paint the temperament of his characters.

The examination of this use in the works of Vergil has shown that the poet has only twice in the *Aeneid* made use of the 'unreal' plural of Poetic Dignity, with reference to himself, whilst there are several instances of the singular pronoun or verb in such a connexion. We find the famous 'arma uirumque cano,' for example, and in the Ninth Book :

- 446. Fortunati ambo ! si quid mea carmina possunt,
nulla dies unquam memori uos eximet aeuo ;
- 525. Vos, O Calliope, precor, aspire canenti, . . .
- and 528. Et mecum ingentes oras euoluite belli.

The two instances in the *Aeneid* where Vergil has used the 'unreal' plural of himself are both in the catalogue in Book VII. (See type b, page 178.) It may be, then, that we should regard this as one of the indications that this catalogue is one of the earliest written parts of the *Aeneid*. Certainly Vergil uses *nos* from time to time in the *Elogues* and *Georgics* of himself as well as putting it into the mouths of his characters. It may be that, in commencing this part of the Seventh Book shortly after completing his earlier works, the poet was unconsciously drawn into the poetic usages which he had hitherto adopted to a limited extent in them. The fact that nowhere else in the epic does he use this pronoun of himself might justify the con-

THE SINGULAR *NOS* IN VERGIL

clusion that Vergil came gradually to view it as something artificial, out of keeping with the greatness of his theme—in short, as an imperfection, which should not appear in the perfected style of the epic, which was to be on a much higher plane than the pastorals.

We may perhaps claim that, by means of this 'unreal' plural use of *nos*, rare as it is in the *Aeneid*, a new point of view is gained in studying Vergil. Both its use and the narrow limits within which the poet confined it may perhaps serve to show him to us even more clearly as the lover and student of nature and country life, as the philosopher contemplating with dramatic imagination the deeper and more subtle movements of human nature, its nobleness and its pathetic weakness; and thus may add something to our conception of the personality of the great poet.

APPENDIX.
TABLE OF ANALYSIS.

Type.	Title.	<i>Aeneid.</i>	<i>Georgics.</i>	<i>Elegues.</i> ⁵	Total.
(a)	Personage	20	1	3	24
(b)	Poetic Dignity ¹	2 ⁴	4	20	26
(c)	Ownership ²	10	—	5	15
(e)	Seniority	2	1	1	4
(g)	Patronage ³	10	2	2	14
(i)	Demonstrator's	—	16	—	16
(j)	Romance	1	—	9	10
(k)	Scenic	10	—	—	10
Total number of examples		55	24	40	119
Total number of lines		9897	2188	753 ⁵	

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF PERCENTAGES (I.E., EXAMPLES PER 100 LINES).

Type.	<i>Aeneid.</i>	<i>Georgics.</i>	<i>Elegues.</i> ⁵
(a)	0.20	0.05	0.39
(b)	0.02	0.18	2.66
(c)	0.10	—	0.66
(e)	0.02	0.05	0.13
(g)	0.10	0.09	0.27
(i)	—	0.73	—
(j)	0.01	—	1.19
(k)	0.10	—	—
Total percentage frequency	0.55	1.10	5.30

E. H. W. CONWAY.

¹ Equivalent to the plural of Authorship in prose.

² Or, very frequently in Vergil, Royalty.

³ Or Reproof.

⁴ In Book VII. alone.

⁵ Omitting Tenth *Elogue* owing to uncertainty of authorship.

¹ With compared participle

of keeping
not appear
e than the

os, rare as
th its use
e to show
try life, as
ore subtle
thus may

Total.

24
26
15
4
14

16
10
10

119

NES).

NWAY.

uncertainty

THE ABLATIVE CASE IN VERGIL.

IN the course of a note on *Aen.* VIII. 86 sq. by Dr. J. W. Mackail (*Class. Rev.* XXXII. 1918, p. 103), the Servian interpretation of line 96 ('secant placido aequore siluas': *ostendit adeo perspicuum fuisse naturam fluminis ut in eo apparerent imagines nemorum, quas Troianaee naues secabant*) is supported with the observation that 'note should be taken of Virgil's distinctive use of the ablative. "Placido aequore siluas" in his language is practically equivalent to "placidas aequoreas siluas" just as "pictas abierte puppes" is to "pictas abiegnas puppes" or "uasta uoragine gurges" to "uastus uoraginosus gurges."

An investigation of Vergil's works, which I undertook at the suggestion and under the guidance of Professor Conway, to meet Dr. Mackail's desire for the collection and analysis of the evidence, has brought together examples of the adjectival or descriptive use of the ablative in more than one phase, which seem worth recording and distinguishing.

(1) In the first place we find phrases like

duri Aequicula glaebis (*Aen.* VII. 747)

or

uiam celerans per mille coloribus arcum (*Aen.* V. 609),

where a noun and adjective in the ablative are together equivalent to a compound adjective such as is frequently used in Greek poetry (e.g. *ροδοδάκτυλος, χρύσασπις*).

(2) There are also a number of instances where a noun in the ablative unaccompanied by an epithet has to some extent an adjectival force. Of these we may note first (a) the use of the ablative of verbal nouns with the suffix *-tu* as in *Aen.* I. 157,

*Cum fatalis equus saltu super ardua uenit
Pergama,*

and similar phrases, where it is equivalent to an active participle.¹

Secondly, we find occasionally (b) an ablative which may be regarded as expressing manner in conjunction with a verb, but at the same time seems intended to some extent to qualify a noun :

Aen. VII. 814. *Vt regius ostro
uelet honos leues umeros, ut fibula crinem
auro internectat.*

Aen. XII. 672. *Flaminis inter tabulata uolutus
ad caelum undabat uertex.*

Aen. II. 208. *Pars cetera pontum
pone legit sinuatque inmensa uolumine terga.*

Aen. V. 821. *Sternitur aequor aquis.*

Aen. I. 105. *Insequitur cumulo praeruptus aquae mons.*

Aen. I. 107. *Furit aestus arenis.*

¹ With this type of ablative in Latin may be compared the so-called gerund or indeclinable participle in Sanskrit, which has the suffix *-tv-ā*, and is an old instrumental singular of a stem in *-tu-*, e.g. *śru-tvā*, 'having heard' (originally 'with hearing').

- Aen.* VI. 300. Stant lumina *flamma*.
Aen. XII. 407. Iam *puluere* caelum
 stare uident.
Buc. V. 3. Ipsi *laetitia* uoces ad sidera iactant
 intonsi montes.
Aen. V. 53. Annua uota tamen sollemnesque *ordine* pompas
 exsequerer.

Then, again, (c) in some cases a noun in the ablative is attached partly to an adjective and partly to the noun qualified by that adjective. In its relation to the noun, the ablative is practically equivalent to a second adjective, and may often be so translated. In order to show clearly the construction in these instances it will be necessary to quote somewhat fully the sentence in which the ablative stands:

- Aen.* VI. 462. Per loca senta *situ* cogunt.
Geo. II. 276. Sin (metabere) *tumulis* adclue solum collisque supinos
 indulge ordinibus.
Aen. VII. 561. Illa autem attollit stridentes *anguibus* alas.
Geo. III. 450. Spumas miscent argenti uiuaque sulpura
 . . . et pinguis *unguine* ceras.
Geo. IV. 18. At liquidi fontes et stagna uirentia *musco*
 adsint.
Aen. I. 393. Aspice bis senos laetantis *agmine* cycnos,
Aen. VIII. 266. Nequeunt explere tuendo
 terribiles oculos, uoltum uillosoaque *saetis*
 pectora semiferi.

(d) In the following instances, when taken with the noun, the ablative is equivalent to a genitive of material or definition:

- Aen.* I. 655. (Ferre iubet) duplarem *gemmae* auroque coronam.
Aen. V. 662. Furit inmissis Volcanus habenis
 transtra per et remos et pictas *abiete* puppes.
Aen. II. 764. Mensaeque deorum,
 crateresque *auro* solidi, captiuaque uestis.
Buc. I. 67. En unquam . . . tuguri congestum *cæspite* culmen
 . . . mirabor?
Geo. IV. 374. Postquam est in thalami pendentia *pumice* tecta
 peruentum.
Aen. XII. 522. Velut inmissi diuersis partibus ignes
 arentem in siluam et uirgulta sonantia *lauro*.
Aen. I. 102. Talia iactanti stridens *Aquilone* procella
 uelum aduersa ferit.
Aen. V. 696. Ruit aequore toto
 turbidus imber *aqua* densisque nigerrimus austris.

(3) In a few instances a local ablative qualifies to some extent the noun near which it is placed:

- Aen.* XII. 914. Tum *pectore* sensus
 uertuntur uarii.
Aen. I. 227. Talis iactantem *pectore* curas.
Aen. VII. 196. Auditique aduertitis *aequore* cursum.
Aen. XII. 69. Tales uirgo dabat *ore* colores.

(4) T
 taken clo

(5) T
 attached

In t
 a genitive

MANC

- Geo.* I. 480. Maestum inlacrimat *temporis* ebur.
Aen. VI. 675. Si fert ita *corde* uoluntas.
Aen. VII. 269. Non plurima *caelo*
monstra sinunt.

(4) There are also several instances where the temporal ablative *nocte* may be taken closely with a noun and regarded as equivalent to a genitive:

- Aen.* XII. 908. Oculos ubi languida pressit
nocte quies.
Geo. II. 202. *Exigua* tantum gelidus ros *nocte* reponit.
Aen. VII. 414. Iam medium *nigra* carpebat *nocte* quietem.
Aen. II. 420. Si quos *obscura nocte* per umbram
fudimus insidiis.

(5) The last examples to be mentioned are those where a local ablative (*a*) is attached to a noun as a qualifying phrase:

- Aen.* I. 109. Saxa uocant Itali mediis quae in fluctibus Aras
dorsum immane *mari summo*.
Aen. VII. 91. *Innis* Acheronta adfatur *Auernis*.
Aen. VII. 225. Si quem tellus extrema *refuso*
submouet *Oceano*.

In the following instances the local ablative (*b*) is practically equivalent to a genitive:

- Geo.* II. 469. At *latis otia fundis*,
speluncae, uiuique lacus . . . non absunt.
Aen. VI. 106. Hic inferni ianua regis
dicitur et tenebrosa palus *Acheronte refuso*.
Aen. I. 108. Aeneas scopulum concendit et omnem
prospectum late *pelago petit*.
Aen. IV. 691. *Alto*
quaesiuit *caelo* lucem.
Aen. VIII. 96. Viridesque secant *placido aequore* silvas.

MADELEINE E. LEES.

MANCHESTER.

is connect
than 'pro
expressed

GRAECA.

(Continued.)

*Αγρα.

The two meanings of ἄγρα [(1) the chase, (2) game, booty taken in hunting] are also meanings of θήρα, and similarly θηρεύειν is parallel to ἀγρεύειν both in form and in meaning. These facts are of more importance for the etymology of ἄγρα than the accidental resemblance to ἀγρεῖν or to ἀγέρειν.

'Αγρεύειν, like other verbs in -ένειν, is a denominative verb based on a noun in -ένς, viz. 'Αγρεύς (Fraenkel, *Griech. Denominativa*, p. 174). In examining the meaning of this 'Αγρεύς (ἀγρεύς) we must dismiss ἀγρεύω (which did not exist when ἀγρέύς was formed) from our minds. As an epithet of Aristaeus (Pind. *Pyth.* IX. 65 ἄγχιστον ὅπάσσα μῆλων Ἀγρέα καὶ Νόμον, τοῖς δὲ Ἀρισταῖον καλεῖν) and of Apollo, Bacchus, Pan, etc., it may be a derivative of ἄγρός, and have meant originally 'god of the fields,' just as 'Αρτεύς 'Αγρο-τέρα was at first simply the 'goddess of the fields.' The regular opposition 'field' and 'house' (ἐν οἴκους ἢ ν ἀγροῖς Soph. *O.T.* 112), which in some languages caused to go 'into the field' (Lith. *laukan*, Serb. *na polje*) to mean 'to go out (sc. of the house)', is reflected in the parallelism of suffix between ἀγρ-ένς and οἰκ-ένς, the man of the fields and the man of the house. As besides οἰκέυειν we find οἰκέτης in the same sense, I conjecture that 'Απόλλων Ἀγρέτης (*G.D.I.* 5666) is identical with 'Απόλλων Ἀγρεύς. As we find δαμέτας (Carpathos, Buck, § 167) as well as δημότης, so the existence of ἀγρό-της 'countryman' does not preclude the existence of ἀγρέ-της as well.

'Αγρεύω may originally have meant 'to be an ἀγρέύς, a man of the fields.' Subsequently this whole family of words suffered a change of meaning and came to be associated with hunting. Thus ἀγρότης, ἀγροτέρα, and 'Αγρεύς, which are clearly still felt as derivatives of ἄγρός in their earliest occurrences, may be observed undergoing this change in historical times.¹ The same is true of another derivative of ἄγρός, viz. ἄγριος, which is clearly associated with hunting in Hom. E 52: βάλλειν ἄγρια πάντα τά τε τρέφει οὐρεσιν ὑλη (cf. German *Wild* = venison). Originating in the phrase ἄγρια θηρία, ἄγρια became a synonym of θηρία, and the way was opened for analogical formations. According to the proportion ἄγρα : ἀγρεύειν = θηρία : x the verb θηρεύειν was formed. Then θηρεύειν came to be regarded as a derivative of θήρα, and the proportion θηρεύειν : θήρα = ἀγρεύειν : x resulted in the creation of ἄγρα.

Θήρ-α was perhaps originally a collective formation of the same type as φράτρ-α and meant simply 'animals.' After θηρᾶσθαι had been formed from it, the noun came to mean 'animals as the object of hunting' and then 'the hunt' itself.

Τιμωρός.

The older form *τιμάορος*, from which *τιμωρός* probably arose by contraction (see Buck, *Greek Diall.* p. 290), is often said to contain -Fopos 'protector, watcher,' which

¹ On ἀγρότης v. E. Fraenkel, *Nomina Agentis* I. compares 'Απόλλων ἀγρευτάς, Soph. *O.C.* 1091. p. 57. With 'Αγρεύς Fraenkel, *Griech. Denom.* I.c.,

A τιμωρός given in a τιμωρία¹. In reference τιμωρήματα that the word by πατρὶ θοσ. s.v.; from the τιμάορος t. hiatus be

The the follow τοὺς δικαὶοὺς δικαίους showed t. καὶ δῶνας ἐς Ἐπίδαν δέξασθαι, phrase at and δίκη δίκην ἄντιοστην a house a

The bring a whole pl. θηράσθαι setting d. in which 'to acce deserves

Οἶκοι άρέσθαι p.

More also in the question w.

is connected with *ἐπίουρος*, ὅρονται 'they watch,' etc. But a *τιμωρός* does much more than 'protect' or 'watch over' the *τιμή* of another. What he does is forcibly expressed in at least three passages in Homer:

A 159: *τιμὴν ἀρνύμενος Μενελάῳ σοὶ τε, κυνῶπα,*
πρὸς Τρώων.

E 553: *τιμὴν Ἀτρεΐδης, Ἄγαμέμνονι καὶ Μενελάῳ,*
ἀρνυμένω.

II 83 sqq.: *πείθεο δ' ὡς τοι ἐγὼ μύθον τέλος ἐν φρεσὶ θείω,*
ὡς ἂν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κύδος ἀρητι
πρὸς πάντων Δαναῶν, ἀτάροι περικαλλέα κούρην
ἄψ ἀπονάσσωσιν.

A *τιμωρός* in fact is one who *τιμήν τινι ἄρνυται*. The sense of this phrase is correctly given in a scholium (v. Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.* s.v. ἄρνυμαι) on A 159: ἡ *τιμὴ* νῦν ἀντὶ τῆς *τιμωρίας*¹ κεῖται· καὶ τὸ ἄρνυμένος οὐκ ἔστι λαμβάνων ἀλλ' εἰσπραττόμενος παρὰ τῶν Τρώων. In reference to the same situation Herodotus (VII. 169) uses the phrase τὰ Μενελέω *τιμωρίατα*. As *τιμὴν ἄρέσθαι* is hardly different from δίκην ἄρέσθαι, it is worth noting that the words πατρὶ *τιμωρὸς* φόνον (Soph. *Electra* 14) are followed at a short interval by πατρὶ δίκας ἀρούμην τῶν φονευσάντων πάρα (l. 34).

Those who admit that ἄρνυμαι corresponds to Skr. *gnomī* (Boisacq, *Dict. Etym.* s.v.; Brugmann, *Grundriss* II. 3, pp. 127, 326) will allow that a *nomen agentis* -*opos* from the same root is theoretically possible (ἄρνυμαι : -*opos* = τάμνω : -*topos*). In *τιμάρος* then, as -*opos* has not lost any initial consonant, we have a compound with a hiatus between the two elements.

Locrian *haρέσται*.

The Locrian inscription *IG. IX. 1. 334* (=Buck, *Gk. Diall.* No. 55) contains the following sentence: *τοὺς ἐπιφοίκους ἐν Ναύπακτον τὰν δίκαν πρόδικον haρέσται πο(τ)* *τοὺς δικαστέρας, haρέσται καὶ δόμεν ἐν Ὁπόντι κατὰ Φέος αὐταραρόν*. What exactly is *haρέσται*? The first editor (I.N. Οἰκονομίδης, cf. Curtius, *Stud.* II. pp. 448 sqq.) showed that δίκαν . . . *haρέσται* καὶ δόμεν must have the same sense as δίκας λαβεῖν καὶ δοῦναι in Hdt. V. 83: Αἴγινῆται Ἐπιδαυρίων ἥκονον τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δίκας διαβαίνοντες ἐς Ἐπιδαυρον ἐδίδοσαν τε καὶ ἐλάμβανον παρ' ἀλλήλων οἱ Αἴγινῆται (cf. δίκας δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι, Thuc. V. 59). It follows that *haρέσται* has the same meaning (in this phrase at least) as λαβεῖν and δέξασθαι. That meaning must be 'to receive, accept,' and δίκη (δίκαι) must mean 'compensation,' as it does in Hdt. IX. 24: *εἰρώτων τίνα δίκην ἄν ἔλοιτο* (what compensation he would choose), εἰ ἔθέλοιεν Ἀπολλωνιῆται δίκας *ιποστῆναι δόσειν τῶν ἐποίγραν*. In that case the compensation took the form of a house and two pieces of land.

There is a temptation to translate δίκαν . . . *haρέσται πο(τ)* *τοὺς δικαστέρας* 'to bring a case before the judges.' This would be justifiable as a translation of the whole phrase (cf. 'to bring suit,' Buck), but it does not justify us in setting down *haρέσται* = 'bring,' any more than δοῦναι δίκην 'to submit to trial' justifies us in setting down δοῦναι = 'submit to.' In *haρέσται* δίκαν πρόδικον π.τ.δ. we have a formula in which *haρέσται* is an archaism surviving from the time when *haρέσται* δίκαν meant 'to accept compensation.' For the etymology of *haρέσται* this older period alone deserves consideration.

Οἰκονομίδης suggested that *haρέσται* = ἄρέσθαι. This involves admitting that ἄρέσθαι means 'to accept,' as in fact it does in Hom. a 390: καὶ κεν τοῦτ' ἔθέλοιμι Διός

¹ More exactly, it has the sense of *ποιῆσαι*, as also in the phrase *τιμὴν ἀποτιμένειν*. On the question whether *τιμὴ* in this sense has a different

origin from *τιμὴ* 'honour' see Schulze, *Quaest. Ep.* 356; Wackernagel, *Glotta* 7. 239, note 1.

γε διδόντος ἀρέσθαι. Similarly ἀρνυμαι means 'I receive' in Soph. *Trach.* 711: *δν ἐώ μεθίστερον . . . τὸν μάθησιν ἀρνυμαι*, and Eur. *Alc.* 55: *μεῖζον ἀρνυμαι γέρας*. The best parallel of all is Soph. *El.* 34: *πατρὶ δίκας ἀρούμην τῶν φονευσάντων πάρα* '(how) I might obtain (= λάβομαι) compensation (vengeance) for my father from (on) his murderers.' Whatever difference of meaning there may be between δίκας ἀρούμην in this passage (which seems to have been quoted by Οἰκονομίδης) and δίκαν *καρέσται* in the phrase which lies behind the Locrian inscription, it cannot be large enough to justify us in ignoring the parallel.

Against the attempts of Curtius (*I.c.*) and of Solmsen (*KZ.* XXXII. 282) to show that *καρέσται* is a form of ἐλέσθαι (according to Solmsen ἐλέσθαι > *καρέσθαι* [by contamination with *aipew*] > *καρέσται* by the West-Greek change of *ep* to *ap*) it is sufficient to emphasize once more the two facts which both of them felt to be awkward: (1) ἐλέσται occurs on a Locrian inscription, (2) ἐλέσθαι δίκην cannot be quoted in the required sense.

When Solmsen (*I.c.*) urged *h* as a reason for separating *καρέσται* from ἀρέσθαι, that was an oversight on his part. It has always been realized (cf. Curtius, *I.c.*, Buck, § 58d) that the Locrians were uncertain in the use of aspirates, as in *Homorōtīōn* beside *'Ομόντιοι, háyev* for *āyeiv*, etc.

The truth (*καρέσται* = ἀρέσθαι) was admitted without argument by G. Meyer (*Griech. Gramm.*² p. 462), but seems, since Solmsen's article, to have been lost sight of. Not, however, by Hiller von Gärtringen (*Sylloge Inscr. Graec.* ed. 3, No. 47, note 19), as I observe while correcting the proof. He does not argue the matter, and in *SIG³* 344, note 25, his grasp of the truth is less firm. *Ἀρνυμαι*: ἀρέσθαι (*καρέσται*) has nothing to do either with *aipow*⁴ or with *aipew*. Outside of poetry ἀρέσθαι occurs in Hippocr. *de aere* 17=59, 23 Ilberg: *ἢ δ' ἄν ἄνδρα ἔνυτη ἄρηται* (Wackernagel, *Glotta* 7, 221, note 1), and in *IG XII. 9. 1273, 1274. iii. 1: ἀρ[έσ]θαι μισθόν*.

RODERICK MCKENZIE.

¹ In Crönert's revision of Passow the Locrian *καρέσται* is correctly rendered (col. 114, l. 45), but wrongly placed under *deipw*.

ON TH

As a
infimae lati
Academy
most impo
which sub
Abstrusa a
extant MS
the presen

The M
one to use
referred to
first carefu
Loewe to
'Omnium
Vaticanus
colleague,
1889. Du
received f
with the M
of the MS

The L
The fly-le
columns.
(1869-89).
to Fulvio
Vatican I
signed in
quire shov

Abbr
matter.
Q; = que

¹ S. *Isid.*
II. 270; R

² *Class.* .
printed ex
excerpts fr
in Vatican

³ *Rheinis*
⁴ *Prodrom*

Leipsic, 18

⁵ *Vnciali*
⁶ The la

MITAE.'

* Lexicon

ON THE OLDEST EXTANT MS. OF THE COMBINED *ABSTRVSA* AND *ABOLITA* GLOSSARIES.

As a contributory step toward a new edition of Du Cange's *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, planned by the International Association of Academies, the British Academy has undertaken to publish a critical edition of mediaeval glossaries. The most important of these glossaries, because it constitutes the parent-compilation from which subsequent compilers of glossaries drew their material, is that pair known as *Abstrusa* and *Abolita*, found combined in the Vatican MS. 3321, which is the oldest extant MS. of purely Latin glossaries. It is with the date and home of this MS. that the present note is concerned.

The MS. was used by Arevalo for his edition of the works of Isidore.¹ The first one to use the glossaries was Angelo Mai, the great discoverer of palimpsests.² He referred to it as 'codicem unum mirabilem litteris grandibus saeculi ferme VI.' The first careful description of the MS. we owe to A. Willmanns.³ It was left to Gustav Loewe to point out the important position which this MS. occupies among glossaries: 'Omnium codicum glossas mere latinas exhibentium uetustissimus esse uidetur Vaticanus 3321.'⁴ The complete text of the glossaries was published by Loewe's colleague, G. Goetz, in the *Corpus glossariorum latinorum*, Vol. IV., pp. 3-198; Leipsic, 1889. During the past few years the subject of mediaeval Latin glossaries has received fresh treatment at the hands of Professor W. M. Lindsay. He has dealt with the MS. in question in this journal, Vol. XI. (1917), p. 120 sqq. A good facsimile of the MS. is given by Chatelain.⁵

The MS. contains 234 leaves, measuring 155 by 210 cm., with 30 lines to a page. The fly-leaves A and B are from an eighth-century uncial MS. of homilies, in two columns. The binding is in modern vellum, showing the arms of Cardinal Pitra (1869-89). The MS. belonged to the Sicilian humanist, Panormita (1394-1471), later to Fulvio Orsini (1529-1600), who bequeathed it, with the rest of his MSS., to the Vatican Library.⁶ The parchment is thick, and not very well prepared. Quires are signed in the middle of the lower margin of the last page. The outside pages of each quire show the flesh side of the vellum. The ruling is on the flesh side.

Abbreviations are frequent. This is partly due to the nature of the subject matter. Besides the *Nomina Sacra*, which are normal, there occur: B; = bus. Q; = que. A: = aut. AVT: = autem. E = est. ID = id est. ISL = Israel.

¹ S. Isidori Hispalensis episcopi opera omnia, II. 270; Rome, 1797.

² Class. Auct. VI. 501-551; Rome, 1843. He printed excerpts from this MS. along with excerpts from seven other glossaries preserved in Vatican MSS.

³ *Rheinisches Museum*, XXIV. (1869) 381 sqq.

⁴ *Prodromus corporis glossariorum*, p. 143 sq. ; Leipsic, 1876.

⁵ *Vcialis scriptura*, Pl. XLV. b.

⁶ The last page has the entry: 'ANT. PANORMITAE.' The paper fly-leaf has the entry: 'Lexicon di voce sacre et profane con alcune

operette de Isidoro Ispalense, et altri, scritto di lettere maiuscole, in 4^o, in carta pergamena tocco dal Panormita Ful. Vrs.' This entry is not Fulvio Orsini's, as is commonly supposed, but the work of an eighteenth-century library official, whose entries are found in other MSS. of the Orsini collection. P. de Nolhac gives a facsimile of this hand (which he too mistook for Fulvio Orsini's) in his excellent book, *La Bibliothèque de Fulvio Orsini*, Specimen VIII. and 'Note sur la planche'; Paris, 1887.

⁷ I omit the horizontal stroke above the letters.

It = item. N = non. Nr = noster. p = per. p = pro. Qm = quoniam. R (with stroke above letter, or intersecting the right leg) = rum. T (with horizontal stroke) = tur. V (with horizontal stroke) = uel. Recurrent phrases like *inter . . et . . quid interest* are abbreviated in various ways, and many arbitrary abbreviations are used at the end of lines where the scribe was crowded for space. Omissions are indicated by means of *HD* in the text and corresponding *HS* in the lower margin, placed either before or after the supplied word.¹ All these additions—and there are many of them—are in contemporary uncial writing. Words are not always separated. Two correctors are contemporary, and use uncials, a third uses ordinary minuscule of the tenth century (fol. 90). Marginalia were added by a humanistic hand of the fifteenth century.

On the date of the MS. scholars have expressed very divergent views. Angelo Mai was ready to assign this 'wonderful codex' to the sixth century.² Loewe and Goetz attribute it to the seventh.³ This is also the date given by Traube.⁴ But Reifferscheid,⁵ Chatelain and Lindsay⁶ ascribe the MS. to the eighth century, which seems to me the more correct date. The number and kind of abbreviations used and the form of the letters T, L, and especially of LL coming together, with the two shafts joined at the top by one horizontal hair-line, conform very well with eighth-century usage, but not so well with seventh-century usage. If the MS. cannot, on the one hand, be moved back to the seventh century, neither can it be pushed forward to the ninth: the use of \bar{T} for 'tur' and the very imperfect separation of words prevent us from regarding the MS. as more recent than the eighth century.⁷ The general impression of the script also favours the eighth. Moreover, the fact that all the contemporary additions and corrections are in uncial would seem to argue for the first half rather than for the second half of that century. Compared with the Autun Gospels (MS. 3) of the year 754⁸ our MS. makes an older impression; compared with the Milan MS. of Gregory (Ambros. B. 159 *sup.*)⁹ written about 750, it makes a somewhat more recent impression. This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the Autun MS. was written in France, the Milan MS. in Bobbio, North Italy, while our MS. may actually come from South Italy, or the vicinity of Rome.

There is nothing to indicate where the MS. was written. The two flyleaves in uncial letters, taken from another MS., the contemporary addition STEPHANVS ARHIPBR BIBAT (!), the later minuscule additions do not throw any new light; nor does the portrait on folio 1 verso, of a teacher, a cleric, seated on his throne (it recalls the well-known portrait of the seated Vergil, in the Codex Romanus), help us to place the MS. The MS. was certainly written in Italy. One is tempted to connect it with South Italy, because pieces of parchment, with Beneventan writing, were used to strengthen the binding, and traces of this writing are still seen on the paper flyleaf. Also the fact that a MS. with a somewhat similar text is still preserved at Monte Cassino (MS. 439 saec. x) and is written in the South Italian minuscule, tends to favour the same locality. Against this, it must be borne in mind that there are no additions in Beneventan writing, and all the minuscule additions at the beginning and end of the volume are in ordinary minuscule. While it is true that ordinary minuscule was used in the Beneventan zone during the entire period when Beneventan was the

¹ On f. 188v *HS* occurs after the supplied line instead of before it. This is very old usage, and is rarely found after the seventh century.

² *Op. cit.*

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Textgeschichte der Regula S. Benedicti* (1st edit.), p. 104.

⁵ *Bibliotheca patr. lat. Ital.* I. 545.

⁶ *Op. cit.*

⁷ The use of *HS* after the supplied line on fol. 188v argues for the older date; see note 1 above.

⁸ Steffens, *Lat. Palaeog.* 2, Pl. 37; Zangemeister-Wattenbach, *Exempla Cod. Lat.*, etc. Suppl., Pl. LXI.

⁹ *Palaeographical Society*, I., Pl. 121.

OLDES
ruling scri
for a MS.
none in E
is a produ
blance to
schools in
famous Na
it is not a
much dep

To su
there is a
date is abo

¹ Cf. *The*

² Cf. *Berl*

OLDEST EXTANT MS. OF THE ABSTRVSA AND ABOLITA 191

R (with stroke)
re used
either
of them
two cor-
of the
fteenth

Angelo
we and
⁴ But
which
ed and
the two
eighth-
not, on
forward
prevent
general
all the
for the
Autun
mpared
akes a
hat the
ile our

ives in
HANVS
t; nor
recalls
o place
it with
sed to
uleaf.
Monte
nds to
are no
ng and
uscula
as the

line on
note 1
heister-
Suppl.,

ruling script in Southern Italy,¹ as many MSS. attest, it would none the less be odd for a MS. of South Italian origin to have all its additions in ordinary minuscule and none in Beneventan. This consideration leaves open the possibility that the MS. is a product of some scriptorium north of the Beneventan zone. It shows no resemblance to the MSS. of famous North Italian centres like Bobbio and Verona. Of schools in Central Italy we know too little to help us in forming a judgment. As the famous Naples MS. of Festus was written, as has been shown, in Rome or vicinity,² it is not at all unlikely that this important compilation of glossaries, which shows much dependence on Festus, may also come from a centre in Rome or vicinity.

To sum up: the MS. is certainly Italian. It is probably South Italian, though there is a possibility of its being central Italian, or even Roman. The most probable date is about the middle of the eighth century, before 750 rather than after.

E. A. LOWE.

¹ Cf. *The Beneventan Script*, p. 84 sqq. (1911), col. 917 sq.

² Cf. *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, No. 29

SOME QUOTATIONS IN THE LIBER GLOSSARVM.

In response to a suggestion in the *Class. Rev.* (XXXIII. 106), the two MSS. of the *Liber Glossarum* preserved at Tours have recently been examined. Since they had not been seen by Goetz when he published his excerpts, the following short descriptions may be added to the introduction of Vol. V. of the *Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum*:

1. Tours, Bibliothèque de Ville, MS. No. 850; end of the ninth century; foll. 493, of which 1, 491, 492 are mere corners; cmm. 49 by 29. The last item is an Isidore gloss, *Zatenen: gemmam*. Gaps due to loss of folia occur between *Abiectus* and *Abdolet*; *Dextera manus* and *Dialogus*; *Faber* and *Impulitum*; *Res diuinæ* and *Samsacus*. There are no corrections except between folia 197 and 300, where a thirteenth-century hand has checked the MS. by means of another copy of the *Lib. Gloss.* The items are drawn up in two columns, and the alphabetical arrangement agrees for the most part with that of *Vat. Pal. lat. 1773*. Marginal indications of the sources of the items are numerous except between *Profanum* and *Remeantes*; where two or three neighbouring items come from the same source, the marginal mark is repeated; and towards the end of the MS., where the scribe takes to writing two items in the same line, the indication is also carefully transferred. This is important in view of Goetz' theory that the source of an unlabelled item is that given by the last preceding label.

2. Tours, MS. No. 851; fifteenth-century Italian hand; foll. 269, all but eight written continuously. Ends with *Zatenen*, as MS. 850. Gap between *Res diuinæ* and *Samsacus*, where three foll. have been cut out. No marginal marks. The items are frequently abbreviated and lemma words are not repeated. In many places short gaps, left deliberately by the scribe, have been filled in from T. 850. In details of omission and insertion the MS. differs from 850 of which it is clearly a descendant but certainly not an apograph.

Many items of the *Lib. Gloss.* contain quotations from classical authors, especially those items labelled *DE GLS* (i.e., taken from glossaries). Goetz, in his monograph 'Der Liber Glossarum' (*Abhandlungen der sächsischen Gesellschaft*, Band 13, 1891), postulates that one of the sources of such items was a 'Glossar mit zahlreichen Citaten,' which illustrated the meaning and occasionally the gender of words. The same label *DE GLS*, however, is used for glosses which we know to have come from the Abstrusa glossary; and it was suggested in the *Class. Quart.* (XI. 128) that the glosses with quotations should be more carefully investigated with a view to defining more clearly the nature of this supposed 'Quotation-glossary' and determining the separating line between it and the items which the *Lib. Gloss.* borrowed from Abstrusa and likewise labelled *DE GLS*. The only way to assure ourselves about this 'Quotation-glossary' is to collect and examine all the *DE GLS* items of the *Lib. Gloss.* which contain quotations; and at a later date I hope to publish a full study of such items. For the present I shall content myself with presenting and commenting on a few of those items which may appeal to a wider circle than students of mediaeval dictionaries.

I. After one has extracted all the items labelled *DE GLS* which contain quotations, there remain quite a number of other items with quotations; and these latter,

even if unlabelled, can frequently be traced to a very definite source. Of these I give two examples:

(a) A gloss labelled 'Esidori': *Iaculum: genus piscatoriae retis, a iactu dictum. Plautus 'probus quid ante iacula torseras'* (leg. *iaculator eras*). (= *Plaut. frag. 175*). This item unmistakeably comes from Isidore, *Elym.* 19, 5, 2; and it is interesting to note that while our existing MSS. of Isidore present the un-Plautine form of the adverb, *antea*, the *Lib. Gloss.* preserves the truer reading.

(b) A long unlabelled gloss runs: *Metalempsis est dictio gradatim pergens ad id quod ostendit, ut . . . item Varro 'ponam bisulcam et crebri[s]nodam arundinem.'* This item is identical with the passage printed by Keil (*Gram. Lat.* V. 324) from the seventh-century grammar of Julian of Toledo whom we know to have been one of the sources used in the compilation of the *Lib. Gloss.* (cf. Goetz, *Der Lib. Gloss.* 287). The interest of the item lies in the Varro citation. Keil himself used a MS. of Julian (*Vat. Pal.* 1746), which gave the reading *crebrinodosam*; but Buecheler in his edition of Varro's Menipporean Satires (appended to his edition of Petronius, 1912) emended Keil's text and made an iambic line (frag. 578) by reading *crebrinodam*. The MSS. of the *Lib. Gloss.* now confirm this emendation with their *crebrinodam*.

In discussing the existence of the 'Quotation-glossary' and its relation to Abstrusa, one consequently puts aside all such quotation-items as the two just given, since their sources can be definitely traced to authors who, we know, formed the groundwork of the *Lib. Gloss.* directly.

II. A great part of that full form of the Abstrusa glossary which was described in *Class. Quart.* XI. 128 consisted of excerpts from Vergil scholia of Donatus and others (suggested *Class. Quart.* XI. 123 and illustrated *Class. Quart.* XIV. 87); and this full form of Abstrusa was one direct source of *Lib. Gloss.* items. If therefore any quotation-item cannot be referred to one of the extant sources of the *Lib. Gloss.*, but bears in itself traces of having come from some scholium on Vergil, we should be on safer ground in attributing it to Abstrusa (of whose existence we are sure) than in calling in the aid of a hypothetical 'Quotation-glossary.' I cannot hope to convince my readers that Goetz' separate and independent 'Quotation-glossary' is a myth until a full list of these particular items is published; meanwhile the two subjoined notes may be of interest:

(a) Goetz (*Der. Lib. Gloss.* 279) specifically mentions the item: *Fungeretur: exemplum operis facere monstraretur. Virgilius 'summoque attigit ore' ut bibentis fungeretur officis.* Here clearly the quotation does not explain the meaning of the lemma word *fungeretur*; indeed it has no immediate connexion with *fungeretur* at all. In point of fact the word treated is one which occurred in a scholium on *Aen.* I. 737; the source of the item therefore was itself based on Vergil scholia, that is to say, the source of the item is very probably Abstrusa.

(b) The following item is found not only in the *Lib. Gloss.* but also in the second-century grammarian, Caper (Keil, VII. 98): *Lacteus (leg. -ens) est quod lacte alitus, lactans qui decipit, lacteus lacte abundans; ut 'lactentes ficos.' Lucilius 'lactantia coagula cum melle,' <Horatius 'lactea> laudas brachia.'* Now Caper was not one of the immediate sources of the *Lib. Gloss.* but he was frequently used by commentators on Vergil. We are therefore on fairly safe ground in deriving this item from Abstrusa, whose compiler found at *Georg.* I. 315 (*frumenta in uiridi stipula lactentia turgent*) a scholium which quoted Caper's distinction between *lactens* and *lactans*.

This item is worth further mention for (as Professor Lindsay points out to me) Marx in his edition of the fragments of Lucilius seems to have misinterpreted it. We know from Charisius (Keil, I. 128) that the line, *fici dulciferae lactantes (-entes?) ubere toto*, comes from Ennius and not from Lucilius to whom Marx ascribes it as frag. 1198. On the other hand, Marx refuses to ascribe to Lucilius the line which Caper quotes (*lactantia coagula cum melle*) because *coagula* is unmetrical. Professor

Lindsay would scan *coagula* (like *coagulet* in *Divae*, 74) and restore the account of these 'differentiae' thus:

<*Lactans est quod lacte alit*>, *lactens quod lacte alitur*; *lactans qui decipit*, *lactens lacte abundans* (*ut <Ennius> 'lactentes ficos'*, *Lucilius 'lactentia cogula cum melle <bibi>'*); *lactea candida* (<*Horatius 'lactea> laudas brachia*''). Thus two meanings of *lactans* and two of *lactens* were contrasted, and of the second meaning of *lactens* examples were given from Ennius and Lucilius. The *lactea* in the Horace quotation, in place of *cerea*, is presumably a slip of memory by Caper, who (like most Latin grammarians, especially Servius) did not verify his quotations.

J. F. MOUNTFORD.

THE UNIVERSITY,
EDINBURGH.

THE EARLIEST VISIBLE PHASE OF THE MOON.

IN the last number of the *Classical Quarterly* (July-October, 1920, p. 172) Dr. Holmes has asked if a trustworthy observer has ever seen with the naked eye a moon not more than 27 hours old in an atmosphere no clearer than that of Geneva. Hoping that I am a trustworthy observer, I will enumerate the cases where I have observed crescents of an age less than 27 hours. I have also constructed tables with which I find the moment when the moon becomes visible. I believe the minimum for Heidelberg is 20 hours from February 1 to April 1, if the moon is at her perigee and the argument of latitude is between 60° and 120° . All times given here are mid-European time (= Greenwich mean time + 1 hour). I have never used a binocular. Heidelberg is 35 m. east of Greenwich, and 25 m. west of the mid-European meridian.

1899, March 12, Berlin. Found at 6 h. 37 m., 21 h. 44 m., after new moon, 34 m. after sunset. Moon set 7 h. 25 m. Seen till 7 h. 0 m. The lower part of the horizon was covered with mist.

1915, March 16, Heidelberg. Found at 7 h. 1 m., 22 h. 16 m. after new moon, 32 m. after sunset. Moon set 7 h. 32 m. Seen only a moment, because a cloud came in front of the moon.

1916, April 3, Heidelberg. Found at 7 h. 25 m., 26 h. 6 m. after new moon, 28 m. after sunset. Moon set 8 h. 22 m.

1916, May 2, Heidelberg. Nothing found, about 14 h. 15 m. after new moon.

1918, March 13, Ciney (Belgium). Found at 7 h. 8 m., 22 h. 17 m. after new moon, 28 m. after sunset. Moon set 8 h. 3 m.

I have made a great number of other observations, but all more than 27 h. after new moon. I believed that 20 h. after new moon was the minimum, but now I have read in the *Journal of the British Astronomical Association* the sensational observation made 1916, May 2, in England, 14 h. 30 m. after new moon. On that evening I found nothing, but it is possible that I overlooked the crescent.

CARL SCHOCH.

HEIDELBERG.
December 5, 1920.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

[These summaries will in future deal only with original work appearing in the periodicals. Reviews of books will be mentioned in the summaries published in the *Classical Review*. Also an account of the contents of *Neue Jahrbücher* for the years 1916-1920 inclusive appears in the *Classical Review* for August-September, 1921.—EDD. C.Q.]

American Journal of Philology. XLII. 2. 1921.

W. P. Mustard, *Petrarch's Africa*. An analysis, with a number of illustrative quotations and remarks on possible classical models both prose and verse, and a few brief notes on language. W. N. Brown, *Bluff in Hindu Fiction*. The writer discusses the various forms of the 'bluff' motif, indicating and illustrating their range of use, and endeavours to determine the relation of some folk or oral stories to literary sources. Charles W. Peppler, *Comic Terminations in Aristophanes. Part V.* This article deals with verbs in ἄλλω, ὑπτω, ἀπτω, άώ, and ίζω, and with comic coinages in verbs, adverbs, interjections, and miscellaneous words. Paul Haupt, *Abraham's Bosom*. A discussion, with parallels from various languages of the exact meaning of the phrase and the particular part of the body denoted by κόλπος. F. A. Wright, *Horace and Philodemus*. Suggests that several passages in Ovid, as well as the episode of the pirate turned gardener in Vergil, *Georgic IV.*, are worked up from epigrams by Philodemus (who is quoted by Horace, *Serm. I. 2. 120*) by Leonidas. Tenney Frank, *Hor. Carm. III. 4 Descende caelo*. An endeavour to explain this ode as 'a dedicatory poem that for some reason is out of the position for which it was intended,' and not as forming part of the 'cycle' in praise of virtue. B. O. Foster, *Livy VII. 14, §§ 6-10*. Proposes to remove the difficulty of the words *instructo uani . . . ueris uiribus profuit* by adopting the new Oxford punctuation, and reading *instructos* (agreeing with *montes*) for *instructo*.

Classical Philology. XVI. 1. 1921.

C. D. Adams, τὰ γέρρα ἐνεπίμπρασαν, *Demosthenes XVIII. 169*. Accepting ancient testimony that γέρρα were the materials of which the σκηναί were made, A. revives Reiske's view that the object of burning them was to secure a place for the instant assembling of the militia. He quotes Andocides' account of a similar situation in 415 B.C. (*On the Mysteries*, 45). He rejects the proposed emendation τὰ γέρρα ἀνεπεράννυσαν ('they stretched the hurdles'), which rests on a misinterpretation of the scholion on Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 22. Both there and in the *Speech against Neaera*, § 90, γέρρα naturally means the wicker mats of the tradesmen's booths. W. L. Westermann, *Land Registers of Western Asia under the Seleucids*. W. examines a few inscriptions dealing with grants of land made by the Seleucid kings. Detailed descriptions of the smaller land units were kept in the local registers, and were absent from the central register, which was constructed on broader lines. J. A. Scott, *Homer as the Poet of the Thebais*. The theory that Homer was regarded in the seventh century as the poet of the *Thebais* rests (1) upon the supposed reference to Callinus in Pausanias, IX. 9. 5; (2) upon the identification with the *Thebais* of τῶν Ομηρέων ἐπέων of Herodotus, V. 67. But in Pausanias Callinus is a purely conjectural reading, and Pausanias refers to Antimachus as the poet of the expedition against

Thebes. As to Herodotus, the Argive inscription in honour of Homer shows that it was the connexion of the Argives with the Trojan War, not with Argos, that aroused their pride. L. R. Taylor, *The Latina Colonia of Livy XL*. 43. T. discusses the identity of the Latin colony mentioned by Livy under the year 180 B.C. He examines the views of Mommsen and others, and suggests that the colony was established at Pisae, Rome's military and naval base against the Ligurians. D. McFayden, *The Princeps and the Senatorial Provinces*. The view, widely accepted, that under the Augustan constitution the princeps possessed an *imperium maius* over the senatorial provinces is based upon certain passages in Dio Cassius and Ulpian. M. shows that the various accounts of the princeps' intervention in the affairs of these provinces are more easily explained if we reject these statements than if we accept them. The progressive movement towards absolutism in the emperor's relations with the Senate led Ulpian and Dio, writing in the third century, to assume that the senatorial no less than the imperial provinces were under the emperor's authority. C. D. Buck, *Studies in Greek Noun-Formation*. Continuing his studies of dental terminations, B. deals with words in -ās, -avros. F. A. Wood, *Greek and Latin Etymologies*. In 'Notes and Discussions' W. A. Oldfather and J. B. Titchener deal with the sources of the *Lexicon Militare*, P. Shorey with the methods of the higher criticism of Homer, W. A. Heidel with two Sophoclean cruxes (*Antigone* 4, and *Oed. Tyr.* 44), and A. S. Pease with the *sceleratum frigus* of Virgil, *Georgics*, II. 256.

XVI. 2.

F. E. Robbins, *The Tradition of Greek Arithmology*. R. seeks to determine the sources and relationships of the ancient writers on arithmology. Starting from conclusions obtained in an earlier paper on 'Posidonius and the Sources of Pythagorean Arithmology,' he traces the connexion of each writer with the lost document, which he regards as a common source. Philo, Lydus, and Anatolius belong to an older strain of the manuscript tradition; Theon diverges from them in his account of the number 7, and is followed by Chalcidius, Capella, Favonius, Macrobius, and the compiler of the *Theologumena Arithmeticae*. A diagram of relationships is appended. G. Laing, *The Origin of the Cult of the Lares*. L. criticizes the view, revived in a recent article in the *American Journal of Archaeology*, that the Lares are ancestor-spirits and their cult ancestor-worship. Ancient testimony gives feeble support to the theory, and the ceremonies adduced by Samter are poor evidence. L. refers to the youth's intention of changing his Lar in Plautus, *Merc.* 836, and to the inconspicuous place occupied by the Lares at the Parentalia. Wissowa's view that the Lares were originally divinities attached to places and not to persons over-emphasizes a single aspect of the cult. L. holds that they were spirits of the primitive Roman type, capable of helping or harming, but otherwise undefined as to function and number. The epithets mark a later stage of differentiation and definition. H. Craig, *Dryden's Lucian*. C. gives (1) a list of seventeenth-century translations of Lucian; (2) an account of Dryden's life of Lucian, prefixed to a new translation of all the works; (3) an analysis of the contents of this edition, with information about the translators. P. Shorey, *Horace, Satires i. 3. 112-13 and Plato, Theaetetus, 172A, B*. S. refers I. 111 to the views of the ethical sceptics, set forth in *Plato Republic* II. and of Epicurus, and finds the ultimate source of ll. 113-14 in *Plato, Theaetetus, 172A, B*, which, presenting a modified form of Protagorean relativity, allows that the distinction between utility and inutility is not a matter of mere arbitrary enactment. He rejects entirely Wilamowitz's interpretation of the Platonic passage. W. L. Westermann, *The "Uninundated Lands" in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. II*. W. shows that the $\alpha\beta\rho\omega\kappa\gamma\eta$ paid at least as high a rate of tax as the flooded lands, and concludes that the government by means of high rentals sought to force

production
the tenant
reimbursed
of Michigan
Coptic—re
numbers.
view that
C. Ritter
possum 212
condition;
connotation
'trifle-reve
von Arnim

Herm

G. W
of the me
view again
basis of V
of Varro's
of the god
thago. A
provoked
the narrat
account, a
but ignora
later when
knowledge
This is tru
and Laqu
asserts th
Book III.
development
of which h
more of F
Roman su
world-hist
MISCELL
p. 123, 29

LVI.

E. vo
Gracchus.
Stern's o
They atte
the princ
and failed
world sta
monody 3
A fresh e
lished by
Sparta un

production on land of this class. He adduces the evidence of leases to show that the tenant attempted to avoid the laborious cultivation of the *ἀβρόχος*, or was reimbursed for it. A. E. R. Boak, *Greek and Coptic School Tablets at the University of Michigan*. An account of three school tablets from Egypt—two Greek and one Coptic—recently acquired. They contain various exercises in writing, spelling, and numbers. Under 'Notes and Discussions,' A. Shewan rejects Professor Bolling's view that the meaning applied to *ποθή* in the *Iliad* differs from that in the *Odyssey*. C. Ritter suggests that the difficult *ἐὰν εἴτε οἴτωλ* of Alcibiades in Plato, *Symposium* 212E, is an expression of his natural self-assurance, heightened by his drunken condition; 'wenn ich so sage, so gilt's.' C. Murley, connecting *συκοφάντης* with the connotation of worthlessness which *σύκινος* frequently bears, suggests that it means 'trifle-revealer.' A. S. Pease quotes a few short passages which do not appear in von Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*.

Hermes. LVI. 2. 1921.

G. Wissowa, *Die Varronischen di certi und incerti*. W. reopens the discussion of the meaning of these terms which he started in 1885, and maintains his original view against Usener, Bickel, Sam Wide, and others. The *certitudo*, which is the basis of Varro's classification of gods, refers merely to the certainty or uncertainty of Varro's own information, and not to the certainty or uncertainty of the character of the gods themselves. R. Laqueur, *Scipio Africanus und die Eroberung von Neukarthago*. A very elaborate investigation of the sources used by Polybius in Book X, provoked by E. Meyer's paper in *Berl. Sitzungsber.* 1916. The earliest elements in the narrative of S.'s attack on New Carthage are ultimately derived from the bald account, admitting divine intervention, given by some fighter engaged in the action but ignorant of S.'s strategic ideas. P. only got to know the plan of operations later when he met Laelius, and Laelius, the confidant of S., is the source of P.'s knowledge of the purpose behind S.'s undertakings, diplomatic and military alike. This is true as well of the 'Scipionic' features in P.'s account of Hannibal's march, and Laqueur, rejecting the view that P. got these from the younger Scipio, now asserts that they are all alike derived from Laelius. The 'Laelian' elements in Book III. were incorporated between 160 and 155. Laqueur goes on to discuss the development of P.'s historiography. He began in the 'rhetorical' Hellenistic school, of which he was later the bitter enemy; but as he collected more material and saw more of Roman power, there grew on him the idea of a system working towards Roman supremacy. Finally, influenced by the Stoa, he arrived at the conception of world-history, and at the same time, but not before, became the complete rationalist. MISCELLEN: Karl Praechter, *Notes on Porphyrius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, p. 123, 29 ff. (Busse). F. Bechtel, *On the name "Αλθῆτος"* (Paus. II. 30. 5).

LVI. 3. 1921.

E. von Stern, *Zur Beurteilung der politischen Wirksamkeit des Tiberius und Gaius Gracchus*. A criticism of recent views on the political activity of the Gracchi. Von Stern's own view is that they were doctrinaire revolutionists rather than reformers. They attempted to apply the doctrines of Greek political philosophy to Rome, e.g. the principle of the immediate sovereignty of the people. They were no statesmen, and failed because they were blind to the difference between the Greek *polis* and a world state. C. Robert, *Zu Euripides' Troerinnen*. A discussion of Cassandra's monody 308 ff. and other passages. L. Deubner, *Zum Freiburger Makedonierdialog*. A fresh examination of a dialogue on the divinity of Alexander the Great first published by W. Aly in the *Heidelberg. Sitzungsbericht*, 1914, Abp. 2. U. Kahrstedt, *Sparta und Persien in der Pentekontaetie*. An attempt to show that Sparta made a

formal peace with Persia about the year 476-5. O. Weinreich, *Blutgerichte* èv ἵπαιθρῳ. W. explains the practice as due to ritual hygiene. Sunlight and rain counteract the pollution. MISCELLEN: W. Spiegelberg maintains that ψύχαν (Athen. 690 E) is the old Egyptian *sgnn* with the masculine article *p-* prefixed. O. Weinreich shows that Apuleius *Met.* VI. 8 *septem saua . . . mellitum* is only a coarse version of Moschus' "Ἐρως δραπέτης" line 4. K. Praechter suggests in Philodemus περὶ ὄργῆς, Fr. E (P. 4 Wilke) τὴν τῆλν τῇ βακτρίᾳ τίπτει. F. Bechtel on the Thessalian river names Κερκίνειος and Βουλεύς. They are derived from Καρκίνος (ablaut form Κερκίνος) and from βῶλος, i.e., the river that carries down βῶλοι.

Revue de Philologie. XLIV. 3. 1920.

V. Bérard, *Sur les Scholies et le texte de l'Odyssée*. A long series of emendations of the scholia based upon a comparison with Strabo, who drew much of his information from Alexandrine ἴπομνήματα, and Eustathius. F. Cumont, *Lucrèce et le symbolisme pythagoricien des enfers*. Lucr. III. 978-1023, where Hell is explained as the torments inflicted on men by their passions in their life on earth, is not borrowed from the source from which the end of the third book is derived. The doctrine is neo-pythagorean and not epicurean. It is found in Philo, who derived it either directly or through Posidonius from Pythagoreanism. Lucretius is probably echoing Ennius, who developed the doctrine of metempsychosis at the beginning of his *Annals* and in his satire 'Epicharmus.' P. Roussel, *Rémarques sur les Suppliantes et le Prométhée d'Eschyle*. Traces references to the participation of the Egyptians in the battle of Salamis in 742 καὶ λέγω πρὸς εἰδότα and in 713-722, and argues that the date of the *Supplies* cannot be earlier than 478-473. In P.V. 440-42 is a reference to Prometheus distributing the γέρα of the gods, a story which must have been familiar to the audience, and which is known to us from Hesiod, *Theog.* 535 sqq. Aeschylus deliberately rejects Hesiod's version that P. deceived the gods. B. Haussoullier, *Inscriptions de Didymes; Classement chronologique des comptes de la construction du Didymeion*. Continued from 1919, p. 175, and 1920, p. 31. Deals with work done between 176-75 and 172-71. The method of consulting the oracle is discussed in an appendix.

LANGUAGE.

Glotta. XI. Band. 1. 2. Heft. 1921.

Albert Debrunner writes on *The Use of àv with the Indicative in Subordinate Clauses in the Hellenistic Age*, e.g. μακάριος ἦν αὐτῶν ὄντινα àv καὶ μόνον προσέβλεψα, Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 9. 2. This idiom is an independent growth, and has no connexion with the 'iterative àv' used by the classical writers in main sentences; it came in to replace the 'optative without àv': λέγει ὅ τι àv βούληται became (for past time) ἔλεγεν ὅ τι àv ἐβούλετο instead of ἔλεγεν ὅ τι βούλοιτο. Hugo v. Helle discusses *The Division of Syllables in Latin*. F. Slotty's *Studies in Vulgar Latin* include (1) a discussion of 'words for the three dimensions'; (2) 'the type Châlons-sur-Marne in Latin.' E. Schwyzer has a few notes on Greek dialectic forms; and E. Kieckers and W. Kroll deal with the question of the 'appositional clause' in Latin and Greek, the so-called 'accusative (or nominative) in apposition to the sentence.' R. Munz on γλώττα and διάλεκτος, and a Fragment of Posidonius. The remaining fifty pages are devoted to summaries and notices of books and articles published in 1917.

ABLATIVE
Abstrusa
MS.), i
accent in
accusative
Achilles T
-ada passi
Aeschylus
Allen (T.
à with i
Anna Per
Apuleius
107
Aristotle,
arithmolo
Arnold (E
Asia Min
Astures,
Atticae (C
Augustus

Bailey (G
Bergidae
Burnet (J

Caesar's
Callimac
the
Callinus,
carmen N
carmen P
case-usa
Cave in
Colson (C
ei and
Conway
177 ff.

dative de
Datum,
Dekeleia
di certi a
Dryden'

Egypt,
-ei, Luci
eis 'in'

πταιθρω.
eract the
90 E) is
h shows
rson of
ρὶ δργῆς,
ian river
Κερκίνος)

INDICES

I.—GENERAL INDEX.

- ABLATIVE case in Virgil, 183 ff.
Abstrusa and Abolita glossaries (oldest extant MS.), 189 ff.
accept in Doric, the, 55
accusative, the adverbial, 24
Achilles Tatius, notes on, 8 ff.
-ada passive in Gothic, 55
Aeschylus, date of the *Supplices* of, 198
Allen (T. W.), notes on Greek geography, 107
ἀν with indicative in subordinate clauses, 198
Anna Perenna, 51
Apuleius glosses in the Abolita glossary, 41 f., 107
Aristotle, on *Eth. Nic.* i. c. 5, 85 ff.
arithmology, Greek, 196
Arnold (E. V.), 'a wilful exaggeration,' 174
Asia Minor, case-usage in the Greek of, 22 ff.
Astures, 110 f.
Atticae (Orosius), 110
Augustus' war in Spain, 110

Bailey (Cyril), notes on Lucretius, 18 ff.
Bergidae (Florus), 110
Burnet (John), Vindiciae Platonicae III., 1 ff.

Caesar's funeral in Lucan viii. 729-735, 75 ff.
Callimachus, Aeolic forms in, 52
the MSS. of the *Hymns*, 57 ff., 113 ff.
Callinus, 195 f.
carmen *Nelei*, 35 f.
carmen *Priami*, 35
case-usage in the Greek of Asia Minor, 22 ff.
Cave in Plato's *Republic*, 131 ff.
Colson (F. H.), the fragments of Lucilius ix. on *ei* and *i*, 11 ff.
Conway (E. H. W.), the singular *nos* in Virgil, 177 ff.

dative decaying in the *kouři*, 29
Datum, 81
Dekelian war, 82
di certi and incerti, 197
Dryden's Lucian, 196

Egypt, 'uninundated lands' in, 196 f.
-ει, Lucilius ix. on, 11 ff.
εἰς 'in' in the *kouři*, 22

ἐν 'to' in the *kouři*, 22
ἐξ ὑποβολῆς, 43
ἐπι 'in view of' with accusative, 25
ἔρρε κακὴ γλήνη, 165
Evans (D. Emrys), case-usage in the Greek of Asia Minor, 22 ff.

Ferguson (A. S.), ἐξ ὑποβολῆς, 43
Plato's simile of Light, 131 ff.
fordus Cassianum, 51
fordus and fordicidia, 108 f.
Forster (E. S.), some emendations in the text of Theophrastus, 166 ff.
Fort (J. A.), corrigenda on article on the *Peruvigilium Veneris*, 7
Frank (Tenney), the Scipionic inscriptions, 169 ff.

games in Virgil, *Aen.* v., 110
genitive in the *kouři*, 25 ff.
geography, notes on Greek, 107
'glossae collectae' in Vat. Lat. 1469, 38 ff.
Gracchi, political activity of, 197
Graeca, 43 ff., 186 ff.
Greek colour-perception, 153 ff.
guild of firemen, 52

Hall (F. W.), nuances in Plautine metre, 99 ff.
Harry (J. E.), Sophocles, *Ajax*, 601-3, 106 f.
Hera, not first worshipped in Tiryns, 51 f.
Homer as the poet of the *Thebais*, 195 f.
Housman (A. E.), Lucan vii. 460-465, 172 ff.
the codex Lipsiensis of Manilius, 175 f.

-i, Lucilius ix. on, 11 ff.
Iguvine Tables, 111
ιερὰ δέσμων, 165
imperium maius of Augustus, 196
inscriptions, the Scipionic, 169 ff.
Isocratea, 78 ff.

Laistner (M. L. W.), Isocratea, 78 ff.
Lares, origin of the cult of, 196
Less (Madeleine E.), the ablative case in Virgil, 183 ff.
†Lejay, P., 112
Leontine inscriptions, 54
Liber glossarum, some quotations in, 192 ff.

GENERAL INDEX

- Lindsay (W. M.), 'glossae collectae' in Vat. Lat. 1469, 38 ff.
- Line, the, in Plato's *Republic*, 131 ff.
- Lobel (E.), Sappho, book i.: the *Nereid* ode, 163 ff.
- Lowe (E. A.), the oldest extant MS. of the combined Abstrusa and Abolita glossaries, 189 ff.
- Lucan vii. 460-465, 172 ff.
- Lucian, Dryden's life, 196
- Lucilius ix., the fragments on *ei* and *i*, 11 ff.
- Lucretius, notes on, 18 ff.
- Lumb (T. W.), notes on Achilles Tatius (continued), 8 ff.
- Manilius, the codex Lipsiensis of, 175 f.
- Martial's literary criticism, 111
- McKenzie (Roderick), Graeca, 44 ff., 186 ff.
- μερὰ* with genitive to express instrument, 28
- Moon, earliest visible phase of, 194
- Mountford (J. F.), some quotations in the *Liber glossarum*, 192 ff.
- Mulvany (C. M.), on *Eth. Nic. i. c. 5*, 85 ff.
- Μυρμιδόνων τόλις, 107
- narrative poetry of Rome, earliest, 31 ff.
- νέποδες καλῆς Ἀλοσύδηνης, 125
- Nereid* ode of Sappho, 163 ff.
- Nero, date of his birth, 111
- New Carthage, Scipio's attack on, 197
- o ablaut, 54
- Pascoli, J., 111
- Perugilium Veneris, corrigenda on article by J. A. Fort, 7
- Phthiotis, 107
- Pisae, Latin colony at, 196
- Platnauer (Maurice), Greek colour-perception, 153 ff.
- Plato's simile of Light, 131 ff.
- theory of vision, 135 n. 1
- Platt (Arthur), Sophoclea, 126 ff.
- Plautine metre, nuances in, 99 ff.
- Polybius, sources of book x., 197
- Posidonius, 110
- Powell (J. U.), ἔρρε κακὴ γλήνη, 165
λεπά βέστεια, 165
νέποδες καλῆς Ἀλοσύδηνης, 125
- Sappho, book i.; the *Nereid* ode, 163 ff.
- Saturnians, 36 f.
in Faliscan and Paelignian, 54
- Schoch (Carl), the earliest visible phase of the moon, 194
- school tablets, Greek and Coptic, 197
- Scipionic inscriptions, the, 169 ff.
- Seleucid kings, grants of land by, 195
- serenades, 110
- Smiley (M. T.), the MSS. of Callimachus' *Hymns*, 57 ff., 113 ff.
- Sophoclea, 126 ff.
- Sophocles, *Ajax*, 601-3, 106 f.
- Sparta's peace with Persia, 197 f.
- Steuart (Ethel Mary), the earliest narrative poetry of Rome, 31 ff.
- subjunctive mood, 51
- SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS, 49 ff., 110 ff., 195 ff.
- American Journal of Philology, 49, 110, 195
- Berliner philologische Wochenschrift, 49
- Bodleian Quarterly Record, 110
- Classical Philology, 50, 110 f., 195 ff.
- Classical Weekly, 50
- Glotta, 198
- Hermathena, 51
- Hermes, 51 f., 112, 197 f.
- Indogermanische Forschungen, 53 ff.
- Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique, 56
- Mnemosyne, 52, 111 f.
- Rassegna Italiana, 52 f.
- Revue de Philologie, 53, 112, 198
- σύν with genitive in κουρή, 29
- Tacitus, date of the *Dialogus*, 52
- Ten generals, the, 111
- Thebais, Homer as the poet of the, 195 f.
- Theocritus, Aeolic forms in, 52
- Theophrastus, his 'characters,' 52
some emendations in the Fragments, 166 ff.
- Theramenes, 111
- τοῦ with infinitive, 26 ff.
- Ullman (B. L.), Caesar's funeral in Lucan viii. 729-735, 75 ff.
- Vellicae (in Spain), 110
- Vindiciae Platonicae III., 1 ff.
- Virgil, the ablative case in, 183 ff.
the singular *nos* in, 177 ff.
- Weir (Robert), Apuleius glosses in the Abolita glossary, 41 ff., 107
- Whatmough (J.), *fordus* and *fordicidia*, 108 f.
'wilful exaggeration, a,' 174

Achilles 9
34
16
6 (1)
Acta S. M. 17 (1)
30
Aeschylus
Agamemnon
Prometheus
Suppliant Women
Androcidae
i. (d)
Antiphon 123
Apuleius
Metamorphoses
Aristophanes
Achilles
Ethica
Pol. 108
Athenaeus
Diplos
Cicero : ad Atticus
Demosthenes xvii
Diogenes i. 2
Dionysius Arcanus
Euripides
Alcestis
Bacchae
Fra
Herodotus v. 1
ix
Homer : Iliad x
Odyssey
Horace
Epistles
Satyrus
'Odes'
Ode
Inscriptions
Athens
'Odes'
(1)

II.—INDEX LOCORVM.

Achilles Tatius :—

i. 9 (4, 5) 8; ii. 7 (5), 9 (3), 15 (3), 19 (3),
34 (3) 8; iv. 12 (1) 8; v. 10 (6) 8 f., 12 (2),
16 (5), 17 (8), 21 (1) 9; viii. 1 (5), 5 (5),
6 (13), 8 (1, 2) 9, 8 (3, 13), 10 (3) 10.

Acta S. Marinarie, ed. Usener :—

17 (12) 24; 19 (13), 24 (1) 22; 29 (11, 17),
30 (18) 28

Aeschylus :—

Agamemnon (1230) 165
Prom. Vinct. (440-2) 198
Supplices (713-22) 198

Andocides :—

i. (*de Myst.*) (45) 195, (92) 1

Antiphon :—

123 (20) 25

Apuleius :—

Metam. vi. (8) 198

Aristophanes :—

Ach. (100) 55

Aristotle :—

Eth. Nic. i. (5) 85 ff.; x. 6 (8) 97
Pol. 1342a (11 sqq.) 49

Athenaeus :—

Dip. xv. 42 (690e) 198

Cicero :—

ad Att. xiii. 5 (3) 52

Demosthenes :—

xviii. *De corona* (169) 195

Diogenes Laertius :—

i. 2 (57) 43; x. (16) 112

Dionysius of Halicarnassus :—

Arch. Rom. v. (70) 112

Euripides :—

Alcestis (55) 188

Bacchae (1165) 30

Fragm. (594) 107

Herodotus :—

v. (67) 195 f., (83) 187; vii. (169) 187;
ix. (24) 187

Homer :—

Iliad i. (159) 187; v. (553) 187; vii. (164) 165;
xiii. (83 sqq.) 187
Odyssey iv. (404) 125

Horace :—

Epp. i. 1 (118) 174, 2 (120) 195

Sat. i. 3 (112-3) 196

Odes ii. (17) 174; iii. (4) 195, 14 (11), 26 (7) 49

Inscriptions :—

Ath. Mitt. '88, p. 241 (18), p. 256 (71) 29;

'00, p. 425 (40) 24

C. and B. (7, 26) 25; (28) 26; (41, 43) 29;

(45) 25; (46, 48) 29; (52) 30; (53) 29;

(146) 30; (203) 30; (212, 232) 24; (251) 30;

Inscriptions—continued :—

(261, 289) 24; (297b) 30; (299) 23, 25;
(308, 322) 29; (368) 24; (376) 25; (380) 28;
(389) 26; (394) 28; (411) 26; (420) 23;
(466, 467) 28; (497) 27 f.; (500) 30;
(561) 25; (564) 22, 29; (581) 30; (635) 24;
(636) 29; (656) 28; (657, 658) 23; (680) 30;
(689) 22; (690) 29

C.I.G. (3816) 23; (3848) 24; (3919) 26;
(3960b) 30; (3989b) 26; (4303) 25

C.R. '01 (pp. 436-7) 23

Ditt. O.G.I.S. 505 (5) 30

Gott. gel. Anz. '97 (p. 405) 26

J.H.S. '97 (p. 411, No. 14) 26; '98 (p. 98,
No. 39) 26; '99 (p. 68, No. 16; p. 69,
No. 19) 29; (p. 113, No. 101) 25; (p. 120,
No. 121) 25; (p. 286, No. 13; p. 289,
No. 189) 29; '02 (p. 123, No. 53) 23;
(p. 366, No. 138) 30; (p. 368, No. 104) 23;
(p. 369, No. 143a) 28

J.P. '91 (12a) 25

J.R.S. '12 (p. 80) 23; (p. 92, No. 18) 28;
(p. 92, No. 19) 23; (p. 254, No. 12) 22, 29

Judeich, Hierapolis (305) 29, (327) 26

Kaibel, Epigr. Gr. (393) 30

Pap. Oxy. (119) 24

Ramsay, E.R.P. (pp. 139d, 143a) 23; (p.
144b) 25; (p. 209, No. 6) 23; (p. 220,
No. 18) 28; (p. 345, No. 24) 29

Sterrett, Epig. Journ. (196) 23; (207) 29

Isocrates :—

Archid. (81) 80

Busiris (9) 84, n. 1; (30) 84

Demon. (11) 80

de Pace (16) 78 f.; (36) 79 f.; (46) 80; (56)
80 f.; (75) 83; (85) 83 f.; (86) 81 f.; (87)
82 f.; (89) 83; (113) 84; (135) 83

Panath. (64) 81

Laberius :—

Frag. (77, 148) 105

Livy :—

iii. (19) 174; v. 3 (5) 27; vii. 14 (6-10) 195;
xl. (43) 196

Lucan :—

v. (19) 174; vii. (310) 174, (460-5) 172 ff.;
viii. (729-35) 75 ff.; ix. (175 sqq.) 77

Lucilius (ed. Marx) :—

ix. p. 25 (358-70) 11 ff.

Lucretius :—

i. (271-6) 18; (551-5) 18 f.; iii. (978-1023)
198, (1011-13) 19; iv. (414-9) 19 f.;
(959-61) 20 f.; vi. (43-51) 21

Manilius :—

iv. (44) 175, (350, 369) 176

Musaeus :—

Hero and Leand. (4, 180-1, 246) 49

INDEX LOCORVM

New Testament:—

- Matt.* vii. (6) 24, (15) 30; x. (28) 28; xix.
 (24) 54; xxi. (32) 27; xxvi. (45) 51;
 xxviii. (2) 51
Marc. ix. (41) 26
Luc. i. (74) 28; x. (30) 29; xvii. (1) 27
Act. Ap. xxii. (20) 27, (21) 28
Rom. iii. (23) 30; viii. (12) 27, (32) 30
 1 Cor. iii. (19) 23; iv. (21) 30; xvi. (4) 26
 2 Cor. i. (8) 27; vii. (12) 27
 1 Pet. iv. (2) 23

Ovid:—

- Fast.* iii. (523 sqq.) 51
ex Pont. iv. 16 (33) 52

Oxyrhynchus Papyri:—
 (7) 163 ff.; (119) 24

Pausanias:—

- ix. 9 (5) 195

Pelagian Legends (ed. Usener):—

- p. 7 (20) 30; 10 (1), 11 (8), 12 (12), 13 (7, 9)
 28; 13 (14) 25; 14 (7), 28 (21) 28

Periugilium Veneris:—

- (17, 21, 63, 64, 72, 73, 95) 7

Phaedrus:—

- iii. (34) 99

Philodemus:—

- de Ira*, (fr. e) 198

Pindar:—

- Pyth.* iv. (394) 28

Plato:—

- Eph.* v. (322b) 2

- Ion* (533d) 30

- Laws* (886a) 107

- Phaedrus* (242b, 244c, 246c, 248b) 6; (249d,
 250c, 256e) 7

- Phil.* (13b) 1; (15b, 25d, 47e, 52d, 61d) 2;
 (66a) 2 f.

- Rep.* vii. (517b) 139 ff.

- Symp.* (173d) 3; (174b) 3 f.; (175b, 176b,
 194a) 4; (194c) 4 f.; (197c, 201d, 203e,
 204c, 208c, 209c, 210a) 5; (210d) 5 f.;
 (212e) 6, 197; (223b) 6

- Theat.* (172a, b) 196

Plato Comicus:—

- Incert.* (8) 30

Plautus:—

- Amph.* (42) 101; (59, 63) 54; (103) 103;
 (490) 101

- Aul.* (86, 95, 375) 101; (576) 102

- Bacch.* (152) 104; (504) 26

- Capt.* (85, 86) 104; (192 sq.) 103

- Cas.* (59) 104; (447) 101

- Cist.* (407) 104; (630) 102

- Curc.* (371 sq.) 103; (380 sq.) 102

- Men.* (102) 103; (263 sq.) 104; (330) 101

- Merc.* (6, 10) 104

- Mil. gl.* (53) 174; (502) 102; (820) 104

- Most.* (595) 104; (656) 102

- Pers.* (408) 105

- Poen.* (7) 104

Plautus—continued:

- Pseud.* (456 sq.) 103; (833 sqq.) 102
Rud. (89 sq.) 103; (91) 102; (461 sq.) 103
Stich. (194 sqq.) 103; (361 sq.) 104 n. 2
 (659) 104

- Trin.* (410) 101

- Truc.* (64) 103

- Fr.* (30) 101

Pliny the Younger:—

- Epf.* i. (4) 52; vii. (20) 52

Propertius:—

- iii. 18, (1) 52

Pseudo-Aristotle:—

- Problems* i. (24) 167; xxvi. (25) 166 f.; (48)
 166

Quintilian:—

- i. (9) 111

Sallust:—

- Iugurtha* 38 [10] 49

Seneca:—

- Dial.* iv. (*de ira* ii.) (33) 174

Septuagint:—

- Gen.* 41 (45) 24

- Ex.* 31 (3) 23

- 2 *Chron.* vi. (7) 27

Sextus Empiricus:—

- adu. Math.* iv. (2 sqq.), vii. (91 sqq.) 110

Sophocles:—

- Ajax* (410) 129, (601-3, 712) 106 f.; (1185) 107

- Antig.* (2) 126 f.; (4) 127 f.; (30) 24; (265,
 466 sqq.) 128; (536) 128 f.; (607) 107;

- (755) 129

- El.* (14) 187; (34) 187 f.

- O.C.* (277, 658) 130; (617) 106

- O.T.* (217) 130; (1083) 107

- Phil.* (852) 130

- Trach.* (150, 671) 28; (711) 188

Statius:—

- Silu.* iii. 2 (20) 111

- Theb.* iv. (147) 54

Suetonius:—

- de Gramm.* (4) 111

- Iul.* (84) 75 ff.

Tacitus:—

- Ann.* xiii. (26) 112

Terence:—

- And.* (767) 105

- Eun.* (915) 105

- Haut.* (290, 320, 481) 105

- Hec.* (488, 506) 105

- Phor.* (590, 619, 957) 105

Theophrastus:—

- Frag.* v. (8) 167, (36) 166 f., (40, 48) 167,

- (49, 56) 167 f., (57, 60) 168; vii. (10, 12,

- 15) 168; ix. (13, 37) 168

Thucydides:—

- i. 93 (4) 26; iv. (60) 26, (81) 23

Twelve Tables:—

- viii. (2) 26

Varro:—

- L.L. vi

Virgil:—

- Aen. i.

- 185,

- 184,

- ii. (1)

- 185,

- iv. (5)

- (691)

- 184,

- (300)

- 184;

- 185,

- (646,

- viii. (

- 177,

- (560)

- (481,

- xii. (

- 178,

- 184,

- 178,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

- 184,

Varro :—

L.L. vii. (28) 35 n. 1

Virgil :—

Aen. i. (102) 184, (105, 107) 183, (108, 109) 185, (157) 183, (227) 184, (250-3) 179, (393) 184, (627-9) 178, (655) 184, (676) 178; ii. (139) 179, (148-9) 179 f., (208) 183, (420) 185, (651) 177, (764) 184; iii. (325) 177; iv. (96-7, 307-8) 180, (369, 659-62) 179, (691) 185; v. (53) 184, (609) 183, (662, 696) 184, (821) 183; vi. (71) 178, (106) 185, (300) 184, (327) 49, (358) 174, (462, 675) 184; vii. (91) 185, (196) 184, (225, 269) 185, (293, 4) 180, (414) 185, (561) 184, (646, 733) 178, 184 f., (747, 814) 183; viii. (86 sq.) 183, (96) 185, (266) 184, (397) 177, (514) 178; ix. (446 sq., 525, 528) 181, (560) 178; x. (42, 43) 180, (68, 69) 181, (481, 880) 179; xi. (54, 55) 180, (605) 174; xii. (50, 51) 179, (69, 407, 522) 184, (571) 178, (672) 183, (677) 179, (800) 178, (914) 184

Virgil—*continued*:*Cat. x. (de Sab.)* (1, 2) 50

Ecl. i. (8) 178, (19) 180 f., (31) 179, (44) 178, (67) 184; ii. (7) 177, 179, (44) 179; iii. (44) 178, (72, 80, 81) 179; iv. (1-3) 177; v. (3) 184, (18) 177, (85) 178; vii. (23, 24) 181, (59) 179; viii. (5) 177, (62, 63) 181, (81, 108) 179; ix. (22) 179

Georg. i. (50) 178, (204, 242, 249, 250, 253, 257, 351) 179, (480) 185; ii. (32) 179, (40) 177, (186) 179, (202) 185, (204) 179, (248, 9) 178, (274) 174, (276) 184, (428) 179, (467) 174, (469) 185; iii. (285) 179, (305) 178, (325) 179, (450) 184; iv. (18) 184, (358) 178, (374) 184, (445) 178, (449) 177

Xenophon :—

Lac. v. (9) 30

Zenobius :—

ii. (19) 4

III.—INDEX VERBORVM.

A.—GREEK.

ἀγέτρια, 48	γίνομαι, 56	λειρίδεις, 155
ἀγγρίζειν, 48	γλαυκός, 156	λευκός, 155 f.
ἄγρα, ἀγρέος, ἀγρέω, 186	δαφοινός, 158	λίθος, 55
ἀγρετός, ἀγρέω, 46 ff.	δεῖγμα, 83	λοφύς, λοφνία, 55
άήρ, 55	διχοτομέω, 28	μέλας, 153 f.
ἀθρόοι, 55		μικκός, 86 f., 97
αἴων, 157		μίλτος, 159
Αἰαίη, 55	εικασία, 145	ξανθός, 157 f.
αἴγαλός, 54	ἐπίληψις, 84	ξουθός, 157 f.
αἱρέω, 46 f.	ἐρυθρός, 159	
ἀλίφαλος, 56	ἔρχομαι, 44 ff.	οἴνοψ, 159
ἀλουργός, 160	ἔφεγκεν, 2	οίχομαι, 44
ἀμαρτωλός, 25		ὄπωδον οἴχι, 127
ἀργός, 154 f.	θῆρα, 186	δρφνινος, 161
καρέσταται (<i>Locr.</i>), 187		παλινάγρετος, 48
δρυμαι, 187	Ιη, 106	παρακλανούσθυρον, 110
ἄρχω, 44 f., (mid.) 45	Ιο-, 160	πηλός, 56
αὐθή, 56		πίστις, 144
ἀψευδήνω, 53	καίνω, 54	ποθή, 197
βαίνω, 90, 95 ff.	κακᾶς, 56	πολύός, 156
βλοσνόρός, 56	κατακορής, 153 f.	πολλακίς, 54
Βουλεύς, 198	κελαυνός, 153 f.	πορφύρεος, 159
βραχύς, 56	Κερκινεύς, 198	πράσινος, 161
Γάλλοι, 55	κέστυψος, 56	
γέρρα, 195	κροκωτός, 157	
	κναυ-, 160 f.	

INDEX VERBORVM

πυκρός, 55	συκοφάντης, 197	φοβεῖσθαι with genitive, 28
πυρός, 158	συνήδομαι, 82	φοιν-, 158
φοδόεις, 159	ταραχή, 56	χλωρός, 161 f.
σαλώμη, 56	τιμωρός, 187	χορδή, 109
σανδαράκινος, 158	Τυρταῖος, 55	χόρνος, 108 f.
σαφής, 55	ὑπόληψις, 84	ψάγδαν, 198
σκηρίπτομαι, 47	φαινός, 156	ώχρος, 162

B.—LATIN.

abducit, 170	formica, 56	nouit, 53
amantissimus, 55	fornix, 55	nos, 177 ff.
artemo, 111	forum, 55	opus, 56
calcare, 55	girgillus, 56	pavens, 56
caldus, 108	hordus, 108 f.	puer, 111
canis, 55	ſiv (Osc.), 54	somnus, 55
cisium, 56	imbecillus, 55	squalus, 56
claua, 56	lanista, 54	squama, 56
decrepitus, 55	lardum, 108	tolutim, 56
diuidia, 28	maneo, 52	tortus (noun), 111
dum, 53	mirus, 20	tragicomedia, 54
exilis, 56	mundus, 56	transporto ('cross'), 49
finis (gender), 19	nihil, nil, 51	uel, 56
forda, 109		vespertilis, 51
fordicidia, fordus, 108 f.		utor (octor), 54

ive, 28

), 49